

Part B

28/ Suppose, once more, that P_1 -ness and P_2 -ness are \neq respectively, a certain determinant and one of its proximate determinates, having, or presenting the corresponding formae essendi $fP1$ and $fP2$:

$fP2$ is a specific form of being, one of those coordinate forms of being in which (or rather as ag which) $fP1$ manifests, exhibits or presents itself; This manifestation, exhibition or presentation is a specification or determination. But, and this is the general conclusion of Part A, we must not construe such specification or determination as the addition of a form of being fpm to $fP1$ ---whether by "addition" we understand an external agglomerative juxtaposition, or an internal cohesive and, as it were, organic mixture or union. (The explanation of these latter quasi-metaphorical formulations was given in Part A of the present Essay).

It is to be noted, with a view also to prelude and meet an anticipated objection, that we are not at all denying--because there is no sense in denying a way of speaking--that $fP2$ may be viewed as the result of the assuming on the part of $fP1$ of a certain form, which considered in abstraction from the complex form of being $fP2$ may be taken as the form of the specific difference which by being added to (or better, by being assumed by) $fP1$ constitutes $fP2$; Only (and this is the metaphysical important thing) this abstracted form of the specific difference is not a form of being, and, hence, the specific difference itself is no real determinant¹.

I. Lest this may be attacked as paradoxical, I hasten to remind on the one hand that I firmly draw a distinction between concepts and what is more or less adequately thought in concepts, and on the other that determinants for a very restricted subject of what may be thought in general concepts.

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Now fP_2 as a particular manifestation of fP_1 is, evidently, distinct from it: the manifestation is necessarily distinct from the manifested, since the manifestation is constituted by a particular, specific modification of the being of the manifested. But this distinctness, as regards being, of the two said forms of being implies, as it can be easily shown, the separate subsistence, as regards thing and subject, of the determinants whose peculiar forms the mentioned forms of being are. For, ex hypothesi, one determinant has or presents itself under just one form of being---its peculiar and proper form of being. So, there cannot be two determinants, as things, having one and the same form of being, nor one determinant presenting itself under two distinct forms of being.

(Before proceeding, I may note that the distinction "as regards being/as regards subject" used above, constitutes another aspect of the distinction between notional and factual identity and otherness^I, which again has its roots in the valuable Aristotelian distinction between identity, otherness etc. according to being or definition, and according to subject^I).

Thus, we may say that in our case, notional difference entails factual one, i.e. numerical difference or individual otherness:

But, it should be added, the separate subsistence of both F_1 -ness and F_2 -ness does not entail their mutually or one-sided independent subsistence, nor, more generally, does it prejudice questions concerning their respective grade of self-subsistence or self-sufficiency of being. So the metaphysical problems of chapters 9-II remain still untouched:

29/ But a dangerous objection may be urged here. The objector may claim that if we are to base the separateness in subsistence between F_1 -ness and F_2 -ness upon the distinctness in being of fP_1 and fP_2 , then we cannot justifiably assert this separateness, simply because the alleged distinctness is fictitious, at least in respect of the degree needed. Indeed, he may propose,

I.

See Part A, pp. 24-25 and n. 17.

fP1 and fP2 are distinct only in the sense in which a part is distinct from the whole to which it belongs as a part: fP1 and is a proper part of fP2. But this sense is not strong enough, it will be contended, to allow the inference to the separate subsistence of the determinants in question.

Notice that if the objection is valid, we cannot continue to uphold the claimed separateness, save by grounding it upon other, more safe ground, or by considering it self-evident. But is it valid?

In fact, I do not think that we can successfully confront the objection by trying to deny that fP1 is a part of fP2. For forms of being are not things, nor entities, nor, even, objects; indeed they are not part of the fundamental inventory of all reality, of whichever sort and grade; they do not constitute a category of objects---though, of course, it should be emphasised, forms of being is a category of being; they are rather, to speak figuratively, one step removed from the fundamental structure of reality, one step nearer the surface or appearance, and thus, correspondingly, the place of their notion in an adequate system must grant them an "easied" degree of technicality in respect to the notions answering to items belonging really to the fundamental core itself. Now this relaxed condition of theirs as regards the strictness of the conformity to rigid metaphysical (and higher) laws, renders it possible to each one of them to be, for example and inter alia, the one and the same form of being under which many concrete things present themselves (or at least may present themselves)---thus exhibiting and combining in a way and in a certain respect the contradictory peculiarities of the immanent instances and the transcendent determinants. How, then, could we reasonably deny that one and the same form of being peculiarly and properly attached to a certain determinant may simultaneously be part of the form of being peculiarly and properly attached to another determinant---even granting the separateness of determinants, supposing it to be grounded differently than by recourse to the criticised strong distinctness of the corresponding forms of being? And how could we also deny that the one and the same form of being above mentioned may, further on, be proper part of various other determinants---in fact of all determinate determinants of F_I-ness?

More than this absolute unwarrantability in such denials (unwarrantability which cannot be circumvented or nullified even by the reversal of the procedure, i.e. by admitting the separateness of the determinants, and accepting the principle according to which separate determinants have distinct characteristic forms of being--for this would only prove the distinctness of the corresponding forms in general and would leave open the here examined question of a strong distinctness, excluding the weaker and therefore insufficient part/whole one), there is positive and direct argument against them.

Thus, suppose a concrete thing presenting itself under the form fP_2 . Obviously it also presents itself under the form fP_1 . But now, at least in such a case, the two forms cannot possibly avoid being connected the one as a constituent part of the other. For fP_2 just is a particular modification of fP_1 , it is fP_1 -modified--thus--and--thus. Therefore the one includes the other as a constitutive part of its specific form of being. And further, these being forms of being and not objects, they cannot differ in respect of subject or factually---except by being attached, if at all this is permissible (we abstract for the moment from this question), to different objects. But here this is not the case. So what can now sustain their absolute distinctness? Not they themselves as forms of being; nor the attachment to different objects, since they are *ex hypothesi* attached to one and the same thing. We then conclude that they are distinct as part and whole ---and that this is so, even if, per impossibile, they were distinct otherwise and in a stronger sense, in the realm of determinants. But then, this cannot remain even as a abstract possibility: for it is one and the same form of being which is attached in different ways to a (in so far as it is P_2) and P_2 -ness. Consequently, if the form of being attached to a (as being P_2) contains as proper constitutive parts the form fP_2 , so does the form of being attached to P_2 -ness---i.e. the same form of being.

It follows that if we are to protect our thesis from the objection, we must try to invalidate the latter by attacking the second of its two main pillars. To this effect, we should show that the weak, if you like, distinctness between part and whole suffices to support the inference to the separateness

(in being and existence) of the corresponding determinants. And indeed this is feasible to be shown---the middle term, as it were, of the proof consisting in the unity of a form of being, notwithstanding the accompanying diversity of constitutive "parts". Thus, we need here an inquiry in order to explain and establish this "middle term".

Before doing this, we must perhaps emphasise that, whereas 'part' and 'whole' as above preliminarily used were meant in their broad but ordinary signification, we shall in the sequel reserve these terms for technical senses of some precision. There would be thus no real contradiction involved, if we find ourselves subsequently denying the constitution of a form of being on the pattern "part/whole", in spite of what has been already said; for the denial will, of course, concern the technical senses above anticipated and presently to be defined.

30/ There are various degrees or kinds of unity or unification¹. Or better, there are various degrees of intensity or "closeness" of unity or unification, depending on the kind of the latter². But generally, in each case of unification, it is to be distinguished the unity itself (of whichever

1. In this usage (that is, with that 'or'), difference of degree coincides with difference of kind, the various so called degrees not being homogeneous or belonging to a homogeneous field of mere quantitative variation.

2. In this usage, difference of degree is distinguished from (though closely connected with, or rather dependent on) difference of kind, and in the way in which they are usually distinguished: the latter connotes principally heterogeneity of the differing items (though an heterogeneity subsumed by implication under a higher generic homogeneity), whereas the former explicitly connotes homogeneity in respect of a common intensive magnitude or quantity. But in cases like the present one, this intensive magnitude or quantity is not extrinsic to the kind or essence of the compared items, but depends entirely, both in respect of its character and of its variation, on the kinds or essences of them. And it is this peculiarity of such cases, which prompts us, and allows us, to make use of the same terminology in the sense mentioned in the previous note as well. There is, of course, no real inconsistency involved in these double uses.

kind and degree) from both the united or unified items and the United^I --- as well as these latter, the one from the others. And evidently, the (kind of the) way in which the united items are connected one to another and to the United, determines the kind and degree of the corresponding unity. We may thus attempt to distinguish some general categories of unity, each one of which is susceptible of further subdivision into various subcategories. But we shall need, in order to effect adequately this general division, some distinctions among connections and relations, which must therefore be explained (only too briefly²) in advance.

In Essay VI we distinguished Instanced and Uninstanced Relations³. We may correspondingly speak here in principle of Instanced and Uninstanced Connections, without prejudicing the question of the substantial and real feasibility of the application of both terms of the distinction to all sorts of connection.

Now we call 'internal' all instanced connections (and 'external' all uninstanced ones), thus reserving this appellation to connections which, by their very nature, have a bearing, normally, on the non-relational being of the objects connected by them. (The 'normally' occurs in order to call into notice the circumstance that it is only in respect of some at least of the connected objects that the satisfaction of the condition is really required). Hence, we may also say, without qualification, that connective determinations are internal, if they involve instanced connections and concern objects whose actual connecting by the said connections affects generally their non-connective being as well.

This amounts to a metaphysically (and theoretically) clear cut division. Yet, it is of the utmost importance to be emphasised (because it is also historically illuminating in respect to the famous relevant and synonymous problem) that the distinction must be carefully distinguished from the evi-

I. I write 'United', with capital 'U', in order to denote the resulting unified "product" of the unification, as distinct both from its unity and from the unified or united items which in their connection constitute it. I do not here avail myself of such substantives as 'whole', 'complex', 'compound' etc., reserving them for the signification of more specific kinds of results of unification.

2. For a fuller discussion we refer to a special treatment of connections.

dently different distinction between essential and non-essential connections, where essential are obtaining connections belonging to the essence or the essential being-something (or "Sosein") of some at least of the connected objects, non-essential those belonging to the essential determination of none of the connected objects.

(By 'essential' here, that sense is meant which applies to determinations of individual objects and not of kinds of them¹. Therefore, the distinction essential/non-essential has full application only in the case of relational or non-relational determinations of concrete things (according to the explications of Essay III), but loses all significance in the case of determinations of objects belonging to any other category of object (for example, determinants have their being totally exempt from the jurisdiction of the principles governing the said distinction²), since every determination is necessary, or better "supra-necessary"³. But since, as will become clear after a while, we are interested to group together with the properly essential determinations of concrete things all necessary (properly or after a, stronger, fashion) determinations of objects, we shall use in the present context the expression in question to cover both kinds of situation, namely, we shall mean by 'essential': either properly essential (in case that concrete things are concerned) or necessarily pertaining (in all other cases, always with individuals concerned:).

The difference between the above mentioned two distinctions is reflected, among other things, in the circumstance that, whereas the former (external/internal) is a distinction of connections, and of them considered in themselves and according to their own nature, the latter (essential/non-

3. ((From previous page)).

Briefly, the distinction is as follows: A relation is an instanced one, if its holding between some terms entails, or rather more strongly, is metaphysically equivalent with the determination of at least one of those terms by a certain, specified, corresponding non-relational determinant; otherwise, the relation is uninstanced.

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3.

