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**Concerning  
the Nature and Structure of Determinants**

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## **PART A**

1/ We shall begin the present Essay with some very general remarks about peculiar features of the, so far recognised, categories of objects.

This will help, by providing the framework in relationship to which, the investigation of the nature and structure of determinants takes its proper place within a systematic inquiry concerning the fundamental structure of Reality.

It is to be understood that the mentioned peculiar features of categories will be given in a very rough and sketchy form, and indeed in a provisional way.

Some scanty, negative hints towards the "position" of space and time in the sketched structure, are not intended for anything more than a forward reference to our next Essay, where that "position" will receive separate examination.

2/ A concrete thing is a thing which is concrete. Things are objects, though not all objects are things. Not being engaged here in a detailed investigation of supracategorical similarities (if there really are any) and differences, and, hence, with whether 'object' is said "in one or in many ways" (to connect with Aristotelian themes), I may be permitted to remark on the present occasion only the following.

Grosso modo, an entity is an object having, in some way, characters or properties, and, despite this multiplicity, having a certain unity; in my technical terminology, it is a unitary object having a forma essendi<sup>I</sup> of its own.

Ties and facts are not entities. For ties do not differ, one from another, *qua* ties; they only differ *qua* connecting different (categories of) objects, i.e. they differ by and in virtue of what they connect and not on their own or in themselves. (Contrast with relations: these instead of differing by relating different things, rather relate different things because they are in themselves different---in respect of their own intrinsic nature).

Similarly with facts; they differ only in so far as their constituents differ. Indeed, facts even lack the necessary unity of an entity: they comprise as proper parts (I do not mean, of course, physical or even logical parts) or rather <sup>as</sup> elements and components (constituents) objects of different categories (in fact, of all other already recognised categories).

Concrete things, determinants and instances are entities. For firstly, they have the necessary unity which is lacked by facts. Admittedly, concrete things and instances are constituted by their respective connections with determinants; yet they do not comprise determinants as parts or determinants constituents. And again, though it may indeed be said that concrete things comprise instances as parts; yet on the one hand instances may be called "parts" of concrete things in a very peculiar sense, indeed in the sense properly explicated by invoking the notion not of part (logical, metaphysical or physical) but of inherence; and on the other hand, even though concrete things comprise instances, they are not just the totality of their instances (whereas facts just are the corresponding concrete thing and the determinant and the tie---considering facts in their transcendent dimension alone). Further,

Correction in  
notes  
Supplemental

concrete things rather give unity to their(inhering)set of instances than acquiring one by the inherence of an intrinsically unitary set of instances. (Remember that properties, and hence instances, include accidental ones. Contrast again with facts. ).

Concrete things, determinants and instances being entities, they fall further into two groups. The fundamental division here would be satisfaction or not<sup>2</sup> of the condition that an entity's existence is just its having its forma essendi (its having the forma essendi it has), just its being that which it is. Entities satisfying this further condition are things.

We have argued<sup>3</sup> that both concrete things and determinants, each in its different way, do satisfy the condition. But instances fail to do so. For an instance, that which it is (its forma essendi) is constituted by its being connected through the instantiation-tie with the determinant of which it is an instance. Still, its existence is constituted by its inherence in the concrete thing in which it inheres, even though it inheres in just that concrete thing which is determined by the determinant of which the instance is an instance.

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2. For the second time we seem to violate the rule according to which principles of division ought not to be constituted by "is/is not"-dichotomies. But I do not think that such dichotomies effected by the consideration of the obtaining or not of a certain condition are necessarily or even in general wrong. I should rather think that they are necessarily incomplete, in that they require a positive account of their negative side, that is an explanation of the reason why what falls under the negative side does not satisfy the dividing condition; and such an account or explanation cannot proceed but from the (positive) characters or nature of that which is put into the negatively defined branch. So that the dichotomies in question are rather incomplete than incorrect, as reflecting a dominant interest in describing (or epistemologically effecting) the division.

In the present second division we shall indicate the required positive account, and even in the first one we gave some hints towards it.

We arrive therefore at the point where an account of the distinction between concrete things and determinants is needed, an account to be built upon their both being things in the explicated sense,--and indeed all the things. Evidently then the distinction must relate to the way and manner in which they are things: concreteness and abstractness must, on this count, be modi of thingness, so to speak.

3/ Before proceeding, let it be remarked that the divisions (structuring the objects) which we have described till now are effected without any reference whatsoever to space and time. Not even an indirect (but essential) use was required.<sup>4</sup> And this, so far, was only to be expected. But if we also succeed in dividing things into concrete and abstract ones without essential (direct or indirect) recourse to space and time, the question concerning the (metaphysical) possibility of concrete things not existing in space and even time would cease, I conceive, to appear to call for an unreservedly unqualified negative answer, with serious repercussions on the metaphysical treatment of space and time.

4/ But let us continue the discussion from section 2.

We say:

Concrete things are things whose forms essential is constituted (i.e. which are what they are) in a certain way. We may formulate the general features of this way, in the following propositions:

4.

Obviously, one cannot say that such a reference was in fact made, in that we have referred to determinants, and these include spatiotemporal characters (if they do so include them). On that count, one would have to hold that an indirect and essential reference was also made to colours.

The *forma essendi* of a concrete thing is constituted by:

i/ its being determined by way of (ontological) proper predication,

ii/ its being multifariously and completely so determined,

iii/ its being so determined by determinants, i.e. by things belonging to another category of object, indeed to the other category of things,

iv/ its being determined in a way which leaves it not identical with its complete determination, or, to be more precise, with the totality of the inhering instances of the determinants determining it. In a variant formulation, a concrete thing is not identical with its *forma essendi*--- and this for a certain reason.

Now we append some auxiliary, explicatory notes.

Ad (i) : The full significance of "being determined by way of (ontological) proper predication" will, naturally, emerge only from a combined consideration of all our analyses of proper predication conducted till now, plus a juxtaposition of it together with other kinds of predication to be distinguished from it (for instance sortal and substantial predication; example for the first: a is (a) philosopher; for the second: a is (a) man).

Ad (ii) :

a/ To be completely determined is to be determined in the way of proper predication by a complete determination---the latter notion having been explicated repeatedly, but more satisfactorily, I should dare say, in Essay VI, pp. 3-5. I add here, firstly, as something being understood, that any determination permissibly, but not obligatorily<sup>5</sup>, not

5.

Permissibly not included: being a determination which is not necessitated by a relevant  $L_1$ -law as a result of any determination included. Not obligatorily not included: being a determination whose inclusion in the set would not violate a relevant  $L_2$ -law, given what is included. The laws are metaphysical laws. See further Essay VI, loc.cit. and context.

included in such a complete determination is considered as not applying to the subject "defined" through it: it is not the case that it is left undetermined whether it applies or not. But secondly, I should also wish to add a further condition, to those already enumerated in the above referred passage:

c<sub>4</sub>/ a set of determinations, in order to constitute a complete determination of an (existing or possible) concrete thing, must also not violate, either by way of addition or by way of omission, any metaphysical law, even such which happen not to derive their validity from the structured system of determinants as structured---in case there be such metaphysical laws.

The meaning and significance of this condition, or rather reservation, will become clearer when we shall come to the details of the problems concerning the nature and structure of determinants.

b/ To be multifariously determined (always by way of proper predication) is:

1/ to require, for any given determination, other determinations, and indeed,

2/ to require, for any given determination, other determinations belonging to various other series of determinable-determinate.

In fact, not only a determination of a concrete thing requires other determinations (and also such of other kinds, for that matter), but even a non-determination of such a thing requires other determinations and non-determinations, of the same and other kinds.

We can easily reformulate (2) so as to run:

2'/ to have more than one absolutely determinate determinations, for these cannot possibly belong to the same "tree" (I mean: to a structure with one given "head" or summit or top-point),

and hence the subject must, in such a case, be determined by more than one series of determinants (connected to each other, by means of the determinate/determinable "relation"), and consequently, because different series or lines of one and the same "tree" are incompatible, by more than one such trees of determinants.

As it turns out, (b) is really included in (a); and this is so, whether we assume that determinants are structured by at least another "relation" than that of the determinable/determinate one---and also, whether we operate with the further notion of valid metaphysical laws not grounded at all on the structure of determinants, as it was hinted just above. But I have chosen to mention it separately, in order to bring into relief features of concrete-thingness useful for our analyses, though admittedly implicit in (a).<sup>6</sup>

Ad (iii) : The contrast with the constitution of determinants will become clearer as the exposition of the latter develops.

Ad (iv) : We note, by the way, how some formulations of the so-called problem whether a concrete thing is identical with its properties or attributes, are philosophically inexact, by being systematically inarticulate. For a thing's having a property is something waiting for philosophical analysis; and we have seen how this analysis, in order to be adequate, has to be split into two dimensions, one transcendental (towards determinants in themselves) and one immanent (towards instances). The supposed question then, could not but be the one relating to the thing and the totality of instances inhering in it. Of course, from our point of view, to countenance the identity of a concrete thing with "its" instances (the instances inhering in it), is (not to mention anything else)

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6.

For the notion of multifarious determination see also Essay I.

to countenance an impossibility of the most fundamental kind: a categorial one (categorial in our strict sense, not to be confused with the relatively weak sense in which one may speak of category mistakes involved in a statement like: "this stone is clever").

Clearly then, a concrete thing "has" its forma essendi; it is not identical with it. To put the matter half-linguistically: the sense of 'be' in which a concrete thing is what (collectively and in its totality) it is, is the predicative sense of 'be'---i.e., the same sense of 'be' in which the said thing is also anything that it is separately (anything, that is, included in its forma essendi, which again is in its turn the totality of everything that the mentioned thing is)---and not the 'be' of identity.

We may find it interesting to notice, that what is really involved in a claim of identity of a thing with its attributes, is an impasse in the form of a dilemma with both its horns "blind" and untenable: Either one would be committed to hold that the connection between a thing and any one of its properties is really a kind of identity relation (just as the connection of a thing with the totality of its attributes is identity tout court)<sup>7</sup>. Or, seizing the other horn, in order to avoid such an unwelcome conclusion, one may try to emphasise that it is the totality of the attributes which is claimed to be identical with the thing itself, and, since the totality of x's is something ontologically different (perhaps even categorially, in the strict sense, different) from any singular x, therefore he is not at all committed to the thesis that the relationship holding between a thing and any one of its attributes is fundamentally and ultimately of the same sort with the one holding between a thing and the totality of its attributes. But in such a case, he will find

7.

The kind of identity relation mentioned may be called 'partial identity' and may be assimilated to the partial identity of a part with the whole to which it belongs as forming a part; or it may be connected, in the meaning-theoretical or even linguistic

himself in a situation of trying to do justice to the predicative connection by keeping it distinct from any kind of identity simple or partial, with the result (because of the defectiveness of his conception in general) of either disfiguring the membership (or the part-whole, as the case may be) connection, or introducing just what he sets to avoid, or once more dislocating predication by another assimilation: for either he would be obliged to assimilate (really: to identify) the relation which he holds to obtain between the totality of attributes and each one attribute (be it a connection of a class to its members or of a whole to its parts) to predication; or he will be really reintroducing the conception of the reduction of predication to (partial) identity, in case, that is, in which he holds that the totality of the attributes concerned has each separate attribute as part; or, finally, he would have to claim that predication is really in no significant way different from the connection holding between a class and its members, in the case, of course, in which he construes the relationship between the said totality of attributes and each one of its constituents as a case of the membership connection.

It is then clear that somewhere in the vicinities of the examined view confusion and indeed absurdity is bound to occur. By abolishing concrete things as separate (not factually, or in respect of things, but conceptually, or in respect of being<sup>8</sup>) and distinct from the totalities of their attributes, he is inexorably led to dislocate or do violence to someone or other of the connections mentioned. (Of course, one may, if he deems it worthwhile, pursue the chase

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level, with the doctrine of common names, as used in the hands of a nominalist metaphysician with the aim of avoiding the positing of characters in themselves as existents. (Compare with Hobbes).

8.

For the distinction see below, section 13. The distinction does not coincide with the distinction between separate in thought and in reality. For example, a conceptual (truly and validly so---goes without saying) separation being a separation in respect of being, is a separation in reality.

by placing such a view against an adequate representation of the whole interlaced field, so as to bring into relief all the various shortcomings to which it is incurably subject).

Again we must notice, that the contrast with the case of determinants, as well as the whole significance of the above sketched peculiar features of concrete things, cannot be clearly seen before a corresponding examination of determinants takes place.

5/ We see then, that we were able to "define" after some fashion concrete-thingness, and thus to distinguish concrete things as a kind of things. More than this, we may claim to have succeeded in effecting this division or distinction by and in reference to the principle or fundamental feature which properly characterises things as things (in their being things) in contradistinction from other categories of object. For the this distinction of concrete things was effected by further specifications of the mode in which they have or are correlated to their corresponding *formae essendi*, and of the way this affects their identity and existence. So that we have conformed, in this at least respect, to the requirements of valid philosophical division, according to which one must proceed by further *per se* specifications of already adduced differentia.

6/ Just in order for a taste of the spirit of our methodological procedures to be given, let me remark the following regarding the estimation of the degree and manner such analyses as the above bear on the problem of the possibility of the existence of concrete things not in space

and time.