See Part A, n. II (p. 14).

This is established in Essay VII, Part A p. 27.

See the discussion on the modality of determinations of determinants in Part A, pp. 56-65

essential) is a distinction of determinations (not barely of determinants) in general (not only of connective ones, but both of connective and non-connective), and indeed primarily and in strict parlance, it is a distinction of determinations of concrete things specifically, and of these considered in a special respect, namely in respect of their successive obtaining in time.

By reason of the noticed difference, neither all essential connective determinations must necessarily be internal ones (or, more precisely: must be effected through internal connective-determinants), nor is the converse universally and necessarily the case. Indeed, all combinations of the four terms of the two distinctions are, in principle and theoretically, possible. (And I must emphasise that we are not at all here concerned with the question of the reality of such theoretical possibilities, or rather conceivabilities on the part of mere subjective thought). Now if we call internal and essential connective determinations "intrinsic," we may be able, I submit, to shed some light to part at least of the confusion in the traditional "dialectics" of the problem of Internal and External Relations, namely to the part originating in not seeing or refusing to accept the distinction between internal and intrinsic relational determinations. But this is not the right place to pursue this topic.

And now, we may proceed to the promised distinction of sorts of unity.

A/ We have, to begin with, the case where the united items are not connected into the unity of a United by and through essential connections (intrinsic or not), but by and through non-essential ones. This does not, of course, exclude, at least in principle, the possibility of the subsistence (partly or to the whole extent) among the united items of essential connections: what is required, is that such connections, if ~~as~~ obtaining, are not the ones constituting the unity of the resulting United---or, in other words, that the unity is not an one effected by means of such connections, that the United is not an United of the united-items-qua-connected-by-such-essential-connections.

Let us call such a United, 'mixture', and the corresponding united items 'mixed' ones. Obviously, 'mixture' and 'mixed' are used in this connection technically, since they cover, inter alia, both cases of proper mechanical mixtures and such of unmingled binding or gluing or, in general, externally forced placing together, or even just heaping.

B/ Here the connections (among the united items) constitutive of the unity are essential. But this notwithstanding, some sort and degree of independence is preserved for the united items---a very relaxed one indeed, if compared with the independence of the mixed items. The metaphysical foundation of this characteristic is the following: the essential being-something (the essential "Sosein") of the united items is not exhausted by the essential connections (and their necessary implications) constitutive of the unity of the present type. Thus it is possible in such a case to remove, as it were, in thought or in reality, the said essential connections, without thereby extinguishing or nullifying everything concerned; there still remain items, truly quite different in kind from the united ones, but yet items of a certain kind or with a certain nature, which further can be considered as subjects (substrates) yielding the united items upon the superimposition, as further essential form, of the uniting essential connections in question.

Let us call such a United 'whole', and the united items of such a case 'parts' of it.

(A further subdivision of the present category may be effected through the distinction of intrinsic and non-intrinsic connections among the essential ones).

C/ There remains a third, and last, possibility. In this, the relevant unity is based on essential connections which completely exhaust the essential being-something of the involved united items. That is, their essential "Sosein" consists entirely in exactly those essential connections (and of course, on what they necessarily entail in virtue of their own being) which constitute the unity of the corre-

sponding United. Thus the removal, in thought or in reality, of these connections leaves no object behind, of whatever kind: there only remains bare first matter (in case of concrete things).

We may call items united through such a unity 'elements', and the corresponding United 'complex'. As with the former cases, the terms are obviously used technically in the present context.

Important results may be deduced from the above sketched, apparently exhaustive, division. Thus:

1/ In (C) the essential connections involved must necessarily be intrinsic ones; for they cannot but be instanced, and hence internal, connections, because of the validity of a metaphysical (in broad sense; more specifically, categorial) principle, according to which, it is not (categorially) possible that there should exist objects whose entire essential being ("Sosein"), if they indeed have such, consists in uninstanced connective determinations.

The proof of the invoked principle may be given as follows. An object having "Sosein" is nothing else than first matter¹ determined by a certain complete determination². In point of immediate constitution (as distinct from the various (kinds of) causes (metaphysical ones; conceived in broad ontological sense) of such constitution), this means that the constitutive immanent elements of an object are on the one hand matter and on the other hand instances of those determinants, which are the formal causes³ (those which formally cause) the corresponding determinations of the object.

1. We have not, in truth, even touched (save incidentally and indirectly) the problems centring round the metaphysical notion of matter, and especially those concerning first matter---let alone developed an adequate account of them, and incorporated it consistently within our system. Nor do we intend to fill this gap in the present dissertation. Therefore, we here rely on the traditional (basically Aristotelian) treatment of the problems involved, as well as on the traditional fundamental schemes supporting their solutions.

2. Concerning this notion, in its particular application to concrete things, see, for the more complete formulation, Essay VI, pp. 3-5.

Thus inherence of instances is the one indispensable immanent part in the inner constitution of an object and, therefore, an object without instances is an ontological contradiction. Hence, there cannot be an object whose entire being ("Sosein")---and a fortiori, whose essential being---consists solely in un-instanced connective determinations.

(One should notice that the proof as above given, was carried on in terms of instances, thus implying a concrete thing as subject, and not just any entity in general. (For, anyway, the restriction among all objects to entities is justifiable, since only entities, ex definitio, have strictly speaking being¹). But as we shall see below, a bifurcation in matter and immanent form (which evidently plays there the role of instances) is also available in the case of determinants. As to instances themselves, their noted divergence between existence and "Sosein" makes them un-thinglike entities and thus unfit to conform to the principle in question).

11/ Accidental determinations do not pertain to objects outside the category of concrete things. The being of such objects (in so far as they do have being, and after the fashion they have it) is, as we have already detailed in respect of determinants², exclusively necessary or rather supra-necessary, and, hence, transcending the essential/accidental distinction, in the latter's applicability to individuals (and indeed, because of the time-factor involved, to concrete things alone). Thus, kind (A) of unity cannot appertain but to concrete things, since only concrete things have non-essential (in the broad sense defined above³) determinations; only such objects can be united in this particular way.

1. See Part A, pp. 1-4.

2. See Part A, pp. 56-65.

3. See above, p. 7.

iii/ Contrariwise as regards kinds (B) and (C). They are capable, in principle, of application to objects of whatever category. Thus, for example, in the case of kind (C), concrete things may be united in this way; their accidental properties cannot remain attached to their matter after the annihilation (in thought or in reality) of their total essential (intrinsically connective in our present case) form, which simultaneously, ex hypothesi, constitutes the uniting bond of the corresponding union.

The reservation implicit in the expression 'in principle' above, has its source in the hesitation to admit the substantial, ontological possibility (as distinct from mere subjective conceivability) of concrete things having their entire essential being constituted exclusively and exhaustively by relational (even intrinsically and thus "instancedly" relational determinations. And if it is correct, as I think it is though I shall not pursue here a strict metaphysical proof of it, that there does not subsist such a real possibility, then we deduce the inapplicability of this third type of a union to the Concrete World, thus achieving a certain symmetry with type (A) applying exclusively to the World of Concreteness, type (C) pertaining to any other category of objects, in which questions of unity may rightfully arise, save^{ts} the category of concrete things, and type (B) being equally applicable to both realms of reality;

iv/ The three kinds of unity above enumerated are ordered in accordance with the degree of independence from the United Total, which they preserve for the united items unified through them. To see this clearly, we may observe, firstly, that the forma essendi of the United as such consists, in the connections constituting the unity of the united items. In all types (A), (B) and (C), removal of this forma essendi destroys the United Total; evidently the United and its unity go together. But the effects of such a removal as regards the united items differ in each case; Thus, in type (A), the removal leaves untouched the essential being (and even, possibly,

the greater part of the accidental being as well) of the united items; we have before and after the removal the same objects, previously mixed, now unmixed. (Of course, there may be cases where such a union is of a sort which renders impossible in practice its dissolution without the simultaneous or, at any rate, consequent destruction of the mixed items not only as such (i. e. as mixed), but even as the objects which they are apart from the mixture. But this is obviously irrelevant to our point). The independence of the united items from the United Total is, in the present case, maximal. We may wish to express this point by saying that the mixed items (as the objects they are in abstraction from their being mixed, and therefore, because of the nature of the case, as the objects they are even under the condition of being mixed (though not qua mixed)---since these two sets of objects are identical materially, specifically and even numerically) are prior to the mixed Total, where, needless to be said, the priority involved is a sort of ontological priority.

The case is different with type (B). Here, the removal of the uniting connections leaves the objects participating in the connection essentially altered, and thus substantially changed---though only partially so. Hence, these objects are different (substantially as well as numerically) during the subsistence of their union and after its dissolution (or before its formation)---and only materially the same. Thus, the parts of a whole considered as parts, and the parts of it considered apart from the whole-nexus, are materially the same, essentially partly the same, partly different, and numerically different (since any change in essence entails substantial and individual otherness). We see then, their independence from the whole is ambivalent, medium. This circumstance may be expressed by saying that the parts are partly prior and partly simultaneous to the whole.

We may add, still in regard of the present type, that in case of such a unity of concrete things, practical impossibilities of formation or dissolution of a whole

composed from such objects is irrelevant to our purposes. On the other hand, when the unities considered concern objects other than concrete things, that is objects all of which have a-temporal being (in so far as, of course, they do have being), the terms 'formation' and 'dissolution' must be understood in a correspondingly a-temporal, ontological sense. Of course, the priority and simultaneity mentioned at the end of the previous paragraph are, anyway, not temporal, just as with the previous type.

With type (C) we reach the other extreme of the scale whose lower, as it were, extremity is occupied by case (A), and whose middle point coincides with cases belonging to type (B). The elements of a complex qua elements, and the elements of the same complex as independent of this its complexity are only materially the same, but totally different in respect of essence, and surely different numerically (other) ---if indeed such a question seems to emerge at all. For truly, in all cases even those involving objects having accidental determinations (i.e. concrete things), there does not even remain an object apart from the complex after the dissolution of its unity, to be compared with the elements of the latter qua elements in it---but only bare matter, which evidently is not an object, though an immanent constituent of objects, or rather of some categories of object. Thus the independence, in the present case, of the united items from the United Total is minimal. We may formulate this, by saying that elements are completely simultaneous with the complex whose elements they are, and which is constituted by their connection.

(Needless to be noted that similar remarks, as those made for the other two cases, apply equally well to the present type).

31/ We now return at the beginning of chapter 30. The question now to face us should be What kind of unity is the one belonging to forms of being?

It is to be remarked, to begin with, that a form of being is not an object. Consequently, strictly speaking, the above made division does not pertain to forms of being. Clearly, for example, we cannot speak about the essential or other being of a form of being without being involved in a regressus ad infinitum---and we have shown in Essay V that such regressi, if real and, so to speak, ontological (and not operational in character), are always vicious.

But then, on the other hand, we must surely distinguish in respect of a certain specific form of being firstly this form itself, secondly its proximately generic form, and thirdly and finally that modification which, in being actually assumed by the latter results in, or produces, or yields the former. And is it not the case, one may plausibly ask, that a certain unity, and a very strong one for that matter, subsists, unifying in the specific form both the generic form and its relevant modification?

We are thus driven to apply to the present case (as well to various similar cases) the above made division in an analogous way. We then see, that by cancelling the modifying connection connecting the generic form and its modification (meaning of course by 'modification' here the content according to which the generic form is modified rather than the modifying itself), we must suppose the two connected items as essentially changed---or at least, one of them; but there is no necessity, it would appear, to suppose them completely annihilated. Consequently, and according to this analogical consideration, the unity concerned must be a unity analogous to the unity of a whole. (Hence, by the way, we would have been shown, after all, and under the condition of the correctness of these appearances, to be even technically (as distinct from ordinarily) correct in our early formulations of chapter 29).

There is nonetheless, even conceding for the sake of argument the validity of the above result, one annoying exception. Suppose the generic nature concerned to be Being ("Sosein") itself. Then, given that every form-of-being is a form (or manifestation) of Being itself, it follows that the

suppression of the modification-connection between Being itself and the modification of it yielding the considered, in the given case, particular form of being must necessarily entail the annihilation of the all-inclusive form---according to the train of thought followed in the previous paragraph. For Being itself being absolutely simple in respect to the various forms of being, it cannot, to begin with, but either be annihilated completely or preserved intact. But on this latter supposition we cannot suppose even the first modifying form annihilated or essentially changed, since Being itself, though absolutely simple, nevertheless is, by reason of its own nature, susceptible of being modified according to the various modifying forms, in accordance with which it can be, and is, modified. All these forms are present, as we shall see, after some fashion in it, though in utter actual simplicity---and indeed, as we again shall see in the sequel, emerge out of it by production, derivation, or rather procession. Thus, the preservation of Being itself in our case entails the unaltered preservation of the whole system of forms in all its detail---something which would contradict our hypothesis of the annihilation of one specific form of being and of its unity, in which that form of being is founded. We have then to accept that, in the particular at least case examined, the extinction of the unity of a form of being destroys totally, besides the form of being in question itself, one of its elements as well.

But this unique exception, worked from within the kind of argumentation observed in allegedly establishing the conclusion that the unity of forms of being is of the kind of the unity of a whole, should make us cautious and even suspicious of the validity of the argumentation employed. And in fact, the inference is defective, as can be easily discerned by contrasting it with the following valid one.

Given a certain generic form of being and one of its definite, particular, proximate modifications, we may distinguish, let us repeat, the modifying form (not: form of being) which by and through being assumed by the generic form of being results in the corresponding proximate specific form of being. The actual modification, the actual assuming of

the modifying form (which is an eternal necessity or necessary, eternal actualisation of the corresponding possibility as we have already explained in Part A) is that uniting bond which forms out of the two former forms the specific form of being as the corresponding United. Suppose now that we consider this uniting bond as cancelled. Obviously, the United (the specific form of being) is simultaneously annihilated. But what of the two united items? Clearly, it is the least which we must say, that they should undergo some essential change or alteration.

Now the change involved should be of such a nature, that the resulting items must be capable (in a relevant, strong enough, but not necessarily to be specified, sense of possibility) of being re-transformed to their initial content, by assuming exactly the cancelled connection and whatever else this necessarily entails. This requirement of the possibility of re-transformation to their initial content, is nothing more than the requirement of the corresponding possibility of transformation, viewed, as it were, from the other end, or the reverse side of it, since we are not concerned with two removals or two impositions of two distinct forms (in which case questions of compatibility would naturally and correctly arise), but simply with a removal and a re-imposition of one and the same form.

Having this result in mind, and in order to determine exactly the effect of the said removal upon the two constituent forms, let us examine them separately.

a/ The modification concerned is defined in its being a particular, definite, proximate modification of the generic form of being. (Let it be once more tediously reminded that the 'modification' signifies the content of the modifying rather than the modifying itself). Thus an essential change would transform it either to another such modification of the same generic form of being, or to a modification (similar or dissimilar) of another form of being. But in both cases, the satisfaction of the above stated condition concerning the possibility of a re-transformation is impossible. For, regarding

the first alternative, different proximate modifications of one and the same form of being are not, to say the least, immediately transformable the one to the other, since, if at all this could be genuinely possible, we should first remove the definite particularity of the first and then impose that of the second¹; and, regarding the second alternative, the imposition on the new modification of any amount, as it were, of further modifying forms would result to the compound modification of the new generic form of being to one of its own non-proximate specific forms of being, thus never amounting to the modification of the initial generic form to its proximate specific ones.

We may observe in this context, that modifying forms not being forms of being, they are not ordered in a comparable system of superordinated generic and subordinated specific forms, as this was proven in Part A of the present Essay. The modifying form of a generic form leading to one of its proximate specific forms is a simple particularity, unrepeatable in any other similar "descent".

b/ The generic form is itself a specific form in respect of its proximate generic form and its (the latter's) corresponding modification. Thus an essential change would transform the initially given generic form to either another specification of its own generic form, i.e. to a conjugate form under the same genus, or to the result of a similar or dissimilar modification of another generic form than its own. And again, the first alternative is impossible because there cannot be a re-transformation by the immediate re-imposition of a form. But in order to show the impossibility of the second alternative, the employment of the requirement of the possibility of re-transformation by the simple imposition of a form, does not suffice. For it leaves open the possibility of the primary removal resulting in the essential change of the involved generic form to one of its own generic forms, in which case the simple imposition of a composite modifying form (provided indeed that there subsist

I.

One must not be misled by the apparent subjectivity of 'we remove' etc. What is really meant is that we consider objective removals. And similarly with similar cases, where practical convenience may be offered as some justification for the relaxation

such forms) would re-transform the generic form "produced" by the removal (or resulting upon the removal) to the initially given one. But here another consideration settles the matter: for there is not the least reason for one of the genera of the given generic form to be the result of the removing operation than any other. Thus the principle of sufficient reason renders impossible the achievement of any result in the removing operation, and consequently invalidates it itself in the present case.

We therefore conclude that the removal of the uniting bond cannot lead to any essential change of the united items, as we have proven, quite abstractly and generally, impossible any such change. But this result is absurd, as we have had already occasion to mention the self-evidency of the contrary claim: the unity of a form of being surely cannot be like the unity of a mixture! Thus we must renounce the possibility of the removal itself, or rather, more accurately, we must hold and assert the annihilation of the united items wholly and completely as regards their essence (and we are at any rate in a realm without accidentality) simultaneously with the cancellation of the uniting bond. But this was the characteristic mark of the type-(C) unity. Hence, we conclude, the examined unity of a (specific) form of being is the unity of a complex of elements.

But an objection may be urged against our proof. Thus, it could be held, the withdrawal of the uniting connection in the present case does not (and cannot) lead from the united items to other definite forms, simply because it does lead to a mere potentiality of assuming such forms in general, and, hence, also to the potentiality of assuming the particular forms constituting through their union (effected by the obtaining of the modification-connection between them) the initially given specific form. That is, this objection concedes in effect our conclusion that the removal of the uniting connection does not transform the connected forms to other, different forms--but insists that this is not due to the pure and absolute impossibility of such removal,

but rather to the circumstance that the effect of the removal is the yielding of mere potentialities to assume such forms, or rather, to be more exact, the yielding of a pure substratum exclusively and entirely "defined" in terms of such potentialities, a substratum devoid of any, however slender, actual form, a substratum therefore, which in its own nature is a sort of intelligible or immaterial matter. And surely, the objection now concludes, such potentialities or such substratum can simply and immediately be re-transformed, or turned back, to the forms initially given as connected.

Now this objection concedes in truth more than it explicitly avows as conceded. For it really accepts the ascription of a peculiarly strong unity to the forms of being, in so far as it denounces for them a unity whose cancellation leaves the united items only partially altered in respect of essence---and accepts indeed a unity which cannot be broken down to constituents able to subsist, in their essential nature, in separation the one from the other: for if the withdrawal of the uniting bond, which is in its isolation just one connection (the modifying connection), utterly annihilates, at least as regards actual form or essence, the connected items, not resulting in items essentially but only partially changed, this means that there is no immanent constituents in each of the connected items corresponding to the uniting connection in such a way as to be annihilated or extinguished simultaneously with the cancellation of the said connection without any other effect on the rest of the essential constituents of the connected items, in this way leaving them, after the cancellation, only partly transformed in respect of essence. Obviously then, to put it briefly, what the objection really concedes is our own conclusion to the effect that the unity of the constituent forms within a given form, of being is not a unity of parts, but a unity of elements.

There is still another way of showing the substantially complete agreement between our proof and the urged objection. For to say that the withdrawal of the uniting

connection leaves nothing but mere potentialities---or rather, to be exact and precise as above, nothing but pure subjects of such mere potentialities---, is to say that this withdrawal leaves no actual form whatever but cancels the totality of the essential form of the connected items---and thus, that this withdrawal leaves no object. For matter, sensible or intelligible, cannot by and in itself constitute an object, concrete thing or determinant respectively. Consequently, the relevant unity is again proven to be of the (C)-type, the unity of a complex of "coalesced" elements, which furthermore subsist and are what they are in this and through this and by this coalescence. ^I

32/ We are, therefore, at last able to return to the end of chapter 29 for the completion of the there sketched counterobjection. Towards this aim, we firstly remark that the formulation of the objection is defective in so far as it makes use of the whole-part conception to describe the unity of the specific form out of the generic one and its modification as united items. But further, the defect is not just a terminological one, harmlessly removed without traces as soon as we substitute the complex-element conception, as above defined, in place of the previous one. For this substitution is necessarily accompanied by a serious and important change in the kind and essential degree of the unity involved; and the change is to a stronger sense and higher degree of unity. Thus, the unity of a form of being cannot be dissolved without the simultaneous extinction or annihilation of both the complex and its elements; and also, a form of being cannot be divided into constituents connected items able to subsist totally or partially unaltered in respect of essence even apart from

I.

The use of 'object' and 'subject' (as well as of the other conjugate terms) in this last argument is, of course, strictly analogical, such as it is the whole application of our division of unity to forms of being, and the argumentation conducted in accordance with this application.

their connection, i.e. to constituents not absolutely interdependent as regards their being (both "Sosein" and subsistence). This unity, expressed as interdependence, may be compared with the already proven feature of the World of Determinants, as being throughout a necessary actuality, or the eternal product of the necessary actualisation of all relevant potentialities.

Now in as far something is unified or united, in so far it is one. Consequently, the higher the degree of unity exemplified by a given item, the more complete and strong its oneness is. Hence, the unity of a complex being the higher possible unity among composite items, the oneness of such a complex is second only (in its completeness and perfection) to the oneness of an absolutely non-composite, sheer simplicity^I. Therefore, the distinctness of fP2 from fP1 is absolutely secured by the former being (strongly) one item and the latter an (=one)-other.

It is to be noticed that the seeming contradiction implied in the apparent inconsistency between the distinctness of the two mentioned forms of being and their absolute interdependence as regards their being, and indeed the seeming absurdity of founding that distinctness on this interdependence, are unreal. For it is exactly the circumstance that fP1 is a constituent, and an inseparable one, an element, of fP2 which precludes decisively the possibility of correctly conceiving the latter as a kind of collection of loosely connected items, or even as a kind of whole of various constituent parts, a possibility necessarily accompanied by the diminution of the corresponding degree of unity and the suppression of the corresponding high status of oneness. To put it paradoxically, yet nonetheless validly, it is the strong interdependence in respect of being between any one of the

I.

These statements may sound dogmatic when advanced in isolation as above. For indeed, they acquire their precise meaning and significance (in its totality) only in the context of a metaphysical analysis of oneness. But such systematic analysis lies outside the scope of the present dissertation.

constituents of a certain United or Composite and the United itself, which guarantees their clear distinctness as two items by means of the consequent upon such strong interdependence enhancement of the unity and therefore of the oneness of the United, since the less clearly one is something, the less clearly two are it and another one, and indeed more so, if this other is a constituent of it.