Consider the following hasty move: Someone may think that our task in answering that problem is already completed---in the sense that only further elaboration of what have been said is required by now. For, he may say, in succeeding to isolate, as it were, the category of concrete things from all other kinds of object without any essential (direct or indirect) recourse to the notions of space and time, we have exactly performed what could be reasonably demanded from us in attempting to solve the mentioned problem.

But it is not good to say so, at the present stage of development. And this, not because of any Kantian transcendental reasons, nor because of any reasons concerning empirical meaningfulness---but simply because of genuine rationalistic demands. For if we were to say things like the above rehearsed, we would not be real adherents of the methodology of systematic investigation in philosophy. Structurally, remarks like the above, are congenial only to people insisting on separating problems and treating, inquiring, arguing and judging regarding each one of them in isolation (on its own right---as the phrase might run). Contrariwise with us: problems come in blocks and depend one upon another in ways extremely significant regarding their solution---and this holds in philosophy as everywhere, and much more in philosophy than anywhere else. Truly, we may see them dividing naturally into clusters (each one of them answering, very roughly, to the traditional philosophical disciplines), but then, within a cluster, (not to say anything about cluster-dependencies) the interconnection requires a system--- and indeed, if you like, no less than a system can even aspire to save even the phenomena, provided you are interested in their totality and entirety.

(ed) / So that even if we concede that we have satisfactorily clarified in respect to difficulties examined till now (and again, of course, by the whole of our investigation) what it is to be a concrete thing without recourse to space and time, yet there still remains, for an acceptably adequate

solution of the problem in question, the task of studying the nature of space and time themselves. For, of course, we are in no way entitled to prejudge that in pursuing the inquiry into this last problem, we shall not face the necessity (dictated to us by Reason---as the traditional phrase might run) of reforming our previous results and claims, of even restructuring our so far constructed system, just because of the systematic interconnections and, hence, repercussions. In our present case, difficulties arising in our more detailed inquiry towards a metaphysical account of space and time, might well lead to drastic revisions even regarding the already proposed divisions of objects.

So little then, against a possible misapprehension of our methodology.

7/ What now, we should ask, is the position of determinants vis-a-vis the above proposed specification of concrete-thingness?

And, generally, what is the manner of constitution for determinants, the way they are in themselves constituted? We may notice here that we come to the core of the platonic problem of the communion of ideas<sup>9</sup>.

But firstly a terminological remark, for the sake of convenience. We have introduced and used 'determine' and its cognates technically, to signify the connection we were trying to elucidate, i.e. (ontological) proper predication. Hence the analysis into determined things, determinants, etc.

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9.

But only to the core, so to speak. For there is this main difference between Plato's platonism on the one hand and (some) Neoplatonic platonism and our own on the other: grosso modo, Plato (according to the interpretation we hold) moves towards the hypostatization of all (valid) concepts as the self-subsistent and separate objects of our concept-ions; but we, hesitatingly, try to de-hypostatize all (our) concepts and not speculate about abstract things in terms of peculiarities of conceptual structures as such, though of course bound to use features pertaining to conceptual structures as representations of the structure of reality.

But now, while intending to continue speaking of determinations etc. in this special, technical sense, we may also avail ourselves of a use of such expressions to signify the more general, though equally perhaps technical, notion of determinateness, irrespective of the specific fashion after which it is constituted. So that the determinateness of concrete things is a "result" of (better: is constituted or brought about by) their being determined, and indeed of (or by) their being determined in the special sense of the term. Similarly and dissimilarly, in the case of determinants, our terminological extension permits (without, of course, any peremptoriness) us to say that their determinateness (the one they have) is again constituted by some, further to be specified determination --- though, obviously, not by the special determination we have spoken of, almost exclusively till now.

Having availed ourselves of this expedience, we observe, firstly, negatively:

i' / <sup>10</sup> The forma essendi of determinants, and therefore their determinateness, is not "built up" or constituted by their being determined by way of proper predication. Obviously so: to try to view determinants at all as the metaphysical subjects (determined things) of proper predication (even irrespective of their being constituted in that which they are by them or not) is to entertain the obtaining of a categorial impossibility.

(ii' / So much, also, is safe to claim even at the beginning of an analysis of the nature of determinants: however they may be constituted and determined (wide sense), they are not so constituted and determined by way of their connection (whatever this may specifically be) with objects belonging to a category of object other than that to which they themselves belong. Indeed, given our notions of "connection" and "tie" 'ties being connections holding among objects belonging

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10. (i') and, below, (ii') are meant to contrast with (i) and (ii) respectively, at the beginning of section 4.

to different categories), it will suffice to say that determinants are not constituted by any "tying" connections, by any "tyings".

8/ But how is, then, a determinant (positively) constituted in what it is?

From what we have said till now, it is clear that determinants are structured by the determinable/determinate "relation", and further that they are essentially so structured, i.e. such a structure and the "relation" producing or sustaining it, pertain to determinants universally, necessarily and per se (qua determinants)<sup>II</sup>.

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II.

I may be permitted to append here the following explanations. We distinguish two basic senses of 'essential': one applying to concrete things, or rather pertaining to (some) properties of a given concrete thing, singling them out from the totality of all its properties by contrasting them to accidental ones and propria. This is the sense explored and explicated in Essay III. On the other hand we recognise a different sense of that expression and its cognates, applying to kinds either of concrete things or of determinants or indeed of any objects whatever, or rather to characteristics or features considered as belonging to such kinds. In this sense, we say that a kind K has essentially the characteristic C (or exhibits it, or equivalently that C is an essential feature of K) if and only if:

a/ C applies universally to K; that is, it applies to each and every object falling under K.

b/ C applies necessarily to K; that is, it is (metaphysically or logically or categorially) necessary that C belongs to K.

c/ C applies to K as such (qua K), or it pertains per se to it, or rather K is per se C.

Notice first that condition (b) does not in itself guarantee the imposition of the requirement that K be necessarily C, in the sense which entails that each and every object falling under K must be C. For example, even (evenness) necessarily belongs to number, but numbers are not necessarily even. Evidently, a necessary belonging in sense (b) together with a universal belonging, constitutes an ordinary necessity.

We maintain that the said "relation", call it 'D-D "relation"', is the only one appearing to pertain essentially to determinants. By this, we do not mean to deny that some features of the structure of determinants, and indeed of the determinants concerned as (qua) these exactly determinants, may or are in truth due to some other "relations" of a different kind holding among determinants; on the contrary, we have repeatedly try to distinguish connections of an altogether different sort than that of the D-D ones<sup>12</sup>. What we do claim is

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Secondly, condition (c) considered as distinct from (b) as well as from the conjunction of (a) and (b), may seem controversial. In this place, I can only give a brief explicatory "definition" and an example.

C does not belong per se to K, or, alternatively, K (in its entirety or partially) is not per se C iff C belongs to K (if at all) not qua K but qua K'. So, for instance, equilateral triangles have the sum of their angles equalling to two right angles--- but not qua equilateral triangles; only qua triangles. Therefore the characteristic of having the sum of their angles equalling to two right angles belongs to them indeed universally, and even necessarily, yet not per se. We may say that a not-per-se-belonging-characteristic belongs derivatively (secondarily etc.) to what it belongs. And then continue by saying that a characteristic belonging not derivatively but primarily, belonging to a subject just in so far as the subject is the subject it is (in modern misleading idiom: just under the description under which it is identified or considered), belongs to it per se.

Notice, thirdly, that these distinctions cut through the various kinds of necessity mentioned in (b).

(The distinctions are modelled, of course, on Aristotelian doctrines).

12.

See, for example, Essay V, pp. 9-12; Essay VI, pp. 1ff. But the problem has not been as yet treated adequately or even satisfactorily.

that any other relation allegedly holding among determinants, does not pertain essentially to them, at least for the reason that it does not hold universally in their field; it may, of course, belong necessarily, and even, perhaps, per se to those determinants to which it truly applies---but this is quite different from belonging in addition universally to determinants, and consequently, in conjunction with the other features mentioned, to determinants as such. (I have in mind connections like the supposed one between being coloured and being extended).

The above indicated apparent uniqueness of the D-d"relation", if correct, entitles us, even gnosologically, to approach the problem of the constitution of determinants by means of the privileged "relation".

9/ Suppose that  $P_1$ -ness is the proximate determinable of  $P_2$ -ness.

We ask: Is the subsistence of both  $P_1$ -ness and  $P_2$ -ness of one and the same sort, on one par or footing as it were, or is there any significant difference regarding their subsistence? More articulatedly: regarding the two mentioned determinants, is the constitution of what they are and of their being what they are different in each case---or, perhaps better, is their being constituted so as to be defined or determined by their respective *formae essendi* different in each case or not?

But what kind of difference are we interested in? Surely, they differ in that they have different *formae essendi*---though intimately connected ones: in this sense, of course, they, and hence also their subsistence in general, are different, other. However, this is not to the point. Our problem consists rather here in the query, Whether the subsistence of the one is similar to that of the other, in respect of their

both subsisting independently of each other or not. The point is the dependent or independent (on each other) character of their subsistence, not their existence itself or other differences concerning their respective *formae essendi*.

But let us proceed towards a more precise and adequate formulation of the problem.

Determinants being things, they have their existence consist in just their being that which they are, in just their having the *forma essendi* characterising or determining (in the wide sense) them or constituting them as the things they are. To mark the peculiarities regarding the *modus existendi* of determinants, discussed in Essay VII, part A, we may call their particular way of existing 'subsistence'. We then are able to say: the subsistence of a determinant consists in its having the *forma essendi* constituting it as the thing it is.

But now we have already remarked<sup>I3</sup> that determinants are not constituted or determined in their being or nature by way of proper predication, nor are they at all so constituted or determined through a connective tie (be it comparable to proper predication or not) to objects belonging to any other category, other, that is, than their own. The question, then, immediately arises, whether they are constituted, wholly or partially, by "relations" to objects belonging to the same category with them, i.e. to determinants. And indeed, the question becomes more pressing due to the circumstance that one kind (and only one according to our contention above) of such "relation", namely the D-D "relation", naturally suggests itself as fulfilling the role of determination in question.

As a result of this, we are faced with two initial alternatives:

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I3.

In (iii\*) above, p. 13.

A/ Determinants are what they are, not in virtue of any connection with anything. They are not constituted or determined as the things they are by any kind of connection to any kind of object. Let us call this independence of determinants respecting their constitution and, hence, their subsistence 'self-sufficiency' (metaphysical, of course!). To be noticed that this is much more than the independence ascribed to them in Essay VII, Part A, which was merely independence from the nexus of exemplification or determination in strict sense, i.e. proper predication. WE say then, according to the present alternative: determinants are self-sufficient in their being (both, of course, in their being-something and in their being-simpliciter); they subsist self-sufficiently as regards their constitution----or they have self-subsistence.

B/ Contrariwise with the second alternative. Determinants are generally constituted through their mutually standing in D-D "relations" to each other. (The 'generally' is required at this stage, because the present alternative covers in fact a variety of sub-alternatives to be distinguished below). We may say, seeing things from this point of view, that determinants are what they are and subsist, independently of any connection to any kind of object, save of their own D-D "relations" to some other determinants (different in each case). Determinants are independent in their being, from anything else than other determinants and "relations" to them. Their self-sufficiency is almost perfect; it is independence in being from anything external to them--- and only restricted by their own structured system, each one being dependent on that part of it, with which it enters into connecting "relations". Their self-subsistence is relative, though relative on account of their own inter-determinations alone.

To put it briefly:

According to (A) determinants stand in the "relations" they stand and form the structured system they form in virtue of their being what they are.

According to (B) determinants are, in general, what they are in virtue of their standing in the "relations" they stand and of being constituents of the structured

system to which they belong.

IO/ At a second step of division, we distinguish various forms which alternative (B) may assume.

One subdivision of it may effected, by bringing for it to bear the distinction between D-D "relations" and such other special "relations" contributing to the structuring of determinants into a unified system, as they may happen (or better, be the case) to hold among them --- whether they are of one kind or of several. Taking into account this distinction, we may divide (B) according to

Whether some (at least) structuring "relations" other than the universally and essentially structuring D-D "relation", are also constitutive, in some way or other, of the being of determinants which they connect,

Or not, and only D-D "relations" are constitutive, in the way they are.

We may christen these subalternatives 'B'' and 'B''' respectively.

II/ Another, and perhaps more important, subdivision of (B) really crosses through the former division. Yet, I shall expound it, for simplicity's sake and because we shall not be occupied for the time being with problems concerning that division, as if it were a subdivision of (B'') solely.

We may take notice, firstly, that the D-D "relation" is an irreflexible and asymmetrical (not simply non-symmetrical) one --- the second, provided, of course, that we "direct" it. So we may, for example, signify the two possible

"directions" by writing ' $D_b - D_t$ ' and ' $D_t - D_b$ ' respectively, in such a way that, in the case of our standard example (or rather, example-schema), we would have truly, that  $P_1$ -ness( $D_b - D_t$ ) $P_2$ -ness, and also that  $P_2$ -ness( $D_t - D_b$ ) $P_1$ -ness. (We shall try to avoid this notation, as it is relatively plain in each particular case, from the context, what is really required.)

Now the noticed "directedness" of the "relation" at hand, suggests or rather hints towards the following principle of further division.