Thus, firstly, a set or collection of ^{un}connected items is not distinct from the "collected" items themselves; indeed there is not here one item, besides (or over and above) the collected items, as their set; and yet the independence as regards being in such a case is the highest possible (in the sense rather of a boundary case), as could be easily seen after reflecting that the collected items were supposed unconnected and that the set has no being (predicative or existential) since there is no such "thing" as a set¹. Secondly, in the case of a mixture, the independence regarding being of the mixed items, one from the other and from the mixture, decreases, since now the mixture appropriates, as it were, for itself part of the accidental being of the mixed items (i.e. their mixing connections), thus establishing a loose (because of the ^{self-}accidental-ity of the connections concerned) unity, oneness and identity, and therefore distinctness from its constituents. (Of course, its being also, taken absolutely and not in relation to the mixed items, its constituents, is enriched compared with the (absence of) being, of its analogue in the previous case: the set or mere group). Thirdly, further, when we have to do with a whole, a new increase in the interdependence of the parts, one to another and to the whole, is effected by the appropriation of part² of the essential being of its constituents (i.e. their essential "wholifying" connections and what is necessarily and essentially entailed by them), itself effecting in

1. See Essay V for a discussion of classes.

2. Here, of course, commonsensically used.

I shall not indicate every such occurrence of this word and cognate terms.

its turn an increase in the degree of unity, in the status of oneness and self-identity, and thus in the preciseness of the distinctness of the whole from its constituents. Fourthly and finally, in the total appropriation of all essential being belonging to its elements by the complex, we reach a position of absolute interdependence as regards being (among them, and between them and it), together with the highest possible, for a composite item, degree of unity, completeness of oneness and self-identity, and "clarity" of distinctness from its constituents.

After this development then, and the consequent rejection of the objection proposed in chapter 29, we hold ourselves to be justified in claiming the validity of the argument in chapter 28 establishing, by means of the distinctness of fP_1 and fP_2 , the separateness of P_1 -ness and P_2 -ness.

33/ But before leaving this troublesome topic, we should face and try to answer a naturally arising question, namely, the question whether the said argument would have been equally vindicated if, per impossibile, the composition of a specific form of being corresponded not so much to that of a complex of elements, as to a whole of parts.

To answer this question, we should investigate further the apparently paradoxical connection, in one of its aspects already mentioned above, between interdependence in respect of being and distinctness (in respect of oneness, one would like to say) of the United (or Composite) and the united items (or its constituents) themselves.

Let us, then, to this end, examine the pure situation, the boundary case, of the mere collection of unconnected items. A class has not being, either predicative or existential; no existence, no properties; it is a non-entity, indeed a non-being, nothing at all. On the other hand, we also wish to claim that a class is nothing more than the collected items, that it coincides absolutely and completely with their totality.

But now, it could be said, if it is one and the same with the collected items, it surely cannot be nothing; it must be something.

Such dialectic is indeed intricate. Nonetheless, we may answer firstly, that from the circumstance that a class is nothing more than its unconnected members or that even it coincides with them, it does not follow that it is one and the same with them. For the members are many, and even many qua members. Secondly, we are not better for dropping 'one' and holding the bare identity of the class with its many member. For the many items, not qua many but qua, ex hypothesis, absolutely unconnected in any way, have no being at all, equally well (or badly) with the class. For they have not even the property of there being a certain number of them, since definite numerical multiplicity entails, or rather presupposes, some unity in the form or some community in respect of a definite being and thus some sort of connection subsisting among the multiple items, or at the very least it presupposes some subjectively imposed, though objectively non-existent unity (or even perhaps, a subjectively created ad hoc objective unity), like the unity of a single act of thought considering together or collecting certain even absolutely heterogeneous items^I. Number presupposes a unit, a unit presupposes a unity, this in its turn presupposes something being, in some sense and way, one, and this finally presupposes a definite being exhibiting the oneness and unity concerned. Thus a definite number or multiplicity of items entails being in common (common being), and hence connection, among the members of the multiplicity; and it is precisely this connection with its definite being which permits the ascription of a certain, definite number to the items concerned. But this connection implies also some unification of the same items, and thus is the foundation of the possibility of their forming a totality (of them), somehow

I.

We do not, of course, affirm that there are such items, nor do we assert the reality of the possibility of there being. This question is irrelevant here. The absolute unconnectedness assumed above of the collected items extends so far only as their co-belonging to a class; that they belong to the class is not due to any sort of connectedness subsisting among them. They are unconnected qua members of the class.

distinct from them.

To conclude then recapitulating: even a definite multiplicity's being a definite multiplicity, even its being of a certain number of items or comprising such a number of items, implies a connection of these items, and thus a common, definite being; but such a connection constitutes also, in so far as it extends, a sort of unity of the items involved, and so gives rise to a certain United comprising them as constituents. Therefore, even as little (quantitative) being as it can be conferred on a number of items by their being of such a number (or indeed, by their being the definite multiplicity which they are even apart from particular number), is necessarily bound with their being somehow united (that is, with their unification of some sort) in a composite United. But that slight being is what, by belonging to the items collectively and not in exclusive reference to their separate (one from another and from the collection) being, provides the foundation of the conferment to their totality of a corresponding degree of unity, then of oneness, and so of distinctness from them. Therefore unification of the items in a United Composite, and distinctness of it from them go necessarily together. The relevant connection implying further an interdependence in respect of being among the connected items and between them and their union, we are also entitled to claim a close necessary connection of this interdependence in being with a corresponding distinctness (in oneness), as we have already noted.

We conclude then, from the above development, that distinctness necessarily accompanying communion or interdependence in being, in as far such communion is incomplete, in so far is the corresponding distinctness weaker. Thus we see, that a United is distinct from its (united) items in so far as it shares being with all and every one of them ~~and coincides with them~~ (i.e. it shares the uniting connections); and it is indistinct from them and coincides with them (in the above explained sense) in as far as they are unconnected. Therefore in a kind of unity where the uniting connections do not

exhaust (in themselves and through their necessary entailments, implications and presuppositions of an essential nature) the total being of the united items, the distinctness of the United from its constituents is incomplete---the more so, the more it coincides with them, that is the less common, uniting being they share, i.e. the more unconnected they are. Hence complete distinctness cannot be achieved except in a kind of unity where the uniting connections exhaust the total being of the united items---that is, in the case of a complex of elements.

After this further specification of the involved notion of distinctness, the answer to the question which prompted this analysis is ready at hand. For in so far as the appropriated being of a whole (i.e. the common, so to speak, being of its parts) does not exhaust the total being of the parts, its distinctness from them is incomplete, and precisely so because of its being identical with them in respect of everything else than the common appropriated being. Thus its distinctness from them is limited and conditioned by its being identical with them (the respects are, of course, different in this apparently incongruous proposition) and in as far this is so, in so far our initial argument from the distinctness of the specific from the generic form to the separateness of the corresponding determinants, would leave this separateness incomplete, and limited by a (at least the possibility of) a partial^I identity of them, an identity now in respect of objects, indeed of things, and not in respect of being (as was the case with the corresponding forms of being).

One more, last, remark, and we shall have finished with the present topic. In classifying the unity of a form of being as the kind of unity pertaining to a complex

I.

I again repeat that such uses of 'partial' (and conjugate terms) as this and many others similar to it dispersed throughout our text, are ordinary, and correspond to the ordinary, nontechnical conception of a part.

of elements, we have, of course, not exhausted the required adequate specification of the composition of forms of being, and of their structure---let alone of the structure and nature of determinants themselves. Far from it. There now remains the more substantial task of ascertaining the exact nature of this composition as a first step (and of this structure)---of the composition which very generically has been described as a kind of complexity. Thus the question now is: what exactly particular kind of complexity? We ask for the nature of the composition itself in its particularity, not simply for the subsumption of this nature under its generic essence.

34/ We are thus left, in the nexus of the determinable-determinate "relation", with two separate (abstract) things, P_1 -ness and P_2 -ness in the present case, with two forms of being, fP_1 and fP_2 , and with one form of a form of being, the form modifying fP_1 to fP_2 .

P_2 -ness presents itself under its uniquely peculiar and proper form of being: fP_2 . P_2 -ness has this form of being; P_2 -ness is fP_2 .

Two remarks are in place here.

1/ The having and the being involved here are not the same with the having and the being involved in the following propositions (and, ultimately, in the corresponding state of affairs): a, a concrete thing, has this form of being (fP_2); a is P_2 . And this difference consists, of course, in the difference of the connection subsisting between a concrete thing and its properties and forms of being on the one hand, from the connection subsisting between an abstract thing and its "properties" and forms of being on the other. And even this formulation is not absolutely happy. For whereas the notion of forms of being has a high degree of "technicality" (though not the absolute technicality of the notions correspond-

ing to the absolutely fundamental ground (according to ~~it~~ each metaphysical theory) and has been defined so that both various concrete things having a certain property, and the determinant determining these concrete things in their having that property, present themselves under one and the same (the corresponding one) form of being (the concrete things do so, of course, only qua having that property, that is in so far as they are characterised through it)---yet, in contradistinction, to the notion of a property itself there is attached only a relatively slight degree of technicality. Thus, in the case discussed, it is not so much as determined by the relevant definition, whether the property of the various concrete things and the property of the said determinant is one and the same; and the more so, the less it is definitive that the same sense of 'property' applies to both cases and realms. (In truth, the notion of a property is so slightly technical and, thus, so much blurred---which is, of course, a sign of insignificance in the context of a system---that it is not as much as definitively determined whether many concrete things, absolutely similar in a certain respect, have one and the same property or properties absolutely corresponding). But anyway we shall have occasion to return to this point in the sequel, when we intend to treat of exemplification, and its forms and conditions.

ii/ This is also a right place to say a few words concerning the (rather popularly) famous problem of self-predication. Thus it has been urged, especially from some quarters, against the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, that it involves the impossibility of ascribing to a certain character, conceived as subsisting in itself and apart from its various exemplifications and instances, the character itself. This impossibility was held to be variously demonstrated in some really entertaining and even picturesque if superficial ways. Such an one, was to ensnaringly ask whether for example Justice itself (the Idea) is just, and then triumphantly "show" that it can be neither just nor unjust, since it is not the

kind of thing susceptible of such predications at all.

Now it was already made clear in (late) Neoplatonic developments of the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition that when they, at least, spoke of Forms or Ideas (and of what is signified by other suchlike expressions) and of their being so-and-so (i.e. of their having characteristics or properties after a fashion), and indeed of their exhibiting precisely the form for which they were supposed to stand themselves, it was to be meant on the one hand that the Ideas in question were not mere characters in their characterising function, that is unsubstantial characterisations or "appendices" to real substances requiring for their own subsistence the existence of the latter as supporting subjects for their (immanent) inherence, but self-subsisting substances (as they would put it), indeed "more" substances (entities subsisting on their own and having definite natures of their own) than the things in the realm of concreteness; and on the other hand that their having "properties" or their being so-and-so, was quite different from the having and being of the ~~concrete~~ things---the former being primary and the latter secondary and derivative. (In fact, the relevant neoplatonic doctrine was much more intricate and, thus, adequate to the complication of the case; I simplify here, for the purpose at hand).

Conformably to such a view, we have always claimed that the determinant is a thing exhibiting a form of being, and not the form of being itself; and again that this "exhibition" is quite different from the corresponding exhibition of the same form by concrete things. Thus no real self-predication is, strictly speaking, involved---except, at most, the harmless kind of seeming self-predication illustrated in the realm of concreteness by such circumstances (or rather expressions of circumstances) as that something white (= a white thing) is white, and the like. What is the source of much apparent disagreement in the present connection and accounts for it is that we are sometimes prone to emphasise the above insisted on difference between the modes of being or having of concrete and abstract things, by saying that the latter do not just (or merely) are or have a certain being, but they are (identical) with this form of being.

35/ To proceed then further.

In a modification there are distinguished, the modified, the bare modification as the modifying form, and, finally, the complete or total modification as the result of the modifying of the modified by the modificatory form. Specification (i.e. the ontological derivation of the specific forms out of the generic ones) being a kind of modification, the same distinctions appertain and apply to it.

Most clearly, a modification presupposes something modified. And even the possibility of such modification presupposes that there is something (with a definite nature) to be modified. Similarly, the actual result of a modification presupposes, in presupposing the modification resulting in it, something modified; and this result in its potentiality presupposes the "subsistence" ^I of something, with a definite nature of its own, to be modified.

It follows that the actuality (actual subsistence) of the specific form presupposes the actuality of the generic one as that which yields the specific one by its specification, or in other words, as the actual "subject" of the specification; and equally, that the possibility of the specific form presupposes again the actuality of the generic one, but now as the possible subject of the specification in question. In brief, we may say that the specific form presupposes the generic one in respect of being.

Needless to be said that this ontological presupposition is not incompatible with the necessary interdependence as regards being between the two forms of being: on the contrary, the former is but an aspect of the latter. For the interdependence regarding being in question involves both the explained ontological presupposition of the generic

I.

I put inverted commas round 'subsistence' because, forms of being being no objects, their being cannot be divided into being-something (or predicative being or "Sosein") and being simpliciter (or existential being and existence). Here, it is perfectly correct to be said that they do not just have a definite form of being or are-predicatively so-and-so; they indeed are-identical with forms of being or with so-and-so determinations.

form by the specific one, and the necessary derivation of the latter from the former, or, in other words, the necessity of the former giving or pouring forth or producing (in some way to be subsequently defined) the latter; the presupposition and the emanation, both a-temporal and necessary (or rather, as we have explained in Part A, supernecessary), are but the two complementary aspects of that interdependence between the two forms which is "phenomenologically" evident.

36/ Having explored up to a certain degree of adequacy the interconnections and inner constitutions of forms of being, and pending a more thorough and positive inquiry into the same problems, we should also turn to the problem for the sake of which these explorative investigations were conducted; the problem, I mean, of the structure and inner constitution of the determinants themselves. Treatment of this problem and of issues connected with it will again shed further additional light on the similar questions regarding forms of being.

We begin with the two circumstances:

1/ P_1 -ness is P_1 or has fP_1 .

2/ P_2 -ness is P_2 or has fP_2 .

We observe that ' P_1 ' and ' fP_1 ' do not signify items belonging to the fundamental categories of object; nor do, consequently, the 'be' and 'have' involved in the corresponding to the circumstances propositions signify items belonging to the fundamental inventory of all objective reality of whatsoever degree and kind. Therefore (1) and (2) stand in need of justification or derivation; they require metaphysical account or explanation; ontologically speaking, they call for a sufficient ground of the reality of the circumstances and of the truth of the corresponding propositions.

This request, it should be noted, is not restricted or limited in any way by the consideration that we have not in point of fact presented a complete inventory of the fundamental categories of items of all reality till now, but only

have tried to discover that part of it which is proven to be indispensable in metaphysically explaining and grounding simple facts with concrete things as subjects---and, to be confessed, not even this part in its totality, since we have already deliberately put aside two such fundamental constituents: matter and efficient cause in determinations of concrete things. This confinement, I submit, has no unfavourable effect on the unfundamentality of the mentioned items, since anyway, properties to a greater, and forms of being to a lesser degree have been found to lack that absolute precision and clear-cut conformability to exact laws which marks unmistakably the fundamentally, real. Here is not, though, the right place to develop this idea.

In the attempt at the ascertainment of such derivations as the ones indicated in the last but one paragraph, so much is evident right from the beginning: the grounds cannot be sought for in the connections of abstract with concrete things, i. e. in the exemplificative and instantiative ties. Therefore the grounds, at least up to a certain extent, should be rather found in the realm of the determinants themselves. And so, it is further clear that the close connections between P_1 -ness and P_2 -ness, and between fP_1 and fP_2 , necessitates the bearing of these connections, and of what is really and fundamentally involved in one of the two initial circumstances (1) and (2), on the determination of the ground of the other.

Now we have seen above that the specific form of being presupposes the generic one. But a form of being is uniquely attached to the corresponding determinant as its *forma essendi* or that which the determinant is---it is the peculiar and proper form under which the corresponding determinant presents itself. Consequently, the *forma essendi* of the determinate determinant presupposes the *forma essendi* of the determinable one; that which the determinate is, presupposes that which the determinable is.

But the question facing us in the inquiry concerning the metaphysical grounds of (1) and (2) is not thereby answered---with such an establishment of mere ontological presupposition. The question rather is the stronger, so to speak, question of ascertaining grounds, i.e. metaphysical causes. In other words we are indeed, but not exclusively, occupied with the point of metaphysical priority in general; and this is in fact settled with the establishment of (ontological) presupposition. But we are further interested in the particular kind of the priority really involved, and, specifically, in the question whether strong causal priority (in the metaphysical sense of the term) is truly at work here. To this further investigation, the establishment of the bare presupposition involved is helpfully conducive, not only by presenting the genus under which the specific kind of the priority to be discovered has to be subsumed, but also by pointing to the "direction" in which this stronger connection awaiting specification must hold. For example, if the question should be, as it is, one concerning the applicability (in the present case) in general, and (in case of an affirmative answer to this) the further specification in particular, of the generalised, metaphysically causal connection---then we know in advance, as a result of the establishment of the previous point, where the influencing and the influenced parts of the connection as a whole should be found; clearly, if the causal connection is applicable, to the determinable must be allotted the title of the agent after a fashion (one which, of course, has to be specified) and the determinate should yield to bear the status of the effect, again after a fashion.

37/ FP1, we have seen, is an element of FP2. The generic form is one element in its proximately specific forms. This immanence is not, of course, incompatible with the

transcendence of fP_1 as the peculiar and proper form of P_1 -ness over fP_2 as the peculiar and proper form of P_2 -ness. Qua peculiar and proper form of P_1 -ness, fP_1 is transcendent in respect of fP_2 , and an "element", if so it is to be called, only of fP_2 ; whereas qua element in the constitution of the form of P_2 -ness, it is immanent in its form, and, thus, in it itself.

The above drawn distinction helps also in rendering clear a more important distinction. Let us call 'Form' of a certain determinant its peculiar, proper and unique forms essendi. Now fP_1 is an element of the Form of P_2 -ness; therefore, P_2 -ness has fP_1 in so far as this latter is an element in its (complete ---which is really aplesonasm)Form. The underlined addition is essential: P_2 -ness does not have fP_1 simpliciter; for if it had it simply, it would not be the determinant which it really is, but its own proximate determinable, i.e. P_1 -ness. This is an immediate corollary from the principle of the unique and peculiar one-to-one correspondence, or rather intrinsic attachment, between determinants and highly unitary, though complex, forms of being.

It is not the case, we hold, that P_2 -ness has fP_1 in its (the latter's) immediacy and unity, in itself. fP_1 qua itself simply is not being had by P_2 -ness. It is not that P_2 -ness presents itself under the form of being fP_1 simpliciter; it ~~is~~ only presents itself under the latter form in the latter's "function" or power, or under its capacity as an element within the form of being under which alone it presents itself simpliciter. Thus, we have:

i/ fP_1 simply and in(or qua) itself is not being had by P_2 -ness.

ii/ fP_1 qua an element in fP_2 is being had by P_2 -ness.

iii/ fP_2 simply and in(or qua) itself is being had by P_2 -ness.

iv/ fP_1 simply and in(or qua) itself is being had by P_1 -ness.

Notice that the difference between (i) and (ii) is not proven groundless through the remark that it is a necessity flowing, as it were, from fP1's own being in itself ~~what it is~~ (that is, from its own nature), that it is also an element of fP2, and vice versa. And this our claim of inconsequence, has two-fold vindication. Firstly, there is the distinction between transcendent element-of and immanent element-in: fP1 in itself is attached to P₁-ness alone, thus being transcendent in respect to P₂-ness and to its Form---and so considered and attached, can be taken, or "act",--if at all--only as a (transcendent) element of fP2; otherwise with fP1 as an immanent element "of" (=in) fP2. And surely, something transcendent and something (absolutely corresponding to the former---which circumstance really aggravates the situation) immanent cannot both be had (or both not be had) by one and the same object, at least in the same way of having. Secondly, there is the distinction, which we have already more than once used, between the necessary-idion and the qua-idion, the second being stronger than the first. (Thus, the sum of the angles of an isosceles triangle necessarily, in Euclidean geometry, equals to two right angles, without it being true that the isosceles triangle has this necessary property qua isosceles, and qua itself simply; it has it qua triangle). Therefore the circumstance of there subsisting a necessary connection between fP1's being what it is and its being an element of fP2, does not in the least show that fP1 qua itself and fP1 qua element of fP2 are absolutely indistinguishable in themselves or in their connections to other items. To this, it must in justice be added that such distinguishability on the other hand does not entail separateness, in so far as the former implies notional, whereas the latter factual or "thinglike" or in respect of subject difference; for truly, fP1-qua-itself and fP1-qua-element-of fP2 are one and the same (identical) in respect of subject, though different in respect of "definition".^I

I.

Of this, more will follow below.

Before proceeding now to a further step, one more corollary of the above made clarification must be drawn. The first consideration propounded in the previous paragraph no more justifies the difference between (i) and (ii) than calls for the recognition of still another relevant difference. For the distinction between element-of and element-in on the one hand, together with the close connection between element and complex on the other, require that some sort of connection must subsist between ΦF_2 -ness (as the determinant uniquely and peculiarly presenting itself under the form of the complex ΦF_2) and fPI (as an element-of this complex)---a sort of connection indeed, which may justifiably be represented as a kind of resultant of the two already established connections, between ΦF_2 -ness and ΦF_2 on the one hand, and between ΦF_2 as complex and fPI as an element-of the complex on the other ----this latter connection being itself the composite total outcome, as it were, of the connection between a complex and one of the elements-in the complex, and the connection between an element-in a complex and the corresponding element-of it. (It should be emphasized though, that these formulations in terms of 'resultant' or 'composite outcome' are not meant to prejudice the all-important questions of respective metaphysical priority and real fundamentality regarding the items involved in what is merely joined or considered as composition of certain constituents. In this respect, the 'resultant' phraseology is slightly better as not implying at least the coalescence within the resultant of the joining their influence factors, in the manner of the coalescence within, say, the complex of its constituent elements).

We are thus obliged to add to the above list (i)-(ii), one more item:

v/ fPI qua element of ΦF_2 is somehow connected with (is being had after some fashion by) ΦF_2 -ness.

The list will soon be found to require additional supplementation, but, before we feel and see this need, we may develop further the already established results.

38/ P_2 -ness is connected, it has been shown, and connected as regards its being-determinations, with:

a/ fP_2 -qua-itself.

b/ fP_1 -qua-element-in- fP_2

and c/ fP_1 -qua-element-of- fP_2 ,

---and unconnected (in some corresponding, relevant sense or senses) with:

d/ fP_1 -qua-itself.