The general contention, in which alternative (B) consists, being to the effect that determinants are constituted (in what they are) by their standing in D-D "relations" one to another, a principle of division is naturally demanded differentiating the *prima facie* possible specific ways of such a constitution (or determination of their being). And indeed, we may distinguish three such general ways, jointly exhaustive of the theoretically available possibilities and singly exclusive of each other. These are:

I/ The determinate determinant, qua determinate, is constituted (partly at least) by its standing in the D-D "relation" to its determinable. But the corresponding (proximate) determinable is not constituted at all by its standing in the (converse) D-D "relation" to its said determinate determinant.

II/ The determinate determinant is not constituted by its standing in the D-D "relation" to its proximate determinable, but the latter is so constituted by its entering into the (converse) D-D "relation" with the former.

III/ Both entities (indeed things) standing in the D-D "relation" are constituted in their natures by their so standing in it---though, perhaps, the constitution is effected in different ways in the two cases: the point is that their entering into that "relation" constitutes them in some way or other.

12/ Before embarking on a systematic investigation of the matter, we may remark that while according to the subalternative (II), absolutely determinate determinants are the really absolutely independent and self-sufficient in their being abstract things, on the contrary, in accordance with view (I), such existential independence and nature-self-sufficiency pertains only to the highest genera under which all abstract things fall via the D-D<sup>n</sup> relation<sup>14</sup>, i.e. to the categories within the category of determinants or abstract things. In a general opposition to both these conceptions, alternative (III) denies in effect absolute<sup>14</sup> independence and self-sufficiency to all and any determinant on whatever level of determinateness. (The precise content and implications of such a denial will have to be investigated below).

To add, in a preliminary fashion, significant historical perspective, we observe that, disregarding for a moment the circumstance that our determinants are rather really subsisting characters in themselves than species and genera (in strict sense) of concrete things, view (II) articulates some central and essential feature of the Aristotelian system, whereas view (I) corresponds broadly to one major structural tendency of the Platonic doctrine, for the development of which one must compare Neoplatonic metaphysics. Finally, view (III) may be held to be ascribable to Spensipus, in the sense that it may be held to represent an articulate formulation of what can be speculatively extracted from the slender evidence concerning the philosopher's theory. But anyway, we shall have occasion to return to these interpretative attempts.

We only now remark, that the difference (disregard of which I have asked for immediately above) between our determinants and second substances (i.e. species and genera of concrete things) is not identical with the difference

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14.

I say 'absolute', because determinants are at any rate independent in their being of anything else than their own structured system.

between the accidental and the essential. For on the one hand there are items essentially pertaining to the things to which they belong, and yet not being species or genera of concrete things; namely, specific differences (in strict sense, not according to our appropriation) dividing a genus to its species (in order to refer to a clear case). And on the other hand, our determinants include both accidental and essential characters, as Essay III has, hopefully, shown. The difference between the two mentioned differences and distinctions rather consists in that the first draws a distinction between the character-like and the substantial, whereas the second amounts to the distinction of the accidental from the essential in a sense of 'essentiality' which does not coincide with substantiality. But of all this, later on. (I remark, that 'essential' in the above paragraph covers primarily essentiality in the sphere of concrete things, but it can also be extended so as to cover essentiality as regards kinds of object in general<sup>15</sup>).

13/ Determinants being things, their existence is their being what they are, their "having"<sup>16</sup> the forma essendi which they have. But what (sort of) forma essendi do they have?

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14. See n. 11 above.

15. The double inverted commas round 'having' are not intended only to call attention to a philosophical use of 'have', but also to indicate a particular, specific philosophical use, ~~very~~ different presently to be contrasted with the equally philosophical yet very different use of the same word in locutions like 'a concrete thing's "having" the forma essendi which it has'.

Evidently, what a determinant is must be closely connected with what a concrete thing is in case that it is determined by the said determinant. For, say, P-ness just is what determines a concrete thing when this is P. It is that, by reason<sup>16</sup> of which and in virtue of their determination by which, concrete things are what they are, in the particular respect in which we consider them, i.e. as being P.

We may also say, that P-ness is the formal cause of all concrete things which are P in respect of their being P, or better, the formal cause of the being P of any and every concrete thing which is P.

But here we must carefully draw a distinction, the non-observance of which results in grave confusion--- both in systematic and interpretative philosophy.

Suppose that a is P. Then P-ness is the cause or ground of a's being P, not necessarily of a's being P. This is what we mean in saying that P-ness is the formal cause of a's being P. We shall call correspondingly 'efficient cause' of a's being P, the ground of or what effects a's being P, the cause or "reason" of a's being P, that in virtue of which a succeeds in being P. The formal causes account for the parts or constituents of the forma essendi of concrete things; efficient causes account for the having, on the part of the concrete things concerned, of the said constituents in the forma essendi.

Notice that efficient causes, as here defined, are not causes of a concrete thing's existence tout court. Thought it must be admitted that they somehow contribute to the existence. But it is not here the proper place to pursue an investigation into this and connected problems further on.

Surely one may elaborate in the above proposed distinction. But we shall assume as clear that the two notions of formal and efficient cause are distinct.

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16. The 'reason' here should be interpreted ontologically, one may say, so as to coincide in all essentials with 'cause' in respect of meaning, the latter conceived again, in a markedly ontological fashion, as a ground of being in general. (Compare with the relevant uses of

Formal and efficient cause are notionally distinct, or, what amounts to the same thing seen, as it were, from the other end of it, they are distinct in respect of being. (In case that this sounds like a paradox, notice that, as we have already remarked, something notional, to speak very generally, is not just something conceived in thought in so far as it is simply conceived in thought, but is something correctly or with (good---really a superfluity) Reason so conceived. And, of course, the Norm of Reason is Reality---to utter a slogan).

But then the question arises of whether formal and efficient cause are also "factually" distinct, or distinct in respect of the objects or entities which are formal or efficient causes. For one may construe the distinction between notional and factual identity/sameness/difference/otherness, as the distinction, regarding two (valid) concepts A and B, between on the one hand the identity/etc. of being A with being B, and on the other hand the identity/etc. of that which is A with that which is B. Notice that, on this account, it is just as well possible for two objects to be notionally the same in respect of a certain concept (in that they fall under one and the same kind or in that they exhibit one and the same character, or, in general, ~~th~~ in that they present themselves under one and the same form of being---namely, the kind or the character or, in general, the form of being whose concept the said concept is), as it is possible for one and the same object to be notionally diverse, in that it coexemplifies two or more distinct kinds or characters or, in general, forms of being. In the latter case, we may formulate the circumstance by some such proposition as that "the A is notionally different from, but factually identical with, the B", just as we may express the former case by the use of some such sentence as 'the A is notionally the same though factually

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corresponding words in Ancient Greek, Medieval and Rationalistic (as a historical movement) metaphysics.

different from the A'. (In the former proposition, of course, 'the A' and 'the B' refer to the same object as two beings, in the latter sentence 'the A' and 'the A' refer to two different objects as one (in) being). Yet, if such statements sound illegitimate or defective, we may revert to the explication given above<sup>I7</sup>.

We agree then that to be a formal cause and to be an efficient one of a's being P (of the fact that a is P), are two different, distinct "things" or circumstances. But still, is it necessarily the case that what is a formal cause is also an efficient one? Further, is it necessarily the case that the entailment holds in the reverse direction? Still further, if the answer to both previous questions is negative, is it possibly the case that what is a formal cause should also be an efficient one?<sup>I8</sup>

We have seen that the formal cause of a's being P is P-ness itself. The above questions might then rephrase themselves in the following main question:

Could P-ness be also an efficient cause, the fact's efficient cause?

Obviously not. For if this could be so, then a would have to be P during all the period of its existence, if only it was P at any one moment within it. For if a is P at any one <sup>such</sup> moment, and its being P, its having the property of

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I7. The distinction of factual from notional identity/etc. tries to reproduce the Aristotelian distinction between identity/etc. according to being or the definition and according to <sup>the</sup> subject. (A connection could also be made to Fregean senses). The explication of the distinction could be given a more emphatically ontological turn---but I abstain from giving it here.

I8. I discuss here a little these problems, both because they have an indirect and negative repercussion on the issues concerning the structure of determinants, but also because they have a more direct though again negative bearing on questions about the nature of determinants (these problems being anyway connected) as clarifying their role or function in the Reality's Economy.

being P is caused by P-ness alone, then there is no reason whatever why at any other moment it should cease to be P. So much is surely guaranteed by the principle of Sufficient Reason. So that, generally, if P-ness alone were the efficient as well as the formal cause of anything's being P, then either everything (and for the whole duration of its existence) or nothing should be P (in the domain of concrete things). (There are some further complications in this connection, but I shall not treat of them here. They relate partly to the exercise of an efficient cause's activity, partly to the notion of an ultimate Efficient Cause).

Now the above consequences are certainly absurd. Indeed, by extending the argument, it can be easily shown that, on this supposition, the World would have to consist in a fixed number of changeless concrete things, remaining everlastingly identically the same, and absolutely similar in all their determinations.

14/ Evidently then, determinants, i.e. the formal causes of facts, cannot possibly be their efficient causes as well, on pains of the above absurdities. But, where we stay, to say this is surely not enough; we have to ask: What sort of impossibility is the one involved here?

Absurdities, it should be reminded, usually point to nothing more than fundamental indeed in respect of the (actual) World structure, yet natural (as we term them) impossibilities: the World, the actual World, our World and our experience of it if you like, is just not all this. Still, we naturally want to know whether there is something more in the indicated impossibility than simply an incompatibility with the fundamental structure of the actual World as actual World (or, even worse, with the general features of our experience of the actual World as a particular mode of awareness of it, or, to take the final step towards the Kantian abyss, with the fundamental structure of our sensitive and intellectual

constitution)---as it happens to be, so to speak (this incidentality not to be confused with accidents within the World).

I think, there is something more. Indeed, much more. For one can show, if I am not mistaken, that the impossibility involved is categorical---the highest (or deepest, depending on the picture) one. We may argue as follows:

If determinants could be efficient causes of facts, they could not help not really being so in any and every occasion. For there is nothing pertaining to determinants, qua determinants in general or the determinants they are, in accordance with or depending on occasions: they themselves provide the foundation of any occasional or circumstantial possibility, under the auspices of only logical and categorical modality<sup>19</sup>.

It might be objected that there is at least one something belonging (and not belonging) to determinants occasionally, circumstantially and, as far as they themselves are concerned, incidentally, namely particular exemplifications in various concrete things. But we have argued in Essay II and Essay VII (Part A) that this does not affect neither the *forma essendi* of determinants, nor, consequently, their subsistence. Thus actual or possible particular exemplification does not really belong to determinants, cannot be considered as a proper property of them; or rather, what belongs to them (without, even this, as we have noted, constituting them, either by way of contribution to their *forma essendi*, or to their existence) in virtue of their being determinants, is the (categorially necessitated) general possibility of exemplification; but this is not circumstantial or incidental at all, belonging to them universally, necessarily and indeed essentially (in the previously explained sense).

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19.

For some development of this theme, together with important qualifications (not affecting our present point) see below section 24.

A particular exemplification of a determinant is of complete and absolute indifference as to its being. Hence it cannot be that the determinant itself brings about the fact corresponding to such an exemplification. On the other hand, it is essential (in our strong sense of the term) to determinants that they be formal causes of (simple) facts. This consideration marks the wanted contrast.

To put it somehow paradoxically: if determinants could be (qua determinants) efficient causes of facts, then they would be necessarily such. (And indeed this is generalisable, as applying to any alleged property of determinants). In other words, what belongs to determinants (universally or not) belongs necessarily to them; more precisely: what belongs universally to them, belongs to them in strict categorial necessity; what belongs individually or severally to them, belongs to them at least metaphysically necessarily (it might also, partly, belong logically necessarily). To put it briefly: the natures and connections of determinants are at least metaphysically necessary<sup>20</sup>.

But our previous objector may very well not have been silenced. Two kinds of prominent counterexamples are most likely to be urged against the validity of the claimed thesis. The one has already been mentioned: it relates to particular exemplifications. The other regards determinants as e. objects of mind's mental attitudes towards them, let us say, of mind's conceptions of them.

As to the former, to come to it once again, part of the reply consists in drawing attention, as we have done, to the categorial difference between proper relations (relating concrete things) and even "relations" on the one hand and exemplificatory ties (connecting determinants to

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20.

For qualifications which only strengthen, by means of further articulation, this doctrine see section 24, below.

concrete things)and, in general ties<sup>21</sup> on the other. If a is R to b, then certainly b is  $\bar{R}$  (is somehow related) to a, and b has the relational property of being  $\bar{R}$  to a, this being included in its (widely conceived) complete determination<sup>22</sup>, and so forming part (however insignificant metaphysically and dispensable part) of its forma essendi. Quite otherwise with a tying connection of a with P-ness. Of course, we may grammatically change the active voice of the sentence 'a exemplifies P-ness' to the passive voice of 'P-ness is exemplified by a'; or the passive voice of 'a is determined (proper-predicatively) by P-ness' to the active of 'P-ness determines (proper-predicatively) a'. But it is obviously unwarranted and unwarrantable to project these grammatical transpositions to the ontological level. Such a projection only betrays basically and at the last analysis the failure to grasp the workings of philosophical explanation (according, needless to say, to our view): the mentioned sentences are used within a theoretico-systematic account<sup>23</sup> of what it is for concrete things to have properties (relational or not), and, therefore, are not really available for a similar treatment, as stating something to be accounted in the same sort of way as proper facts are accounted by means of what the sentences in question state or express. And this failure is understandably but unjustifiably

21. The plural of 'ties' is rather nothing more than a convenient way of speaking. Nevertheless, it might seem not completely out of place: in the two facts that a is P and that b is Q, the exemplificatory tie as connecting a to P-ness may be considered as in some manner distinct from the same exemplificatory tie as connecting b to Q-ness, despite its unique self-identity. Furthermore, there are various sorts of ties, for example exemplificatory tie, instancial tie etc. Anyway, I reserve a fuller discussion of connections in general for a subsequent Essay.