Now, the items enumerated are all different the one from the other. As it happens, (a), (b) and (c) are both notionally and factually different. More than this, they belong, so to speak, to different orders or levels (or rather sublevels) of reality, always, of course, within the realm of Forms---or, more correctly said, within the World of Determinants of which the realm of forms is but an objective aspect, the result of a basic bifurcation essentially suffered by any entity as we shall see in the sequel. Thus, fP_1 -qua-element-of- fP_2 , being factually identical with fP_1 -qua-itself (or fP_1 -in-itself) is, qua generic, "higher" than fP_2 -in-itself and fP_1 -as-element-in- fP_2 ---"higher" in a easily defined sense. Again fP_2 -qua-itself is higher than fP_1 -qua-element-in- fP_2 , in a different but connected sense, relating to the difference and connection between complex and element; and still in another connected sense is fP_1 -in-itself higher than fP_1 -qua-element-of- fP_2 , as we shall observe below.

Consequent upon these differences is the difference among the connections of P_2 -ness with the mentioned items. More than this, to the difference in (respect of) level or order or sublevel among the items connected with P_2 -ness, there corresponds a difference in respect of grade---let us call it thus---among the connections themselves.

Before proceeding to answer an easily anticipated objection to the above reasoning---an objection of some vogue in some quarters---let it be remarked that the connections spoken about above are not genuine, real connections in the

technical acceptation of the term. For a connection, in general, as so far defined, connects objects, whereas forms are not objects, but forms of being of objects, or forms (mere forms) of such forms of being. So, strictly speaking, we have here to do with a natural, I trust, extension of the term's meaning, an extension intended to comprehend connections between objects and non-objects, (This latest 'connections' is of course meant commonsensically).

And now the above indicated objection. It might be urged that the difference of the items connected with a certain item does not in itself entail difference in the corresponding connections between them and it. Formulated in terms of the theory of meaning, the objection becomes apparently stronger, running thus: that there are various kinds of items connected with a certain item after a particular fashion (call the particular manner of the connection 'r-ing'), does not in the least show that there are different senses of 'r-ing' employed in the various applications of this expression to cases involving items belonging to the said different kinds. Briefly said, it is held by the objector that difference in kind among the connected items does not entail difference in the sense of the expression signifying the connection obtaining between them and any given item.

But this and suchlike objections have whatever apparent force they have through sheer misgormulation. For it is as clear and evident as could be wished, that to the kind of difference subsisting among sets of connected items (I mean difference exclusively due to the difference in kind of the involved items in each case), there answers an exactly corresponding kind of difference among the connections themselves connecting, each separately, the said classes. Thus, to apply this evident maxim to an immediate generalisation of the presently examined case, if a certain item is connected with several kinds of items falling under a genus, then the connections subsisting in these cases form similarly a variety of kinds falling under a genus. In an analogous way,

if the former difference amounts to categorial diversity, the latter one follows suit. And so with all forms of variety.

These few general remarks will suffice, I trust, to set aside the above and similar objections by overthrowing their apparent reasons---though at bottom one really suspects a general preoccupation against, and mistrust of, rationalistic procedures as such.

Besides these negative remarks, we may adduce positive reasons for holding fast to the claimed difference in the examined connections. But these would emerge the clearer and more natural, after a more adequate description and identification of the connections involved.

Thus, the connection between P_2 -ness and fP_2 -in-itself is the unique and peculiar connection between a determinant and its own complete and unitary Form, its total and united form of being under which it presents itself. This is undoubtedly the fundamental and primary connection, the basic and principal "having". Let us say that P_2 -ness has its own unique Form fP_2 , or is P_2 , in respect of substance or substantially. Being-substantially is, therefore, the ground-grade of being. (Call it 'substantiation' or 'appropriation'). This grade is the signification of 'have' in (iii) above (chapter 37).

Obviously, P_2 -ness does not have-substantially either fP_1 -in-itself, or fP_1 -qua-element-of- fP_2 , or (even) fP_1 -qua-element-in- fP_2 . This circumstance differentiates all other connections from the above mentioned fundamental one.

Now fP_1 -qua-element-in- fP_2 allows to be viewed as a part (in the ordinary, non-technical sense) of fP_1 -qua-element-in-its-specified-specific-forms in general, or, for brevity, of fP_1 -qua-element-in. The former as a part of the latter is distinct from it, in the mode of distinctness which the whole-part connection, ordinarily conceived, entails. This particular mode may be found to characterise the present case as follows. fP_1 -qua-element-in- fP_2 is distinct in respect of

being (or notionally) from fPI-qua-element-in-fP2'---where we assume that P₂ⁱ-ness is another proximate determinate of the determinable P₁-ness; what is more, the two mentioned items are even separate, i.e. factually, or in respect of subject, different, since the one is an immanent element "of" (-in) the Form of P₂-ness, and the other an immanent element of the Form of P₂ⁱ-ness, and these are surely separate determinants. But this separation, in spite of the essential connection in respect of being obviously subsisting between them, and together with it, constitutes a necessary condition for the application of the whole-part connection as (relatively) commonsensically understood. And the condition, indeed almost a criterion in the present circumstances, is evidently satisfied in our case.

A part, thus conceived, is partially (in a still more ordinary acceptation of the term!) identical and partially other than the whole---this identity and this otherness being now such in respect of subject, factual ones. This is the ground of the truth of the saying that, in such a case, by having a part, we have part of the whole (the second 'part' being meant in the same ordinary sense as the 'partially' above). We may, thus, call the connection holding between P₂-ness and fPI-qua-element-in-the-proximately-specific-forms (or fPI-qua-element-in simply for brevity) 'participation' (in strict sense) to the latter on the part of the former. In the same sense, we may say that P₂-ness has fPI-qua-element-in by participation, or is P₁ (in the corresponding sense) by participation. Participation, we see, is another grade of being besides substantiation or appropriation.

Obviously, participation is according to its nature, participation to a whole; participating is not participating to a part, but through a part to a whole. Consequently having a part of a whole (in the appropriate sense) is not participating to the part, but to the whole of which the part is a part. Thus, having a part cannot be the sort of having which is called 'participation'---that is, it cannot be that in itself and qua itself, though, naturally and evidently, the two "havings" are necessarily connected in the easily comprehended way above described. This consideration establishes

the distinction between participation and having a part of the participated whole as one own's element.

We are, consequently, obliged to recognise a yet another grade of being, the one illustrated by the way P_2 -ness has fPI-qua-element-in-fP₂, or is P₁ (in the corresponding sense). This is the way a determinant has an element of its Form. If we wish to give a name, which anyway we shall rarely find occasion to use, to this grade of being, we may call it 'elementary or participatory substantiation', provided we have taken ample notice of the circumstance that this elementary substantiation does not possess the fundamentality of the simple substantiation and is connectely distinguished from it.

It is clear moreover, that whereas fPI-qua-element-in is participable and participated by all proximate determinates of the determinable P₁-ness, and, in a different though exactly corresponding and connected sense, by all proximately specific forms of the generic form fPI---- contrariwise fPI-qua-element-of (a similar abbreviation of the longer locution: fPI-qua-element-of-its-proximately-specific-forms in general) is not so participated, and not even participable, by them. For strict participation, as above explicated, implies the immanence of the allotted, so to speak, share of the participated whole. And even if we are prone, moved by force of misplaced analogy, to construe the connection between fPI-qua-element-of on the one hand and fPI-qua-element-of-one (or another) of the proximately subsumed specific forms on the other hand, as a whole-part connection, even so we cannot possibly conceive of the former as a participated (in strict sense) whole, since its alleged parts are not immanent in the supposedly participating proximate determinates and their Forms. This alone could suffice to show the manifest incorrectness of such a conception of fPI-qua-element-of as something participable and in fact participated. But, besides, what is above conceded for the sake of argument, is equally wrong in itself. For surely, fPI-qua-element-of in general, as well as fPI-qua-element-of-fP₂ (or, also, fPI-qua-element-of-any definite one of its

proximately specific forms of being for that matter) are one and the same (identical) in respect of subject or factually, since they both are the unique transcendent (because element-of) generic form of being in its "functions" as an element of all, and each one of them, specific forms proximately subsumed under it. This identity in respect of subject is obviously extended to cover every other similar (notionally distinct) item like: fPI-qua-element-of-a certain proximate specific form under fPI. And this natural extension annihilates that factual separateness of the items, which was deemed above a necessary condition for the case being a case of whole-part distinction (and connection), in the semi-ordinary, semi-technical acceptance of these terms here employed.

This result proves that not only is fPI-qua-element-of unparticipated, but that it is also unparticipable, since it is not a whole having parts in the relevant, required way. And if it cannot possibly be participated by P₂-ness and its Form, then, to the same extent and degree, the connection between P₂-ness and fPI-qua-element-of-fP₂ cannot be what was above termed 'elementary participatory substantiation'.

39/ But in fairness, it should be carefully observed that strict participation as above defined is but a species of sharing in general. In this particular form of sharing, the sharing items take separately hold of the parts into which the shared item is partitioned, and in this way, share in their totality the shared item. But besides, we can also distinguish other specific kinds of sharing relevant here. These can be properly understood in themselves and in their interrelations, if seen in the framework, and against the background, of a systematic division (into kinds) of sharing in general, where they would occupy so many "positions", as it were.

We claim then, that sharing (or sharing ownership) in general can be of three pure, genuine kinds and one mixed pseudo-kind (this is the first division). Thus, to begin with: either the sharing items share the shared one by its being partitioned to parts each of which belongs or is owned by only one of the sharing items; or the sharing items share the shared one by its, in its entirety, belonging to, or being owned by, the sharing items only collectively, jointly, or in their totality, so that none of them in itself owns it or even a part of it; or the shared item, in its entirety, belongs to, or is owned by, each one of the sharing items (in which case, naturally, there is a joint ownership, too—and even this is different from that of the previous kind); or the sharing consists in some mixture, in various ways effected, of the other three pure and genuine kinds— in which case, of course, we have truly to do simply with more than one sharings rather than with one mixed sharing. Let us call briefly 'several or single sharing', 'joint or collective sharing' and 'several and joint sharing' respectively the three genuine kinds of sharing in general above enumerated. For indeed we have, in the last case a belonging of the entire shared item to each one, and hence to all collectively, of the sharing ones; in the second case a belonging of the entire shared item to the sharing items in their totality, but not to each one of them; and finally, in the first case, there is a distributive belonging of parts of the shared item to each of the sharing ones singly (and only thus some sort of collective ownership of the entire shared item by all the sharing ones in their totality).

Now it is an evident real division of belonging or being owned in general (one, that is, according to, and in conformity with, its own intrinsic nature), that it may be either transcendent or immanent, depending on whether the owned item is external or internal to the owning one. In the sense, in which we are here using these terms, something is external to another (item), if they are totally separate, i. e. factually different or different in respect of subject; on the other hand, something is internal to another if they are not at all separate,

or only partially separate, meaning by the latter the partial separation or separateness (and partial coincidence or identity¹) of the whole and any one of its parts (in which case, of course, the part is internal to the whole), in the quasi-ordinary acceptation of these expressions above explained². (It is to be noted that the said partial identity do not apply to two parts of even the same whole, if they belong to the same level of partition of the whole in question; in the contrary case, if they are in fact partially identical they are not so qua parts of the same whole but in virtue of the circumstance that the one ^{happens to be} a proper part of the other).

Combining now the above mentioned two divisions, it clearly follows that immanent ownership is incompatible with several and collective ownership. For it is not possible for a numerically one and the same shared item to be severally and jointly owned after the immanent fashion by more than one item, since the ownership of it by any one of them, being immanent, would render it internal to the owning item, and thus preclude its being owned, in the same fashion, by any other of the supposedly sharing items³.

We conclude then, that several and joint ownership can only be a sharing of the transcendent type. Similarly with mere collective sharing; this must be transcendent. For if immanent, it would imply either that the entire shared item should be internal to each one of the sharing items, which is doubly impossible, both because of the involved impossibility of one and the same item's being, in its entirety, internal to other, more than one and separate one from another, items, and because in the envisaged case we would rather have

1. See above p.41.

2. See above p.41.

3. It would seem that there is an apparent exemption to this principle. For suppose a to be a (quasi-ordinary) part of A, A of B, and B of C. Obviously each one of A, B and C own a, and all of them own it immanently.

But then we object that they do not own it jointly-or, at least, not only jointly-since each of them in itself and on its own account owns it. And anyway, such counterexamples are invalid, simply because it is surely presupposed throughout the above divisions that the sharing items are absolutely external one to another, that is, separate or different in respect of subject (factually).

to do with a single or a several and joint ownership than with a mere collective one, which is contrary to our hypothesis; or that portions of the shared item should be distributed, as internal, to the various sharing items, in which case we would really have a case of strict participation and, consequently, a case of single or several sharing, again contrary to what we have supposed.

Now, it is just an easily executed reversal of the above argument which we need in order to establish that immanent sharing entails participation, partitioning and part-distribution, and consequent single or several sharing--- though the contrary entailment does not hold good. Thus, it can be easily seen that several ownership or sharing can be either transcendent or immanent, depending on whether the partitioned, shared item in its belonging severally to the sharing items remains external or becomes internal to them. Evidently now, the strict participation explicated above, is a several, immanent sharing or ownership---in other words it is subsumed under the immanent sub-type of the several kind of sharing in general. The other subkind of several sharing is, of course, the transcendent several sharing, to which it could belong (as subsumed under it) what may be called 'participation in broad sense' or 'participation'. Needless to say, this is no proper participation, since the partitioned item remains ~~to~~ transcendent in respect of the sharing items, each one of them sharing in it by a sort of mere ownership of the transcendent kind, a sort of transcendent belonging of the allotted part to it, the allocation being a sort of transcendent distribution.

40/ We have thus assigned strict participation to its correct position within the division of sharing in general above drawn. We have also seen^I that the connection

between P_2 -ness (and its Form) and fPI -qua-element-of is not strict participation; indeed that the latter is strictly unparticipable. Correspondingly, when we have asserted that the connection between P_2 -ness and fPI -qua-element-of- fP_2 is not elementary participatory substantiation, we meant the 'participatory' in the strict sense above explained.

Thus the question now naturally confronting us is, Provided that there is and holds such a connection as the former of the two beforementioned ones (and this is admitted by implication by (v) above¹), then what is the proper place of this connection within the previously ~~adva~~ advanced division of sharing in general---for indeed a sharing it is, using the term in the broad sense here ^{availed and} employed.

We shall prove by exclusion that it is not a several sharing, in the sense here used. Thus, obviously, if it is such a sharing, it must be of the one or other of the two specific kinds of several sharing: strict participation and "participation". Now strict participation it is not; so much at least we have already shown. As to "participation", we firstly observe that this kind of sharing presupposes also a partition of the shared item into (quasi-ordinary) parts, each one of which transcendently belongs or is owned by the corresponding (one and only one) item alone. But such a partition is impossible in the present case. For fPI -qua-element-of- fP_2 is not separate (different in subject) from fPI -qua-element-of in general, the latter not again separate from fPI -qua-element-of-any given proximately specific form (of fPI), and thus all of fPI -qua-element-of- fP_2^i (where P_2^i -ness is, for every permissible value of i , a proximate determinate of P_1 -ness) are identical in subject one to another and with fPI -qua-element-of; further all these are equally identical in subject with fPI -qua-itself, as is immediately seen. Such identity in subject, excludes every

separateness^I indispensable for the applicability of the quasi-ordinary notion of the whole-part nexus with which we manipulate here. Therefore, each one of fPI-qua-element-of-fP2¹ is not a part of fPI-qua-element-of.

The requisite partition being impossible, the examined connection cannot be correctly assigned to "participation". Hence, not being a strict participation either, it is not a several sharing at all. It can thus be either a mere joint, or a several-and-joint sharing. But a simple consideration of its nature reveals it as properly assignable to the latter. For the self-identical fPI, as the Form of P_I-ness, is the common element of each one of its proximately specific forms as Forms of the proximate determinates of P_I-ness. Thus the entire Form is being had by each one of the said determinates, and consequently, the involved connection is a sharing of the several-and-collective kind.

We conclude therefore, that the connection in question is a sharing (or rather more expressively befittingly here, an ownership or belonging) of the several and collective kind, of the transcendent type. Since the owned item in it (namely fPI-qua-element-of) is essentially connected (in respect of being) with the shared item in the corresponding a strict participation (that is, with fPI-qua-element-in), we may choose to indicate the consequent relatedness between the two corresponding connections by calling the former 'participation_o', as a sort, so to speak, of unpartitioned transcendent participation².

41/ WE have found P₂-ness connected after some fashion or another with the following items:

1. Absolute---in respect to the parts (belonging in general to the same level of partitioning) among themselves. Partial---in respect of the whole and each one of its parts.

2. Needless to add the necessary historical perspective by noticing that we have here to do with the problem of $\mu\epsilon\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ as it presents itself in the world of ideas, with an aspect of the problem of $\kappa\omicron\iota\nu\omega\nu\iota\kappa\ \alpha\iota\delta\omega\nu$.

- i/ fP2-qua-itself
- ii/ fP1-qua-element-in-fP2
- iii/ fP1-qua-element-in
- iv/ fP1-qua-element-of-fP2
- v/ fP1-qua-element-of
- vi/ fP1-qua-itself.

We have ascertained the factual (i.e. in respect of subject) identity or diversity between them: thus (iv), (v) and (vi) are numerically the same; while (ii) and (iii) are partially identical in respect of subject, since the former is a quasi-ordinary part of the latter. (i), (ii) and (iii) are each numerically diverse from the item (iv)-(v)-(vi); and finally (i) is factually or numerically different from both (iii) and (ii)---the latter circumstance manifesting the technical sense of 'in subject' when we speak of the same/different in respect of subject, since in ordinary parlance (i) and (ii) would certainly be said to be identical in respect of "subject".

But in order to clarify as much as possible the entire situation, one should also investigate the question concerning the identity and difference of the above enumerated items in respect of being as well. Considering this very important problem, it is evident, to begin with, that (i) is different in being from any other item of the list. Now as regards the rest of them, it appears plausible, initially at least, to maintain the identity in being of all of these. For surely, one would wish to claim, it is one and the same content which is considered in its various aspects, or, to put it more adequately, it is one and the same content of being considered in the various aspects which thought can discriminate in it (that is, aspects under which it can be considered by thought), but which nonetheless are not really distinct in objective reality even in respect of being.

But an *éppagner* might here intervene. He could point out that if, in general, thought can discriminate thus-and-thus or can consider (or view) something under such-and-

such aspects or points of view, then, in so far as the thought in question is validly and correctly conducted, there must be in reality something answering to these discriminations and aspects (or whatever there may be), that is, there must be in reality what grounds the thought-discrimination or thought-dissolution in aspects or moments and, in so doing, renders (or rather determines) the thought correct and valid---in so far as it is so. To put it briefly: for thought to be able correctly to discriminate, there must be a real absolutely corresponding discrimination; for thought to be able validly to consider under aspects, there must in reality be aspects for items to be considered under them; and quite generally, for thought to be true, there must be ~~is~~ a reality making it ~~is~~ true. Thus, we see, the opponent's Generalised Rationalism reveals itself---for in fact this is the soul of his assertion: to be ultimately "foundable" on nothing more (and nothing less) than the profound triviality of the last adduced statement.

It is to be noted, that that last statement does not at all specify the nature and character of the correspondence required to subsist between thought and reality in general. It does not even determine the character of the presupposed correspondence between a merely true thought and reality. But it does specify in the stricter possible manner, the nature and character of the necessitated correspondence between true and adequate (i.e. adequately or completely analysed and articulated) thought on the one hand and reality on the other: for in fact asserts their absolute congruence. Thus, it is simply irrelevant to argue, as it is usually done, that from the difference of, say, numerical thoughts (expressed in arithmetical propositions) from thoughts about concrete things, it does not necessarily follow that there must be (and so we do not have, in this respect, to posit) a realm of numbers over and above concrete things---and to attribute the denied inference in the present case to Mathematical Platonism. This is just a void attack on an imaginary opponent, an opponent moreover "constructed" upon one's own principles---the easier to be overthrown, he and his doctrine. For obviously, the mere difference

between the above mentioned thoughts (or systems of thoughts) does not entail the alleged (by whom except by the imaginary figment-opponent of the anti-realist) conclusion; indeed, the conclusion does not even follow from the mere truth of the thoughts concerned. But if someone was to claim that the two systems of thought, in their truth, exhibit their irreducibly & fundamental and completely adequate proper form, and if he consequently went on to infer from this claim the separate subsistence of the scandalous world besides the ordinary (and supposedly unproblematic) one---then, to such a person and to such a view of the inference in question, the argued objection most clearly breaks down; indeed it does not even possess the advantage of breaking down, since it is from the very beginning an absolute nullity.

Further, it should be noted that the oppugner above mentioned, having the advantage of being fundamentally right, can also be concessive towards his opponent. For in insisting strongly on the assertion that there must be a real difference of aspects in objective reality to answer to the correctly and adequately (if correctly and adequately) drawn thought-distinctions in the present case (difference of items (ii)-(vi) in the list above given), he may nonetheless easily admit that the real, objective difference involved is not, strictly speaking, a difference in respect of being, but a still more delicate, so to speak, distinction which can be drawn within an identity in respect of being. In the clarification of this position, of the nature of such distinction as the above indicated, we now turn, having in the meanwhile appropriated as well the oppugner's assertion and point of view.

Let us then admit what is in no way inconsistent with our views properly understood, that the same content "runs through", as it were, all the items (ii)-(vi), that is, that the same basically content of being is modified according to modifications not themselves instituting a difference in respect of being (at least not such a difference as we have

till now recognised as being covered under such a locution), yet constituting a certain difference of aspects or moments of the self-identical content or rather of the self-identical form of being concerned. This difference in modification is clearly seen quite easily, though only with difficulty understood in its systematic nature and connections. Thus FPI in ~~itself~~ the aspect which it presents when considered as being simply and purely in itself cannot be self-same and identical, in any respect whatsoever, with FPI in the aspect relating to its being available as an element of the proximately underneath lying specific forms, or with FPI in the aspect under which it is viewed when considered in its serviceability as an element in the said specific forms. And it cannot be identical in any respect whatsoever, simply because the aspects described being distinct, they necessarily impart some sort of distinction to the content, whose aspects the aspects are. Not even thought could discriminate the absolutely indistinguishable. We thus say: the self-same form of being is accordingly modified through modifications which though not affecting the content itself of this form of being, nevertheless effect a certain diversification or multiplicity within the identical content, a diversification or multiplicity not strong enough, to be sure, in order to constitute a difference in respect of being (thus destroying the identical unity of the content in question), yet one instituting a distinguishability (by the agency of thought based on objective state of affairs) of various aspects under which the content presents itself (both absolutely and to the mind), or of various moments which are so strongly tied together as to preclude a variation in a respect of being.