22. See Essay VI for various restrictions of this wide conception, and consequent qualifications of the general claim here made. But of course such qualifications are of a completely different scale and order from the radical and fundamental difference on the part of ties.

23. It is highly irrelevant, of course, that such locutions may, more or less accidentally (as opposed to philosophical design), find their way even in ordinary discourse, with meanings to be explored, classified and scientifically explained by scientific Linguistics.

assisted by the circumstance, naturally emphasised by the exponent of the theory himself, that by means of (the form of) such theoretical propositions he purports to analyse and exhibit perspicuously the real structure of the selfsame fact ordinarily expressed by the simpler sentences, thus encouraging in the mind of the thoughtless the thought that same content calls for same treatment. On the other hand, these methodological and metaphilosophical considerations have their exact ontological counterpart in what constitutes in general a major source of anti-realistic polemics, namely the sometimes as much naive as erroneous supposition that abstract things are after all to be conceived if not as a kind of concrete things, at any rate on the analogy to them, and hence, in the present case, that the relations among the latter are not fundamentally different from tying connections between these and the former. To put it briefly and generally: if  $k_1, k_2, \dots$  are kinds of object acknowledged by both realism and anti-realism, and  $k^*$  another kind posed by the former and deemed non-existent by the latter, then an important part of the latter's misgivings and ensuing arguments against the affirmation of  $k^*$ 's existence constitutes really (and, usually, to the anti-realist's ignorance of the fact) of the real nature and power of his own mental troubles) an effective weapon against misconceptions of  $k^*$  based on and drawn from faulty analogies to various acknowledgedly existing kinds. In such a case, the thorough realist would not leave the opportunity to avail himself of the positive significance of the anti-realist's negatively-thought objections. (To give an eminent example, this, in truth, is what, I believe, Plato does in the first part of his "Parmenides").

It is to be noticed that we do not hold that entrance into a tie-connection cannot be constitutive of the being of the object standing in such an one to something else: the exemplification nexus, for example, really constitutes the forma essendi of concrete things. What it is claimed,

is that such constitution is not necessary (to happen) in the way that even an un-instanced relational property<sup>24</sup> constitutes an aspect however superficial of the being of a concrete thing entering in the corresponding relation to another concrete thing. And further, it has been argued<sup>25</sup> that such constitution does not occur in the case and on the part of a determinant's exemplification. The whole point, to put it simply, is to the effect that ~~such constitution~~ an objection to this thesis, based on the premises that concrete things are constituted in what they are by their standing in exemplificatory tie-connections to determinants, and that, if something is so affected by its tying-connection (not: relation) with something else, then this latter object is also similarly, though as it were conversely, affected by its (the latter's) converse tying-connection with the former-----an objection based on these premises is invalid because of the falsity of the second supposition (a falsity, partly based on the non-recognition of the categorial difference between relations and ties).

The second kind of counterexample mentioned above appears more difficult. For what type of connection is the one holding between a mind and a determinant when the mind thinks of or conceives, has the thought or the concept(ion) of, the determinant? (Of course, such a thought or conception has various modes, modes of representation one would like to say, of intelligible representation).

Clearly it cannot be a proper relation: for the connected items are not both of them concrete things (minds are assumed to be

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24. For the notion of un-instanced relation and related concepts, see Essay VI.

25. In Essay VII, Part A, and, indirectly, in Essay II.

concrete things<sup>26</sup>). It would seem then, that thinking or conceiving should be a peculiar tie, at least in that they connect objects belonging to different categories. If so, it would be natural to claim that just as the exemplification of determinants leaves them completely, as it were, untouched, in the same way the thinking of them, their being objects of thought or conception, is of complete ontological indifference to them---notwithstanding the twin facts that concrete things exemplifying determinants are constituted in their being by such exemplifications, and, correspondingly, that minds thinking (of) determinants are intrinsically modified through such conceiving<sup>27</sup>. But it is not quite clearly felt that we could acquiesce in such an account of thinking as tie. So that we discern clearly two matters, regarding which the system strongly calls for further elaboration and articulation: the two matters are, first, the nature of connections in general, relational, "relational" and tying ones, and, second, the place of mind or of the mental in the metaphysical theory expounded.<sup>27</sup>

Even leaving this at that, it may seem not over-rash to maintain that the second kind of counterexample, alike with the first, does not really necessitate an essential modification of our doctrine, according to which nothing non-necessary (at least metaphysically) pertains or belongs to determinants.

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26.

I disregard here, of course, complications arising out of the mind-body problem; for example, whether mind is one kind of concrete thing, or whether 'mental' and its cognates signify a certain field of qualities and functionalities of a kind of concrete thing (the ensouled or feeling, perceiving, willing, thinking etc. concrete things).

27.

The first nexus of problems will be treated in a subsequent Essay. The second one, is not planned to fall at all into the compass of the final dissertation---for a systematic investigation at any rate.

15/ We conclude then, even if provisionally in some respects, that that which pertains to determinants belongs to them at least metaphysically necessarily<sup>28</sup>. But now their being formal causes of facts is something which they are in virtue of their being just the kind of object which they are. If you like, it is a peculiar feature or even a defining character of their being determinants. Hence, it is categorially necessary that they are formal causes.

What now would be the modal status of the alleged circumstance that determinants are efficient causes of facts. According to the argumentation in the previous section, this should be at least metaphysically necessary. And according to our analysis in Essay VII, Part A, this entails, *inter alia*,<sup>29</sup> that their so being, would have to be:

immutable and timeless  
in the there explained senses.

In consequence, if, in the present case, a thing's having a certain property P is (efficiently) caused by what gives to it the specific form of being (i.e. being P) which it has if and when it has it---in case, that is, in which the corresponding determinant P-ness is both the formal and the efficient cause of a thing's having the property of being P, then any and every concrete thing should have, throughout the duration of its existence, all properties corresponding to the subsisting determinants. And this is

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28.

For some elaboration and qualification of this claim see section 24 below. To be noticed that the qualification strengthens it.

29.

See the recapitulation at p.28 of the cited Essay.

even logically<sup>30</sup> impossible.

Further, concrete things would persist unaltered throughout the span or interval of their existence. The distinction of essential and accidental properties of concrete things would easily be seen to collapse, as a consequence of the circumstance that the changeless character of concrete things would have to be, at least, metaphysically necessary. And the question of the (sufficient) reason for their coming into being or for their passing away once they have so come, would pose unsurmountable difficulties. And such consequences would have to be drawn not only with regard to some extraordinary though possible World, but with regard to any and every possible World, including the actual one, again in view of the circumstance that such consequences would be at least metaphysically necessitated.

(I may remark here, that the use made above of change and time is not really indispensable for the argument. It makes the absurdities more vivid, "imageable" - if I may so say - and easily felt. (And anyway in spatiotemporal (possible) Worlds these results will in fact follow). We are not, therefore, really committed so far, to any view concerning the metaphysical nature and status of space and time. ).

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30.

I say significantly 'even', because given that our determinants are positive natures or characters (of course, in themselves), it is perhaps not *prima facie* evident that the described situation involves logical contradictions. But if a is P and a is Q, P-ness and Q-ness being two determinants of the same determinable, then from a is P it metaphysically follows that a is not Q, and this in conjunction with the assumed fact that a is Q yields the desired logical contradiction.

16/ It is evident then that the exemplification of determinants requires Regulating Principle(s), which are not themselves determinants. It is not for this occasion to discuss the status of such principles. For the time being let us keep in mind that determinants are (essentially) formal causes, not efficient causes of facts.

Now by being formal causes of facts they must be intimately connected with that form of being which concrete things exhibit as (metaphysical) subjects of the said facts. For if a certain concrete thing presents itself under a certain form of being (among various other <sup>such</sup> forms too) in that it is being something (such and such), and if the formal cause of the fact that it does so present itself, that is, the cause of the circumstance that it has that form of being as distinct from the cause of the equally distinct circumstance (though not distinct fact!) that it has that form of being, ---- if the formal cause, I say, of the fact in question is the determinant by whose exemplification the said concrete thing is determined in such and such a way, then clearly this determinant must be most intimately connected with the form of being concerned. Indeed, the form of being of the determinant involved must be the same form of being as the determined concrete thing's own. (Remember that we are occupied with how things are, not with how we experience or, in general, are aware of them as being; so that any falsification or discrepancy introduced by our modes of apprehending the World - if there be such an one - is simply irrelevant to our argument). Only, of course, the determinant's "having" this form must be quite different from the concrete thing's "having" it; that is, even though that which a determinant is, is the same with that which concrete things are qua determined by this determinant, still, obviously, the way or the mode of the determinant's being that which it is is different from the

way or mode according to which the corresponding concrete things are what they are, that which they are (and which is the same with that which the corresponding determinant is).

17/ The analysis of what it is for a concrete thing to present itself under a certain form of being or to have a certain property was given in previous Essays<sup>31</sup>. Our problem now is:

What is the correct analysis of what it is for a determinant to be that which it is?

Constraints which should be imposed on any attempt to formulate such an analysis, are the results so far achieved as regards the character and peculiarities of the being of determinants. These are<sup>32</sup>, that the being (both Being-Something and Being simpliciter) of determinants is independent of the nexus of exemplification, actual (only), immutable, timeless and transcending the essential/accidental distinction (in the sense in which it applies to concrete things and their properties).

Towards an answer for the present problem, we may begin by noticing that a form of being is not anything ultimately real, according to the present theory. For the corresponding term appears only in a first-order, so to speak, systematisation of our subject matter, a systematisation which calls for an analysis of such a kind, that its occurrence proves the non-ultimately-real feature of the analysed item: briefly, of a metaphysical analysis. But if this is so--- then we cannot simply give the following answer to our present problem, namely that whereas concrete things exhibit, or present themselves under, forms of being, or are characterised by such forms, corresponding determinants just are (identical with) these forms. For the untenability of such a line of procedure, besides, problems relating to the unity and oneness of

these forms, in the face of their multiple occurrence in the various concrete things as well as in the corresponding determinant might also be urged-----and indeed problems which do not really affect our position, since, as I have remarked above, according to it, a form of being is not considered as an ultimately real constituent of the proposed metaphysical structure of reality.

Therefore, only that there must be a difference in the (mode of) having or being something between determinants and concrete things is what we are really entitled to assume at this early stage of the investigation. Indeed, there are those, who would like to hold that a determinant just is (identical with?) what corresponding things have or are predicatively ~~by~~ or by participation. Now of course this cannot, at any rate, be accepted, if it is conjoined with the view that attributes or characters of concrete things (i.e. what concrete things have or are predicatively) inhere immanently in them. For this conjunction virtually abolishes the transcendence of determinants. Anyway this is not in the spirit of those who propose the said view. Rather it is, that determinants just are the Forms, to which concrete things are transcendently connected, and in so doing acquire their various inherent instantial properties. But even this formulation is defective in that it unpermissibly blends two different levels of discourse (and correspondingly of reality): the one, in which we speak of forms of being as being displayed or exhibited by things presenting themselves under such forms; the other, in which we give the ultimate metaphysical account and ground of the previously spoken circumstances, by invoking the second-order, let us say, technical notions of instance, determinant, connection etc.

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31

For a fuller version, see Essay VII, Part B.

32.

See Essay VII, Part A. For a synoptic recapitulation, see p. 28 of that Essay.

Keeping the distinguishable and distinct strands separate, we see both the confusion and the validity of the mentioned view: really it is a misguided plea to accept our own point, namely, that the way and manner in which a determinant is correlated to the form of being, under which concrete things determined by that determinant present themselves, is fundamentally different from the way and manner in which these concrete things are correlated or have it.

We can thus appreciate the sagacity of, for example, the Proclean formulations, according to which (to transpose them to our own case) the determinant should be said to be or have primarily or in respect of essence, what the concrete things falling under it are or have secondarily or by participation. Clearly, we have not in the present connection to do with a distinction based on linguistic or others proprieties regarding 'have' and 'be' (the one appropriate to the one case, the other to the other) --- but a metaphysical distinction between the way determinants are what they are or have what they have, and the way concrete things are what they are or (equivalently) have what they have.

18/ Let us call the form of being associated with P-concrete things qua being P, and with P-ness itself, 'fP'. And let us continue using the example-schema with P<sub>1</sub>-ness the proximate determinable of P<sub>2</sub>-ness.

We say that fP<sub>1</sub><sup>33</sup> is a kind (or species --- if I may be permitted to avail myself of this handy terminology, in order to avoid multiplying terms in connection with what, being distinct, should ideally be distinctively signified) of the highest genus Being-Something; it is a special form of Being-Something, i.e. a particular content, under whose "form" Being-Something discloses or exhibits itself. And similarly for fP<sub>2</sub>.

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33.

fP<sub>1</sub> for 'fP<sub>1</sub>' etc., simply for convenience (in typing).

(Parenthetically, I may remark that somebody may take exception at the word 'disclose'. Now, disregarding dispute s about words, as far as this is possible, and concentrating on the ideas expressed by means and through the words (in order to appropriate for my own purposes the adnotation of that great figure of Classical Empiricism(?), Bishop Berkeley)---there are three things to be distinguished in the present context:

i/ the way a higher form appears or exhibits itself, or presents itself in lower, subordinate forms,

ii/ the way a thing appears or exhibits itself or presents itself under a certain form (of being)---with further subdivision depending on whether the thing in question is concrete or abstract),

iii/ the way a lower form appears or exhibits itself or presents itself as a specification of a higher form.

Now, I use 'disclose', in the main, to mean the first way; 'present under' or 'assume', chiefly for the second one; I have no predilection for a certain word, in the third case.

Further distinctions should have to be drawn in the sequel, when forms corresponding to "specific differences" will come into the picture. But even the above, I may hope, could appease our objector---provided he was genuinely worried about the substance, and not the sound, of 'disclose'.).

Now fP2 in its turn, is a particular form in which fP1 discloses or exhibits itself. For any thing, be it concrete or abstract, to assume fP2 is a particular way of assuming fP1; and equally, to assume fP1 is to assume some one or other of the particular forms into which it discloses (exhibits) itself.

So we have a mutual dependence, in so far as forms of being are concerned: fP2 is nothing more (we are inclined to say) than a particular specification or manifestation of fP1; but also fP1 cannot be assumed by anything, except by means of assuming one or other of its particular specifications.

We observe also:

A particular specification of a form of being ensues in a form of being, which is obviously distinct from the form of being, whose specification the result it is.

The more specific form presupposes the more generic one, in that it is constituted by a particular specification of the latter.

Again, although the actuality of a particular specification is not included in the generic form, yet the potentiality or possibility of it is already contained therein; it is part of the nature of the generic form.

Finally we may say at the present preparatory level, that though the specific form presupposes the generic one in respect of its constitution (let us speak of 'constitutive presupposition'), nonetheless the latter presupposes the former in respect of their being assumed by things (we may speak of 'assuming priority').

A terminological remark: I make, it will be observed, a free use of 'generic' and 'specific' as applied to forms of determinants. And below, I shall take the liberty to speak about forms of specific differences. As this terminology is normally applied to kinds of concrete things (kinds of various degrees of generality), I must say that in the present usage, 'generic' signifies nothing more than pertaining to determinables as such, ('specific' the same as pertaining to determinates as such, and with 'forms of specific differences' I shall refer to those questionable as regards their status (in the present connections and investigations) forms, presently to be explained (Section 20).

19/ But now, how are these results to be firstly developed and articulated, and secondly translated in order to be made applicable to determinants themselves instead of <sup>to</sup> mere neutral, ontologically non-committal forms of being? It is in these directions that we should now move.

Let us symbolise the circumstance that a concrete individual, say a, displays itself under a certain form of being fP, by the formula:

I/ /a/ is /fP/

The symbolism is meant to give warning that what is expressed through it, is not exactly the same meaning as the one expressed by the formula

I'/ a is P.

Though, of course, (I) entails (I') and vice versa. Not, on the other hand, that ultimately there is any difference. The difference lies in the different degree of technical articulation as regards the metaphysically systematic account of phenomena. So (I') represents a level near enough to the ordinary one (to be noticed that it does not coincide with the ordinary level; for, to say only this, not all ordinarily conceived properties, are proper properties even at the level of discourse in which (I') belongs), whereas (I) is further removed from it. Our analysis by means of the apparatus of determinants, instances etc. represents a still different level, which we hold to be the ground-level of discourse in that it corresponds to the ultimate structure of reality. To put it briefly and roughly: (I) and (I') do not differ in respect of the object to which they refer and which they signify, express or represent (i.e. the fact), but in respect of the degree of systematic technicality of the way and manner in which they do refer to, and represent, it, or better, they differ in respect of the adequacy of their articulation to represent the real ultimate structure of the object referred to and expressed.

Now (1) is accounted by recourse to the determination(proper predicatively) of a by P-ness and the inherence in a of an instance(unrepeatable instance) of P-ness. Could, perhaps, the same or an analogous procedure be valid in the case of the constitution of the forms of determinants and further of determinants themselves?

It is true, to begin with, that we have above hopefully established the following:

2/ /P-ness/ is' /fP/.

(Notice, before proceeding, that the accent is put over 'is' to indicate the difference, already spoken of, between the ways a concrete thing and an abstract one have, or assume or present themselves under a certain form of being. Apart from the fundamental difference in the respective analyses which is to be expected and will be detailed in the sequel, we may observe the obvious, even from what we have already obtained, differences in respect of immutability, timelessness and transcendence of the essential/accidental distinction etc., in the senses explained).

Now, evidently, strictly the same analysis cannot be correctly or even plausibly (or even meaningfully) applied to (2) as to (1). For surely, P-ness has the corresponding form of being not in virtue of its being determined (in the appropriate way, this is taken for granted) by P-ness, and the inherence in it of an instance of P-ness. As to the first clause, it is (identical with) P-ness; as to the second, instances inhere in concrete things, and, at most, only by a dangerous ambiguity could we be permitted to speak of instances in abstract things, an ambiguity which must be cleared ----if, that is, a use must be made of it, at all, which is not, at least presently, certain.

So that the same (in its basic at least features) analysis will surely not do. But what of an analogous analysis, like the following one:

fP2 is a definite, particular form of fPI (in which fPI discloses itself). Hence,

3/ /P<sub>2</sub>-ness/ is' /fP2/

is equivalent to:

4/ /P<sub>2</sub>-ness/ is' /a specific particular form of fPI/.

But then, clearly (4) points unmistakably to the circumstance that P<sub>2</sub>-ness is a determinate of the determinable P<sub>1</sub>-ness. Hence, we may maintain, that the circumstance that P<sub>2</sub>-ness presents itself under the form of a particular manifestation or determination<sup>34</sup> of fPI in so far as this particular determination is such an one of fPI, i.e. that P<sub>2</sub>-ness presents itself under the form of fPI too, is due to its standing in D-D<sup>u</sup> relation<sup>34</sup> (and at the determinate side of it) with P<sub>1</sub>-ness. But the forms of being under which a thing (be it concrete, be it abstract) presents itself, are (tautologically) what a thing is (in whole or in part), are part (or the whole) of its forma essendi, hence constitute (totally or partly, as the case may be) its Being-Something, and consequently (finally) constitute indirectly also its Existence (i.e. its Being) *Simpliciter*, in the sense (only) that, its existence consisting in its being what it is, the dependence of What-it-is or of its Being-Something on any item, indirectly affects to the same extent also its existence, though possibly further dependencies may be peculiar to the latter<sup>35</sup>.

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34. Of course this use of the very pregnant word, expresses a yet another, third, sense from the two already recognised: in so far as on the one hand proper predication, and on the other any constitutive connection in general of something with something else.

35. The complication and the last qualification are required in order to take account of the distinction already made between *causa formalis* and *causa efficiens*, and of the initial, theoretical availability for its application in the realm of determinants, too. (And not only in respect to concrete things, in connection with those determinations it was originally above drawn).

It is to be emphasised that we do not propose definitively the above as even a partial solution of the problems mentioned in chapters I<sup>0</sup> and II above. The theory is proposed at this stage, as a kind of working hypothesis, plausible in itself (as distinct from its consequences)---and we shall develop it, constructing its skeleton and then adding some flesh to its bones, with a view to see whether it will prove to be feasible to cover adequately the whole of the field under consideration.

The theory is also convenient in that it helps and facilitates the introduction of problems concerning forms, to be dealt with in the sequel, which could admittedly be confronted independently of any such theory however connected with the problems mentioned in the above cited sections, but which indisputably gain in pregnancy and significance by being so viewed in conjunction with, and against the background of, attempted solutions to the more metaphysically important problems of these sections.

We retain then, what has been reached till now ---a rather meagre result: a determinant's having a form of being corresponding to a superordinated determinant is to be accounted by its standing as determinate in D-D"relation" to the latter determinant.

20/ But what is to account for the determinant's presenting itself under a specific, particular form of the form of being, attached to the superordinated determinant?

By all means, we must resist here a strong and almost natural (not quite natural, of course! Or rather quite natural in its true meaning, but unnaturally misunderstood and misused as regards that true meaning) inclination to reply that the particular determination of FI is to be accounted,

quite similarly to the above explanation, simply by a connection subsisting between  $P_2$ -ness and a certain determinant, whose proper, peculiar form of being is just what is required to be added to  $fP1$  in order to obtain  $fP2$ .

In such a reply, I take grave exception mainly to what is expressed in speaking of something being added to  $fP1$ , with the desired result:  $fP2$ . To be more precise, I object to such an addition being conceived as just a simple additive, conjunctive operation on two elements, as it were, yielding the required third term or item.

In the realm of concepts (whatever the metaphysical status of this realm really is) we may, of course, combine two concepts (and combine them purely conjunctively in a truth-functional way) to form a third---with obvious rules (truth-conditions) regarding its application<sup>36</sup>.

But here our whole discussion is through and through ontic-----otherwise it is nothing, or very little. This is the very basic reason, for which we have undertaken some pains in Essay IV to oppose claims which admittedly are clear and even intuitively plausible if taken as holding for concepts.

And in the ontological realm, things do not behave in such a tractable, well-mannered and "decent" way. To put it metaphorically (referring back to Essay IV for the argumentative discussion), two abstract things, or better their forms, either thoroughly coalesce into an organic unity or remain untouched one by the other: the only connection they know is a thorough interpenetration or communion, called for by their intrinsic natures, not an agglomerative juxtaposition of the truth-functional kind. But enough of the metaphor.

The truth is that not even in the realm of concepts, mere conjunctive addition is the only available possibility for conceptual complexity. Truth-functional compoundability is but one, and not very important philosophically for that matter, kind of complexity. And this was only

to be expected, if, that is, the system of the concepts is to represent, however vaguely and inaccurately, the structure and system of Reality.

21/ But an improved version of the account given in the previous section may now be proposed. According to this new version, the particular determination of fPI which is assumed by  $P_2$ -ness is to be accounted by a connection subsisting between  $P_2$ -ness and a certain determinant, whose proper and peculiar form of being is just the modality (modification in abstracto from the modified generic form) of fPI which, qualifying or modifying it by no simple, conjunctively additive way, results in fP2.

Even this, I submit, is still inadequate to the situation. Or rather, it is not explicit enough in its articulation, and so ambiguously covers acceptable and unacceptable elements alike.

Working towards the separation of these elements, we shall begin here a rather long examination of the above sketched theory. But firstly, we shall elaborate some points concerning its formulation, with a view to isolate some essentially crucial point on which to have the battle fought.

Towards this goal we remark the following.

If  $P_2$ -ness is a determinate of  $P_1$ -ness, this circumstance is, of course, (metaphysically or in some stronger sense<sup>37</sup>) necessary---nothing accidental<sup>38</sup>. Or, to speak in terms

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37. The significance of the qualification will emerge in section 24 below.

38. One may object that we have argued (in Essay VII) that the being of determinants transcends the essential/accidental distinction, so that it makes no sense to affirm or to deny that a connection holding between determinants is or is not accidental. And indeed we claim this transcendence as true. But, as we have already explained, the distinctions on the one hand of Necessary/accidental etc. and on the other of essential/accidental are distinct. (So that, of course, 'accidental' is ambiguous). For example, the second distinction applies to simple facts,

of forms of being, that  $fP2$  is a certain definite, particular modification of  $fP1$  is something necessary. It is not the case, for example, that but for the existence of concrete things in which the property of being  $P_1$  and the property of being, say,  $P_m$  coexist (where the property of being  $P_m$  corresponds to that modification of  $fP1$  which yields  $fP2$ ); no natural kind, no abstract thing such as  $P_2$ -ness would exist<sup>39</sup>. On the contrary: concrete things have various properties, exhibit themselves under various forms of being. Some of these properties or forms of being are connected intrinsically, some disconnected. But those that are connected are so connected in virtue of the validity of logical, metaphysical (or, lastly, natural) laws---not that the laws are valid by reason of the regularity and connectedness of properties of concrete things. This is, one could think, in a certain sense just trivial. But then, metaphysical laws are grounded on the structured system of independently subsisting determinants, so that this system and the interconnections of its parts and elements cannot possibly depend on how concrete things are<sup>40</sup>. Rather the other way round.

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whereas no such fact can be necessary. In Essay III, we have given an explication of the second distinction in terms of the former, without identifying them. Further, we have distinguished above (see n. II) two senses of 'essential' and so we may obtain further senses of 'accidental'.

39.

Of course, the extension of  $P_2$ -ness would be, in such a case, the null-class. But this is anything but relevant.

40.

For certain well known misgivings in this connection, I think it is salutary to reflect on a case as clear as we could wish: ' $p$ ' is true because it is the case that  $p$ ---not: it is the case that  $p$  because ' $p$ ' is true. IN short: formal equivalence does not guarantee metaphysical equipotence in status.

It is then (at least) metaphysically necessary, that fP2 is a definite particular modification of fP1. So it is necessary that there be a certain, definite modification pertaining and modifying fP1. Now fP1 is a form of being; so is fP2, too. And further, fP2 is a definite particular modification of a certain form of being (namely, of fP1). What now of the modifying constituent, of the modification considered in abstracto from the modified form? Is it, equally, a form of being? (Given that it is, in a different sense, a form of the modified form of being).

But of which modification are we speaking--- one might object. The said modification of fP1 just is (identical with) fP2. fP2 just is fP1 modified in such and such a way.

We must beware here, lest language cheat us, as so often it does. Consider the following propositions:

A certain form of being is a definite, particular form of a given form of being.

The three occurrences of 'form' in this proposition refer to two distinct elements of the situation: the derivative form of being or the specific form (first two occurrences) and the originally given form of being or the generic form (third occurrence). And this is so, because of the identity-is of the proposition. (Of course, and certainly so if we are correct in discerning a third constituent of the situation, even in the above proposition some signification of this third constituent is involved (in the second occurrence of 'form'), but not a (direct) reference to it---in much the same way as in using subjectively the expression, say, 'the white(thing)', I refer to just one object, namely the concrete thing which is white, but nonetheless I implicitly distinguish it from its whiteness or of its property of being white precisely by referring to it by means of a form of being under which it presents itself).

But consider now this proposition:

A certain form of being is the (timeless) result of the assuming by a given form of being of a certain form.

Here the three occurrences of 'form', not only indicate or signify directly or indirectly, but also are used to refer to the three distinct elements of the situation: the derivative form of being (first occurrence), the initial form of being (second occurrence), and that form, which by being assumed by the initial form of being (eternally) produces or yields the derivative one.

22/ Thus we can, surely distinguish the derived form of being, the form of being from which the derived derives, and, finally, the form (not necessarily of being) from which, by being imposed<sup>41</sup> on the second yields the former. For, certainly, we can, in conceiving of the derived form of being, abstract from the original form of being; what then remains is the form assumed by the latter in yielding the former.

But then, is the imposed form, a form of being? Is a form (in the explained sense) of a form of being, itself a form of being? This is the crucial point, in the present connection, about which we have spoken above. The rest of the present part, will be an examination of this point, in the form of a criticism of the affirmative answer to the stated question.

Suppose, then, that a form of a form of being is itself a form of being? Then, there is a determinant corresponding to (indeed defined by) it, a determinant whose proper and peculiar form this form of being is, call it 'P<sub>m</sub>-ness'. This transition, is not to be considered as, strictly speaking, a real step. Forms of being are essentially the *formae essendi* of determinants, the peculiar forms of being of determinants. We may, in this case, explain the constitution (as regards its *formae essendi*) of P<sub>2</sub>-ness as follows:

41

The imposed form is, of course, not just super-added juxtapositively. Its place is, so to speak, ready in the initial form, prepared to receive it. It organically fits into a predetermined space. We shall have occasion to explore the precise meaning of these suggestive expressions in the second part of the present Essay.

$P_2$ -ness has fPI by being connected as determinate through D-D"relation" to  $P_1$ -ness; and has fPm by being connected with  $P_m$ -ness-----how?

Clearly the connection cannot be a D-D"relation". For, if it were such an one,  $P_2$ -ness would have to fall under two distinct proximate determinables. Which is impossible. Further, on such a hypothesis, we would have taken the first step towards a regressus ad infinitum. For what about the form, which, in being assumed by the form of being proper and peculiar to the determinable  $P_m$ -ness, results in fP2? Is this form again a form of being? And the affirmative answer being granted (as it should be, for simple parity of reasoning), we come up with a further mediating form, and hence with a further mediating determinant, say,  $P_m'$ -ness, the connection of which with  $P_1$ -ness we shall again be obliged, on the same principle and ground, to construe as D-D"relation", and so on.

Consequently, the connection of  $P_2$ -ness to  $P_m$ -ness which makes the former to have the form of being fPm, must be a connection differing from D-D"relation". Let us call it, for brevity's sake, Dm"relation". (Of course, we might "direct" it: D2m"relation" would be the "relation" holding between a certain determinate determinant ( $P_2$ -ness) and that determinant ( $P_m$ -ness), whose peculiar form imposed upon (or assumed by) the form peculiar to the proximate determinable of  $P_2$ -ness (i.e.  $P_1$ -ness) yields the form peculiar to  $P_2$ -ness; Dm2"relation" would thus be the converse "relation").

Before proceeding further, let us also ask concerning the connection holding between  $P_1$ -ness and  $P_m$ -ness. For, to begin with, they are surely somehow connected: it is not to be assumed that any two chance determinants always yield, by an organic, not merely conjunctive communion of their peculiar forms (so that mechanical addition is not the point here), the peculiar form of another determinant---not to be assumed even on the principles of the presently studied

theory. The determinants must be of certain, appropriate kinds, communicable, fitted to come, as it were, into the co-operative communion, which their eternal product,  $fP_2$  of  $P_2$ -ness, necessitates. And further, we have already remarked that  $fP_1$  calls for (in a certain sense to be further specified) the modifications yielding the forms, appropriately corresponding to the various determinates of  $P_1$ -ness. So there must be a connection between  $P_1$ -ness and  $P_m$ -ness.

But what sort of connection? Obviously, not a  $Dm^*$  relation. But maybe a  $D-D^*$  relation with  $P_1$ -ness the determinable and  $P_m$ -ness one of its determinate determinants?

Again, the answer must be negative. For one thing, there is no reason to saddle the case with two different though co-ordinated systems of determinates under one and the same determinable; I mean the system of the normal determinates (like the assumed  $P_2$ -ness) and the system of the corresponding (one-to-one) specific differences<sup>42</sup>. (Not to mention the impossibility of such a double or, in general, multiple subsumption of separate families of coordinated proximate determinates under the determinable determinant in question<sup>43</sup>). For another thing, the problem of the constitution of the forms peculiar to this second system of determinates out of the

42.

I take the liberty to use this expression in the present connection as a shorthand device. Specific differences apply primarily to species and genera of substances, i.e. to kinds of concrete things. Yet the use of the expression is harmless, the more so, the more there is a structural analogy between the way and manner species of concrete things are connected to their genera and the way and manner determinates are connected to their determinables---in spite of the fundamental differences between the way concrete things are connected with their kinds and the way concrete things are connected with determinants.


43.

On this point, see at the beginning of section 23 below.

form of the determinable, would naturally arise, with a potential (indeed, an inescapable one, if the assumed principles are to be applied similarly in all similar cases) regressus ad infinitum as in the case of the connection between  $P_2$ -ness and  $P_m$ -ness. For a third thing, and the more conclusive, I should think, because intuitively transparent, the specific difference just is not a determinate of its superordinate determinable; their forms go somehow with the form of that determinable in order to constitute the forms of the genuine determinates----but, this circumstance only contrasts, does not assimilate, them to determinates.

Consequently we must further postulate a third kind of connection, let us call it "dm" relation", holding between determinables and their specific differences<sup>44</sup>.

44. To recapitulate with a schema:




of which the said feature of the uniqueness of the proximately subordinated family of determinate forms holds true, we should arrive (as we shall do below) at contradictions resolvable either by renouncing even the existence of some determinants of the said sort, something manifestly absurd, or, alternatively, by taking the arguments as a reductio ad absurdum of the examined theory regarding the forms of specific differences.).

Now the form of  $P_m$ -ness (fPm) is, again, constituted from fPmI together with the form of a determinant which is to serve for the determination of the form of  $P_m$ -ness in just the way that  $P_m$ -ness functions in the derivation of the form of  $P_2$ -ness. Let us call this latter determinant  $P_{mm}$ -ness.<sup>45</sup>

45.

To facilitate reference, I append the following schema:



Let me introduce further the sign ' + ' to signify that combination of forms of determinants, which yield forms of derivative (i.e. determinate) determinants. Naturally, as we have already discounted the view that such a derivation consists in a mechanical, as it were, juxtaposition of chance forms, we must keep clearly in mind that ' + ' does not symbolise any agglomerative addition, but rather that combination of forms, which we have metaphorically described as the situation in which the one combined form intrinsically calls for (communion with) the other, with subsequent modification.

By means of the symbolism introduced till now, we may summarily state the relevant circumstances as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} fP2 &= (fP1) + fPm \\ fPm &= (fPm1) + fPmm. \end{aligned}$$

(The equality sign is explained by itself. The parenthesis indicates the form which is the base of the "additive" operation yielding the determinate form, that is, the form of the determinable).

Now  $fP1$  is intrinsically susceptible (susceptible in virtue of its own intrinsic—a pleonasm, of course—nature) of the modification ensuing in  $fP2$ ; indeed it (eternally) produces or brings forth  $fP2$  by assuming the relevant modification. But this modification is, according to the presently discussed view, a form of being corresponding or rather attached as its proper and peculiar form to a certain determinant. This latter determinant,  $P_m$ -ness, has itself its form (eternally) derived from  $fPm1$ :  $fPm$  is just  $fPm1$ -modified—in a certain way (the way represented by  $fPmm$ ). Hence, given that  $fP1$  is intrinsically susceptible of  $fPm$  (to put it briefly), it must also be intrinsically susceptible of  $fPm1$ ; for  $fPm$  is (partially) identical with  $fPm1$  in that it is constituted by a certain, definite modification of  $fPm1$ . And since  $fPmm$  is also intrinsically called for, as it were, by  $fPm1$ , and is a necessary constituent of  $fPm$  too,  $fP1$  must, further, be intrinsically susceptible of  $fPmm$ .

The above conclusions follow from the theory examined. But, now, in the realm of determinants and their forms there is no unactualised possibility: every real possibility is actualised; and further, the corresponding actuality is necessary, as well as the corresponding possibility or potentiality.

This metaphysical Principle<sup>46</sup>, I shall use here mainly as an axiom. And perhaps its formulation is not particularly happy, at least in that certain distinctions must be made concerning the status of modalities involved in it. But though this is not the proper occasion for a full investigation of the principle's validity, I feel obliged to append a few remarks, rather by way of explicatory confirmation.

#### 24/ DIGRESSION

Suppose  $P_I$ -ness is intrinsically (in virtue of its own nature, of its forma essendi) susceptible of modification consisting in the assuming of a certain form, say,  $fP_m$ . It would be granted, I submit, that this susceptibility, if real, is necessary (at the metaphysical level), that is, given the natures of  $P_I$ -ness and  $P_m$ -ness it could not be otherwise than that the form of the former is susceptible of (a modification by) the form of the latter. But suppose that the said possibility of modification is not actualised in the a-temporal World of Determinants; that is, that  $fP_I$ , though susceptible of modification in the said definite way, is, yet, not so modified. Consequently, there is no such form as  $fP_2$  (only the possibility, and necessary possibility, of such a form), being the peculiar form of a subsisting determinant. Of course we may entertain in thought the modification being

46.

In its first part explicitly formulated by Aristotle, *Physica* 203b30: "for being possible and being do not differ in eternal beings". The second, by implication.

carried on and the result achieved and being formed as  $fP_2$ . Nevertheless, in our present case, there is no determinant  $P_2$ -ness, only the possibility that there should subsist such an one.

But let us now descend to the level of concrete things and existences. Since  $fP_1$  is (and indeed necessarily) susceptible of modification along the lines of  $fP_m$ , we are obliged to acknowledge the metaphysical possibility of a concrete thing's being  $P_1$  and, further, having  $fP_1$  as modified by  $fP_m$ . We may say, using our symbolism, that we must admit the (metaphysical) possibility of a concrete thing's exhibiting the form  $(fP_1) + fP_m$ , that is the form  $fP_2$ . In other words, such a concrete thing does belong to some possible World, possibly to the actual World.

But now notice, firstly, that we are not talking of truth-functional compounds, nor of part-whole (in a weak sense) complexes. The form which we represent by the addition of two other appropriate forms is simple in respect of those ways of complexity; it is complex only in the sense in which a determinate form is complex, as consisting in a modification (an internal one---we wish to say) of another determinable form, or rather as being the a-temporal result of such modification (depending on the exact sense of 'modification').

Consequently, the possibility of there being such a concrete thing as the above described (i.e. such as to have the form  $(fP_1) + fP_m$ ) cannot be accounted by its just having the two forms  $fP_1$  and  $fP_m$ . Because of the nature of  $P_1$ -ness and  $P_m$ -ness,  $fP_1$  and  $fP_m$  cannot just co-exist side by side, as it were, in separation; they coalesce in one, simple (in all other senses except the organic complexity of the specific form in which a generic one discloses itself) form. Therefore, the mentioned possibility is just the possibility of exemplification of no less than  $P_2$ -ness. Indeed, as

we have argued elsewhere, it is the subsistence of a determinant which grounds the possibility of there being a concrete thing possessing the corresponding form of being---just because that subsistence entails possible exemplification and, hence, possible determination of a concrete thing by the subsisting determinant (and only that subsistence can guarantee as much).

Therefore, there must be such a determinant as  $P_2$ -ness---and this contradicts our supposition. Consequently, a possibility of modification of a determinant's form must of necessity be carried out, so to speak, and a determinate determinant must subsist to which the modified form peculiarly and properly attaches or belongs.

We may be, then, perhaps, permitted to generalise from the above treated characteristic example-schema, and claim that any real possibility in the realm of forms is actualised. And such an actualisation is necessary; it could not conceivably be otherwise.

But one must beware, lest he may take the above doctrine in a way alien to its true spirit. Let me try to make clearer what I mean.

Suppose again that  $P_2$ -ness is a determinate of  $P_1$ -ness: they are connected by the D-D"relation". And now ask:

Is the connection necessary? What modality should we ascribe to it?

These questions pinpoint part of the misapprehension of the expounded doctrine, to which I alluded above. For the correct answer to them, within the system concerned, is that, strictly speaking, no modality pertains to them, of the sort and in the sense in which modalities grounded on, such connections do pertain to certain circumstances, themselves again grounded on such connections.

For example, the said connection is not a necessary (in the same sense) one; rather it grounds the necessity of the circumstance, *inter alia*, that if anything<sup>47</sup> has the form of being appropriate and peculiar to  $P_2$ -ness, then it also has the form of being appropriate and peculiar to  $P_1$ -ness. And similarly for other cases.

It is this immunity from, or rather transcendence of modal distinctions, the transcendence which grounds the transcended<sup>48</sup>, which we try to convey by saying that structural connections among determinants are necessary and yet they represent necessarily actualised possibilities, indeed necessary actualities of all available (possible?) possibilities. This systematically connected accumulation of modalities points to exemption from the sort (at least) of the accumulated modalities (this suggests the important qualification which will be introduced immediately below), in the same (or parallel) way in which systematically connected

47.

'Anything' covers both concrete and abstract things. In order to cover both cases, we have chosen the general formulation in the text.

48.

I may be forgiven for using metaphorical language for brevity's sake, where I do not think that a good-willed misunderstanding is likely to occur. For example, the grounding referred to is the distribution of modalities to various circumstances (primarily (non-simple) facts and general facts about concrete things, and their relations, the facts's relations) in accordance with what is prescribed, prevented or allowed in virtue of the structured system of determinants. Of course further "coming down to the earth", if I may put it so, is possible---but perhaps it is, hopefully, dispensable.

accumulations of temporal terms indicate a-temporality or timelessness<sup>49</sup>.

(We may, in this way, add to our list of defining peculiarities of the being of determinants that:

the being of determinants is (metaphysically) a-modal, although (or rather, picturesquely; and so) the ground of all (metaphysical) modality.).

Needless to say, there remains place for categorical and strictly logical modalities in the system of determinants. Thus, the circumstance that their connections and being are metaphysically a-modal is indeed categorially necessary. And again, that there is no determinant which both has and lacks a certain form of being is logically necessary. And so on.

Still, this is not the whole of the story. (And here comes to the picture the above promised important qualification). For we are certainly disposed to assign necessity to conditions and circumstances of the Form-World quite generally, not only for certain more or less restricted in scope or otherwise very general specific reasons like those referred to immediately above and ascribed to categorical and purely logical necessity. In other words, we surely feel inclined to ascribe necessity to the source of all metaphysical necessity and indeed modality. And this is not without justification. For by this forceful inclination we sharpen our awareness of the circumstance that, in a certain sense, the Determinant-World could not be otherwise than it is, in all and each of its details. And what were natural than to express this fundamental inconceivability of the possibility of its being otherwise, by claiming it to be necessary, in some sense or other, in its general structure and all its details alike?

The trouble lies in the specification of the required sense of 'necessity' here at work. We cannot go, at this place, in any depth regarding this inquiry. Yet, we may notice that this "necessity" makes the, dependent on it, distribution of metaphysical modalities to their proper receptors

itself "necessary", i.e. not "possible" (in the corresponding sense) to be otherwise.

The "necessity" pertaining to the structured system of determinants, as distinct from the metaphysical necessity (and, in general, modality) to which the said system gives rise by grounding it, is what grounds (or is the source of) the necessity of the latter necessity (as well as modality).

To give an example schema.

Suppose P-ness and P\*-ness are not connected with a D-D\* relation, nor are they connected in any other way (to be remembered that we have reserved the right for an independent inquiry into this problem) which would generate metaphysical necessities<sup>50</sup>.

49.

As when we may find suggestive to say that an eternal (atemporal) truth or being was, is and will be, or that it is all the infinite span of time (the totality of time, as it were, all the "was" and the "is" and the "will be") in one moment---and so on.

50.

We have deliberately selected and phrased this supposition in order to provoke the easy objection that we really regulate our structuring of the realm of determinants by paying heed to ordinary circumstances and their modalities, while we pretend to derive the validity of such ordinary, first-level modalities from the structured system of determinants itself. The answer to this kind of objection (which obviously, is much more general, indeed sweeping in its alleged significance, at the hands of what we call Generalised Empiricism) is simple enough, from where we stay: If B does really rest or is grounded (as on its fundamentum or source) on A, then what better reason could we possibly find in the World, for proceeding in our knowledge of A through B, than precisely the circumstance of B's being dependent (in the appropriate sense of 'dependent' in each particular case) on A?

Ontological precedence is not at all incompatible with epistemological posteriority: far from it, especially with beings with restricted abilities, like us, men.

Consider, secondly, the circumstance (or "fact"):

1/ something which is P, is P'.

Because of the relevant (actual) structure of determinants, (1) is metaphysically possible. Let us formulate this new circumstance as follows:

2/ it is metaphysically possible that (1).

Now ask: What is the modal status of (2)?

I think that it is intuitively evident, but I could also argue, that, quite generally, if you have a certain system of modal concepts, definite and rich enough in a certain sense regarding their meaning-content, then you cannot meaningfully reiterate them. For, roughly, if the system is really definite enough, it would pertain appropriately to a certain field of fact or discourse (as you prefer, my point here is quite general), whose being (or truth-value, respectively) would qualify or "modify" in certain ways. But then, these modal qualifications of that being (the object-being, we may say), could not themselves qualify their own "being" (for example, the 'is' of (2) as against the 'is' of (1)); for they just mark distinctions in the mode of the former, the object-being, and therefore have their own being in such distinctions of the object-being. To put it briefly: they are modes of a certain, well-defined being, say, of being<sub>1</sub>; hence, their own being, in so far as they are just such modes, cannot be of the type: being<sub>1</sub>.

(It must be emphasised by all means that no conflict is thereby created with Formal Modal Logic. For there, we have to do, as generally with in Formal Logic, not strictly speaking with notions having definite content but rather with forms of such notions; or, again, there we have to do with extremely abstract notions, with formal, structural features of content-notions which though, of course, abstracted (this is the aim at least) from the World of Reality and thought, yet they are abstracted from there.

To sketch both dogmatically and inadequately the outline of the conceptions: Formal Logic is primarily concerned with formalisable inference. A theory of such inference necessitates treatment of certain connected topics (e.g. theory of terms and statements). The whole enterprise must be based ultimately on the structure of reality just in order to work, to fulfil its purpose (connections of truths or falsities or rather of thoughts). But in abstracting from reality it is highly selective, because it is concerned with only those features of its structure which are most general and most serviceable and subservient in the formulation of a system of rules of inference which is to be as simple as possible, and as rich as it is feasible without impinging on its utter generality. Consequently, the aim and nature of Formal Logic require such a selection of the structural features of Reality to be used and such an ordering, combining, classifying etc. of them, as they could best serve its end and conform to its nature. Here we draw from reality and thought, not primarily aiming to reproduce their exact structure.

Quite otherwise with Metaphysics. The aim here is to exhibit the ultimate structure of reality. No question of further supervening, or indeed of anyway connected purposes is permissible. This manifests the difference? (And also points to a certain sense in which priority should be, ideally, ascribed to Metaphysics as against not indeed Formal Logic (the two disciplines are really "incommensurable"), but in respect of the Philosophy of Logic).).

In spite of the fact that a specific enough set of modalities pertains to a definite field of being, consisting in the latter's modes, and excludes from the domain of its modified object-being the modalities which it contains, yet it may of course be the case that another, connected set of modalities may apply to the previous etc. And further, it might also be the case that the two sets have certain features in common, such as to make it possible that a third

set may be involved in the case under consideration, which applies to both the object -being of the first set and to the first set itself. But it is one thing to acknowledge, in principle, the theoretical, abstract conceivability of such cases, and quite another to be misled by the procedures of Formal Modal Logic into various faulty (mainly, because oversimplified) theories of philosophically important and relevant modality.

But enough of this digression within the digression.

Granting, then, our view that definite, systematic, technical senses of modalities do not permit reiteration, we may begin to answer the above proposed question regarding (2), by holding that, anyway, the modal status of (2) cannot be one of metaphysical modality. (Provided that the notion of metaphysical modality is sufficiently articulated in its technical (i.e. functioning within the system) sense). The circumstance stated in (2) is of an entirely different order from the one stated in (1). And metaphysical modalities are (defined so as to be) applicable to circumstances like (1) ---not like (2).

But on the other hand, we do wish to claim that circumstance (2) could not be otherwise than it is. Clearly, if something (an ordinary circumstance) is metaphysically possible, it could not be metaphysically impossible. Hence, we seem inclined to acknowledge some sort of necessity as applying to it. I refrain at the moment of attempting to locate this sort of necessity. Yet we observe that the inclination to accept such an one, fits very well with our system. For just as the metaphysical possibility of circumstance (1) is grounded on the "fact" or on the actuality structure of the relevant part of the system of determinants (on the "fact" that (abstract) things in this sphere are so and so), so, also, the appropriate necessity of circumstance (2) (i.e. the appropriate necessity of it being metaphysically

possible that (I)) is grounded on the appropriate necessity of the system of determinants having as it actually has.

By the way such considerations indicate clearly, I submit, (though they only indicate or rather suggest at the present degree of articulation) the grave shortcomings and the inadequate (over) simplification of some of the contemporary philosophical (as opposed to the formal logical) Theory of Modality, with its preoccupation with just one set of rough distinctions derived from Formal Logic, on whose analogy everything relevant is forced, by Procrustean methods, to be modelled and shaped. The situation is the more (understandably) curious, the less it is the evolution from a mere primitive state of affairs. In fact, it is manifestly a retrogression, the more serious, the less it is prepared to concede a richer arsenal at the disposal of some forlorn traditions, and the more it, consequently, strives to interpretatively reduce even these to its own circumstance and condition---indeed predicament.

25/ Returning now to the point from which we digressed.

We may reformulate, in the light of the preceding discussion in the digression, the principle invoked at the end of section 23, by saying:

that actual being in the realm of determinants is metaphysically a-modal being, but that a certain necessity, nonetheless, applies to it,

there is nothing but actuality in this realm.

So that if we speak of a potentiality or possibility in the sphere of determinants, we mean simply the possibility of the actual qua actual, not the possibility of the actual qua possible. In other words, we do not mean that real potentiality which may or may not be actualised, but rather the abstract possibility which may be attributed even

to something necessary; if necessary, it is (actual); and if it is (actual), it is possible to be---otherwise it could not be. (It is true, this does not absolutely coincide with the required sense of possibility, since our actuality is, in one sense, a-modal. Yet it is also necessary in the above explained sense).

We now apply our, hopefully vindicated, provisionally at least, metaphysical principle, to the case which gave occasion for its conception and ~~discussion~~ discussion<sup>51</sup>.

We there concluded, that, according to the theory examined (the theory, that is, that the differential forms of forms of beings are themselves forms of being), fPI must be intrinsically susceptible of both fPmI and fPm.

But this, in view of our metaphysical principle, causes intellectual disaster. For since no unactualised potentiality remains in the Realm of Forms, fPI must be taken as being actually modified by the mentioned forms, so that to produce the simple, in the relevant sense, forms (fPI) + fPmI and (fPI) + fPm. But these derived forms require corresponding determinants to which peculiarly to attach as their proper, unique forms--for this is the sense in which we speak of forms of being--and consequently, we must conclude, the subsistence of two determinants, call them 'P<sub>ImI</sub>-ness' and 'P<sub>Imm</sub>-ness' respectively.

Now these two determinants, as it is evident from their "construction", must be determinates of P<sub>1</sub>-ness. And clearly, since fPmI and fPm are severally proper parts of fPm, they modify fPI not up to the extent to which the latter is modified by fPm, but, still, up to a certain extent which constitutes a proper part of the latter, more thoroughgoing modification. Therefore, P<sub>ImI</sub>-ness and P<sub>Imm</sub>-ness fall as determinates of P<sub>1</sub>-ness between it and P<sub>2</sub>-ness. But then P<sub>2</sub>-ness is not a proximate determinate of P<sub>1</sub>-ness---which is directly contradictory to our assumption that it is. Hence, the examined theory is false. (Reductio ad absurdum).

51.

See pp. 55-56.

26/ One may try to evade part(in fact:half) of the absurdity, by denying, not without apparent reason, that the modification of fPI by fPmI results in any form distinct from fPI. For, he might say plausibly enough, just the susceptibility on the part of fPI of modification by fPm, indicates that in fPI itself, fPmI is somehow included, since fPm is a modification of fPmI.

Now even if such an appeal was vindicated, enough burden would remain for the examined theory, in the form (literally as well as a figure of speech) of P<sub>I</sub>-ness<sup>52</sup>.

But still, I do not think that the attempt at evasion is, or could be, successful. For it would seem that the prima facie plausibility of the contention rests on the ambiguity of 'modification'. As we have already explained, this may mean (inter alia; one other thing it may mean is also the operation itself, i.e. the (eternal) derivation) either the ensuing upon the determination of the generic form specific form, that is the derived form, or that which consists in the abstracted (from the specific form) form, which by being assumed by the <sup>generic</sup> form produces or yields the specific one. And this distinction goes naturally together with the already drawn distinction between the D-D<sup>m</sup> relation and the d<sup>m</sup> relation<sup>53</sup>.

Having made these distinctions, there does not seem to be any compelling reason why P<sub>I</sub>-ness's susceptibility to assume fPm, i.e. the circumstance that P<sub>I</sub>-ness is d<sup>m</sup> related to P<sub>m</sub>-ness, must be due to the circumstance that fPI contains or includes somehow fPmI. For P<sub>mI</sub>-ness is D-D<sup>m</sup> related to P<sub>m</sub>-ness----and why should it be assumed that d<sup>m</sup> relations necessarily rest or are grounded on D-D<sup>m</sup> relations? The presumption would be to a negative answer (at least with regard to the thesis as stating a necessary and universal feature

52. This will be further exploited in the following section.

53. See pp. 49ff, and schema in n. 44.

of determinants), and especially in so far as the examined theory is concerned. For it is vital to it, to preserve intact the mentioned distinctions, which alone can guarantee the avoidance of certain unpleasant consequences, like the one that  $P_2$ -ness falls under both  $P_1$ -ness and  $P_{m1}$ -ness, the first in so far as it exhibits  $fP_1$ , the second in so far as it presents itself under  $fP_m$ , and, hence,  $fP_{m1}$ . And the distinctions are not left intact, at least on the ultimate level or in the last analysis, if we conceive of the  $d_m$  "relation" as based on the only proper or genuine, so to speak, D-D one.

In short, it does not seem necessary for a determinant, like  $P_1$ -ness, to be  $d_m$  "related" to someone else; here to  $P_{m1}$ -ness, in order to be  $d_m$  "related" to yet a third appropriate one, like  $P_m$ -ness in our example, ---- and this to hold universally about determinants.


But nevertheless, though the presumption arising out of the whole tenor of the theory may be for such a view, still the theory may impose as an ad hoc condition the discounted necessity and universality. This is why arguments, like the above one, resting on plausibilities and unplausibilities of a more or less ordinary and unconnected, unintegrated in a systematic account kind are far from conclusive.

It is incumbent then on us to criticise the consequences of such an improvisation on the part of the examined theory.

To save words, I shall again employ a schema exhibiting the type of connected, parallel lines of descent (or of increase in determinateness) which would result, as we shall see, according to the improvised theory.

(Some alterations made on the symbolism, for convenience, are self-explaining).

(For the extreme right-hand part of the schema and its form, I shall argue immediately below).



I shall criticise this theory after drawing corollaries from its principles under three headings, as follows:

I/ The absolutely determinate level.

$P_{j-1}^1$ -ness is a determinable, i.e. stands in "D-D<sup>m</sup> relation" to a determinate of it ( $P_j^1$ -ness), in that it is  $D_m$  "related" to the appropriate determinant of the second line, namely  $P_{j-2}^2$ -ness. And the same, with the appropriate changes in subscripts, holds in respect of the members of the second line vis-à-vis the third one, and so on.

Now suppose  $P_2^1$ -ness is an absolutely determinate determinant. This means that it is not connected in the D-D manner, and as a determinable, with any determinant. This, again, should be due, according always to the theory, to the circumstance that it is  $D_m$  "related" to the absolutely determinate corresponding member of the second line. For obviously, it could not be due to its not being  $D_m$  "related" at all to a corresponding member of the second line, since this would render it unable to stand even in the D-D "relation" to its own determinable;)-- D-D "relations" carrying with them, on the strength of the theory,  $d_m$  and  $D_m$  "relations" universally and necessarily.

Correspondingly for the other lines.

II/ The highest determinable terminus.

$P_1^1$ -ness is a determinate, i.e. stands in D-D "relation" to its determinable ( $P_0^1$ -ness), in that it is  $D_m$  "related" to the appropriate determinant of the second line, which in turn stands in  $d_m$  "relation" to  $P_0^1$ -ness. The appropriate determinant being here  $P_0^2$ -ness.

Now suppose  $P_0^1$ -ness is the highest determinable of its line. This means that it cannot be further (towards the direction of determinability) analysed through a D-D/ $d_m$ / $D_m$  scheme of "relations". Therefore it must be  $d_m$  "related" to the highest determinable of the second line. (The proof is obvious).

Similarly, for the rest of the lines considered.

### III/ Right hand extremity.

But these restrictions on the subsequent(right) line drawn from the character of the previous(left) one, determine also the number of members of the former, given the number of members belonging to the latter<sup>54</sup>.

So that if we begin with  $n$  members of the first line, the second line must have  $n-1$ , the third  $n-2$ , and so on. (As it is easy to verify). Consequently we must end with a line comprising just one member.

Now this one member, being (vacuously) the last member of its line, must be an absolutely determinate determinant. Being also (vacuously) the first member of its line, it must be the highest determinable of its line. The satisfaction of both of these conditions entails that that one member must be an absolutely determinate determinant which does not fall under any determinant whatsoever, being quite unique. and, as it were, absolutely incommunicable or unsociable--- a situation already suspect in view of what appear to be minimal conditions as regards the multiplicity of such a line of descent<sup>55</sup>. But let us waive this consideration, here.

And now the devastating consequences.

The various determinants represented in our scheme, belong to families of co-ordinate determinants, each family consisting in members having the same degree of determinateness and affiliated differences, each family being subsumed under one, certain determinable. So  $P_j^i$ -ness, belongs to the family of the proximate determinates of  $P_{j-1}^i$ -ness. Now, since  $P_j^i$ -ness has its form <sup>derived</sup> from the modification of  $P_{j-1}^i$  by the form of  $P_{j-1}^{i+1}$ -ness, its co-ordinated members must have their

54.

The number of members is, correctly speaking, the number of families of determinates, each family having a certain degree of determinateness, if I may so speak. We shall see the crucial importance of this presently.

55.

See p. 53, supra.

forms resulting from the modification of the same generic form  $P_{j-1}^i$  by co-ordinated members to  $P_{j-1}^{i+1}$ -ness. So much is surely required by the unity of the families proximately subjoined under any determinant, or, in other words, to the same effect, by the unity of the principium divisionis which breaks down a certain generic unity to its proximately specific multiplicity.

The multiplicity, then, of, say, the family to which  $P_j^i$ -ness belongs, necessitates an equally-numbered multiplicity of the family to which  $P_{j-1}^{i+1}$ -ness belongs. And, this in its turn, requires an equally-numbered multiplicity of the family, from the variety of the forms of which members, it draws the variety of the forms of its own members, namely, it requires an equally-numbered multiplicity on the part of the family to which  $P_{j-2}^{i+2}$ -ness belongs.

Pursuing this successive series of requirements, we shall inevitably come to some first member of some one of the lines in our scheme----which, needless to repeat, is a scheme deduced from the principles of the examined theory. Let us suppose that we finally reach  $P_0^x$ -ness. It is evident that this determinant would have to satisfy the following two conditions:

a/ it must be a highest determinable, i.e. a determinant which does not fall under any other determinable as one of the latter's determinates.

b/ it must belong to a family of determinants whose members present a certain multiplicity in their forms deriving from the modification of a generic form, proximately superordinated over them, by an equally-numbered variety of forms belonging, as a family, to the next line of determination and the appropriate place.

Obviously, satisfaction of both conditions (a) and (b) is logically impossible. Thus, we obtain a new reductio ad absurdum of the examined theory.

(As a limiting case, if we had begun by from the last member of the first line and its family, we should have ended with ascribing a family with an equally-numbered multiplicity to  $P_0^{x+1}$ -ness----which makes the above, in general, deduced impossibility more vivid).

27/ We, or rather one, may elaborate further, if he wishes.

For example, if the theory under examination included a purely additive (conjunctive, juxtapositive) conception of the derivation of the form of the determinate out of the form of its determinable and the form of the specific difference (as we took the liberty to call it), then it would have to face the absurd consequence of one and the same determinant ( $P_2$ -ness) falling under two distinct determinables ( $P_{iml}$ -ness and  $P_{imm}$ -ness); for according to an additive conception, the derivation might (timelessly) proceed indifferently either as:

$$fP_1 + fP_{mi} + fP_{im}$$

or as:

$$fP_1 + fP_{mi} + fP_{im}$$

and so, on the first acceptance we would have the net result falling under  $P_{iml}$ -ness ( $fP_{iml} = fP_1 + fP_{mi}$ ), whereas on the second, it would fall under  $P_{imm}$ -ness ( $fP_{imm} = fP_1 + fP_{im}$ ).

Now if the theory renounced such a conception (as we have, right from the beginning of its examination, assumed it to do) and substituted in its place the organic-additive notion of modification, it would escape the above stated particular absurdity only to find itself into another.

By denouncing the former, purely additive, conception, it would claim that the order of "production" or "addition" or "derivation" is not indifferent. And so, though  $P_{iml}$ -ness must fall in between  $P_1$ -ness and  $P_2$ -ness and in the same line of descent (and this is dreadful enough by itself, as we have seen), still there is no such necessity for  $P_{imm}$ -ness; indeed,  $P_{imm}$ -ness does not fall in the same line of descent, defined by  $P_1$ -ness and  $P_2$ -ness: for in the timeless process of the derivation of  $fP_2$  from  $fP_1$ ,  $fP_1$  does not immediately encounter  $fP_{im}$ .

Thus, we would to say consistently with this approach, that only  $P_{Imm}$ -ness intervenes between  $P_I$ -ness and  $P_2$ -ness in the same line of determinants connected by the D-D<sup>\*</sup> relation<sup>56</sup>. But then what place should be accorded to  $P_{Imm}$ -ness after all? Obviously it cannot be subsumed under  $P_{Imm}$ -ness. For this would mean that we are permitted to view  $fP_{Imm}$  as being "produced" also<sup>56</sup> through the assuming by  $fP_{Im}$  of the form  $fP_I$ . But then  $d_m$  and  $D_m$  "relations" are interchanged, and so the distinction between generic forms and forms of specific differences collapses, and we are reduced to the already condemned doctrine of the additive agglomeration of two forms yielding another. Besides, being permitted to view  $P_{Imm}$ -ness as a determinate of  $P_{Im}$ -ness, we must also see it as a modifier of  $fP_m$ , and, hence, of  $fP_2$ ; whence we obtain the complete absurdity of a form essentially incorporating a certain generic form and nonetheless acting as a modifier of a specific form of that selfsame generic form.

Having thus rejected the only other even remotely plausible candidate, appearing with some sham-plausibility to accommodate  $P_{Imm}$ -ness, we cannot but claim, what from the beginning should have been clear, that  $P_{Imm}$ -ness, according to the nature of the case, and the assumptions of the examined theory, must fall under  $P_I$ -ness. So, it must belong to a family of determinates of  $P_I$ -ness different from that family to which  $P_2$ -ness belongs; and both families would be proximate to  $P_I$ -ness, of course. But this is impossible<sup>57</sup>. The only remaining alternative is that the mentioned family lies "between"  $P_I$ -ness and the second family (the proper one), but this reduces us once again to the view already dismissed right at the beginning<sup>58</sup> as wholly unacceptable.

56. The other alternative being, of course, that it derives through the assuming by  $fP_I$  of the form  $fP_{Im}$ .

57. See p. 53. Even if, per impossibile, it were not impossible, the achieved conclusion above would be contradictory to our unexceptionable assumption (based on the possibility, at least, if not necessity, of such situations) that, at any rate  $P_I$ -ness and  $P_2$ -ness satisfy the condition of uniqueness of proximately subordinated family. On this, see pp. 53-54.

26/ I trust, it will be conceded that the theory in question, taken in the thoroughly ontological context of our investigations, as holding of abstract things, and not as simply articulating the structure of our concepts, proves under examination to be intrinsically wrong, generating a host of incompatibilities, incoherences, absurdities and awkwardnesses, which can be multiplied to a much more greater number than we have done, if one cares to pursue further such an unprofitable inquiry. The theory indeed seems to act as a source or matrix of unacceptabilities, a signally significant token of being fundamentally erroneous.

We conclude then by rejecting the theory.

That is, we conclude that forms of forms of being are not themselves forms of being. In other words, that forms corresponding to specific differences are not to be taken as forms on a par with generic and specific forms. And since forms of being are the proper and peculiar forms of determinants, we also conclude that there are no determinants corresponding to specific differences.

27/ One may object that we have not really proven so much. He might say, that what we have succeeded in doing, if indeed anything at all, is rather to show that the rejected theory cannot be true as a universal and necessary account of the structure of determinants (in the relevant features), as something essentially (our strong sense) pertaining to determinants. And this, he could continue, does not have the least tendency to exclude the possibility of such an account being correct in respect of some parts of the Realm of Determinants, though, admittedly not of all.

But on reflection this countercontention proves not to be correct. For our arguments would equally well apply, producing inconsistency and absurdity, at any part of the said realm to which the criticised theory could have been held to represent truly its structure. Consequently, we are entitled to the general, unqualified conclusions which we drew in the previous section, and hence to the unrestricted rejection of the theory in question.