Let us say then, in order to express the above circumstances that an identity in respect of being is susceptible of a diversity in respect of moments of being. Thus, in FPI-qua-element-of we have a certain moment of being modifying the same content of being which is differently modified by another moment of being in FPI-qua-element-in. (Strictly speaking, a moment of being is the result of the modification of a content of being by a certain parameter, as we shall see).

Before proceeding further, it is important to clear the sheer ambiguity which may lurk unperceived behind the expression 'fPI-qua-itself'. For it must be by now obvious that such an expression may be taken to signify either the form of being concerned in its entirety, or the content of this form of being (the mentioned content of being), or, lastly, the first moment of that content of being or in this form of being.

But to explain. We asserted the subsistence of a certain scale of grades (or modifications in respect of grades of being) which by being attached severally to a given bare content of being yield a number of moments of this content. These moments, however, do not exhibit, ex hypothesi, a multiplicity or diversity in respect of being, as being moments of one and the same content of being, and in one and the same form of being. Nevertheless, they institute a sort of diversity, which, in its turn, constitutes a certain unity as being, so to speak, tightly compressed and held together by the twin bond of belonging to one and the same content of being as its own moments on the one hand, and of being diversified through the modification introduced by a scale of grades of being, not of forms of being on the other. That beforementioned unity in its totality, is what we mean by form of being in its entirety.

We have thus established the first point of the last but one paragraph, namely the distinction (and the consequent danger of ambiguity on the part of 'fPI-qua-itself' or 'fPI-in-itself' and similar expressions) between a form of being and a content of being. (Between the two, needless to be added, there is no difference in respect of being). In order to establish the second point, we need the distinctions between, on the one hand, form of being or content of being, and on the other, first moment of a given content of being or in the corresponding form of being. But to this end, it will be better to define previously in more detail the scale of the grades of being, together with the ensuing upon it form of the succession of moments within any given form of being.

Suppose a certain generic form of being (and any form of being, corresponding to any but the absolutely determinate determinants, is generic). When we consider in it the bare content of being in which the said form consists, in explicit abeyance from any consideration of its being generic, and thus in abstraction from any consideration of its being connected with other forms in a structured system of articulated being, we consider it, we may say, merely in itself, as the content of being which it is; we view in it only the definite being-content, the being-determination in which it positively consists---and nothing more. Or, we may say, we view it under the explicitly isolated, sole aspect of its possessing or exhibiting or, rather, just being that definite being, this being-determination. We thus have a first grade of being: being in itself. And a corresponding moment in any form of being: the form of being in itself, or qua itself (Let it be added by the way that, of course, we do not either take any account and even notice of the form's being a specific form, subordinated under its genus. A form as specific is just a form as "constructed", as the result of a derivation; and it is just the "mechanism" of such a production or derivation that we wish to articulate here);

We must beware here of a possible misapprehension, the avoidance of which is what we were asking in effect by our second point above. The said first moment does not coincide with the corresponding content of being. It is rather the "result" of the content's being modified through the first grade of being. And this is so, in spite of the phenomenal plausibility of a claim of identity between them, based on the apparently evident circumstance that the first moment as above defined is nothing more than the content in itself or the content unmodified. For the content of being is what is common and identical in all moments of a form of being; it is what remains if from the latter it is abstracted the ordered scale of the grades of being, the first of the which, by its imposition on the content yields

the first moment in the said form of being. To put it in a slightly different way: the being-content of the first moment is the common content of being in the form of being considered; what is added to this content in order to obtain the full first moment is the modification or qualification that the corresponding form of being is not considered in its interconnections with other forms of being. Briefly said: the content of being is one thing, and the form of being considered as consisting in that content of being with everything else (and everything else that this constitution presupposes, entails and generally necessarily and essentially involves) explicitly suppressed, is clearly another thing.

To the objection that the advanced descriptions of the first moment of being are, or at least include, negative qualifications or modifications, I answer firstly, that even if this were true, it would nonetheless serve to distinguish the content from the first moment, since the content is not the content it is, even in its smallest part, in virtue of the circumstance that the corresponding form of being allows to be considered in either the obtaining or the nonobtaining of its interconnections with other forms of being, in, or irrespective of, its relatedness. Secondly, I answer that the objection is anyway incorrect; for the negativity of the modifications involved lies on no profounder level than on their expression. It is the same as if, in case in which we would choose to describe the other moments by saying that they consist in the form of being being not just considered in itself and qua itself, we would have felt in consequence inclined to object that this makes the other moments, too, to include negative determinations. The truth is that, as we have argued in Essay IV, though reality is positive, it finds valid expression in both positive and negative thoughts: negativity begins with mind. Thus, we could in principle equally well express our explication of the notion of the first moment by saying that it is the content modified

through the qualification that the corresponding form of being is considered in itself, as a definite being-determination of such a peculiarity and unity that attaches it substantially to a unique determinant. To put it briefly: the modifications constituting the scale of the grades of being are positive (and this is, in truth, pleonastic to the utmost), but we may employ formally negative as well as positive formulations in expressing them, in accordance with the occasional availability of linguistic expressions, convenience or point at hand.

To proceed now to the second step. Considering the form of being in its generic character, that is, in its potentiality or positive power to be divided into a co-ordinated variety of proximately subordinate specific forms of being, we isolate the second moment in it. The grade of being involved in the present case is what may be called 'capability of eidetic division or procession' in general. The form of being taken in this capability is nothing but the form of being considered as an element-of its proximately specific forms. To consider it as capable of eidetic division or procession is to consider it as an element-of the proximate results of the procession.

In this second moment, there can be further distinguished two submoments in accordance with whether we consider the mentioned potentiality as a potentiality of eidetic division in general, or as a potentiality of a definite eidetic division (one that is, towards and with a definite result). Obviously, we obtain in the former case the form of being qua element of its subordinate specific forms left unspecified, whereas in the latter case we arrive at the same form of being qua element of the specified system of its specific forms, and, therefore, qua element of each one of those specific forms in its specificity. (There is some possibility of further elaborative articulation here, but such systematic detail may be harmlessly omitted here).

And now to the third step. As we have shown, in the realm of determinants, and consequently in that of forms, no sooner does a possibility subsist than is actualised.

This is in fact part of what forms the content of the neo-platonic distinction between potentialities in the worlds above which are productive powers, and potentialities in the concrete world which are mere liabilities or susceptibilities. (The case of active powers in this world is not a definitive counterexample, in spite of appearances). Now the actualisation of all possibilities is here, in the realm of determinants and their forms, universal and necessary. Thus, the capability of division above mentioned necessarily entails both the actual division and the "products", as it were, of it. These latter are the proximately specific forms. In their systematic interconnection they form the actual eidetic division of the generic form. This latter now, considered in the activity of eidetic division, as against the mere possibility of it, (an activity which is, of course, written in its intrinsic nature), presents the third aspect, and gives the third moment of itself. The grade of being involved in the present case is what may be called activity or actuality of eidetic division or procession. Here, as above in the second moment, it is possible to distinguish two sub-moments. Thus, the generic form of being considered in its activity ensuing (a-temporally of course) in the actuality of the division (as result and not as procession) in general, i. e. when the actual result is left unspecified in its definite, specific constitution, is nothing but the generic form of being considered as an element in its proximately subordinate specific forms taken as a totality but left unspecified as to which in particular they are. On the other hand, the generic form of being considered in the specific, definite actuality of the accomplished division (as result) to which it itself gave rise (or produced or constituted) by and in its own activity of procession, is the generic form of being considered in its immanence as element in the various proximately subordinate specific forms (in each one of them, each one being definitively and completely circumscribed as to its particular nature), --- an immanence effected through the partitioning of the item described in the immediately preceding (sub)step. This present sub-moment then

of the third moment, is in truth a system of co-ordinated sub-sub-moments, which is, in a different formulation, the generic form of being in each one of the subordinate specific forms separately.

We conclude then that the list (ii)-(vi) in p.49, must be organised as follows:

	<u>Grade of being</u>	<u>Moment of a form of being</u>
A/	being in itself (or pure being or being in its particular determinateness)	the form of being in itself or qua itself
B/	eidetic divisibility (or power of being) a/in general or b/specifically	the form of being qua element of: a/an unspecified system of specific forms in its co-ordinating totality, or b/a certain, definite, co-ordinate system of specific forms severally.
C/	eidetic division (or activity of being) a/in general or b/specifically	the form of being qua element in: a/ or b/ as in (B) above.

42/ By way of tightening some loose ends of the previous chapter, let it be remarked, firstly, that, obviously, 'fPI-qua-itself' could be used (as it was in fact used) to signify the first moment of the form of being fPI. Hence, given also that it could have been used as well to signify either the form of being in its totality (comprehending all distinguishable moments as well as proper elements), or the bare content of being, or both, we have justified our earlier

remark as to the susceptibility, on the part of the before mentioned expression (and of the similarly used 'FPI-in-itself', too), of ambiguity. The use here adopted is the one previously made: the expression is taken to signify the first moment in the corresponding form of being---except when we may liberally speak of the "substantial" connection of a determinant with its own form of being in itself, meaning, of course, then the entire form of being in its complete totality.

Further, it should be emphasised that pure being, power and activity of being are three grades distinguishable within each one form of being, and absolutely united therein so as not to constitute a difference in respect of being. Then, it may also be added that the insisted unity of these three grades in each one form of being, is completely different from the immunity of each content of being (considered in itself and apart from its respective modifications) from their diversifying (after the fashion above explained, though not in respect of being) imposition and influence.

Finally, we must observe that the third grade of being is not the actuality itself of a certain form of being in its definite determinateness (this is rather attached to the form of being itself, marking its own first moment: the form of being in itself or in its particular determinateness), but rather the activity of that actuality, of that definite, determinate determinateness, its, so to speak, outward manifestation or projection. Similarly, the before mentioned power of being, is not the intrinsic possibility of the form of being in question in its definite being-determination (i. e. the possibility of the actuality of this being-determination in itself), but rather, the power of the outward manifestation or projection above indicated.

Naturally, the above expounded doctrine will further gain in clarity of articulation after its completion and application, to which we immediately turn.

43/ It is essential to a form of being to be generic, i.e. to have subordinated under it a multiplicity of specific forms of being---and this holds good generally, with the sole exemption of the absolutely determinate specificity of forms of being corresponding to the absolutely determinate determinants, where their own nature precludes the subordination of any multiplicity of a similar character, leaving only free play for instancial and exemplificatory multiplicities which are obviously of a radically different kind. Evidently, the above stated circumstance is but an aspect of the basic circumstance concerning the articulated structure of the determinants with reference to the determinable-determinate "relation", according to which it is essential for a determinant to be determinable---save for the absolutely determinate ones.

Now, in respect to a certain given form of being (not an absolutely determinate one), say fPI, it is not only essential to it that it be generic in general, but it is also essential to it that it should belong to it, as its proximately subordinate specific multiplicity, exactly that proximately subordinate specific multiplicity which in fact is subsumed under it---and no other, that in its specificity.

This notwithstanding its being self-evident, stands naturally in need of systematic elaboration and articulation (i.e. metaphysical "explanation" and justification), which should be offered in the following way.

Firstly, we have shown above that the generic form of being is an element, in strict technical sense, of each one of its proximately subordinated specific forms, and thus, on the one hand that the connection between the being of the specific form and the being of the generic one is such that the annihilation of each one of the two simultaneously brings about the annihilation of the other, and further on the other hand, that the being of the former just consists in the latter's being specially connected with, or qualified by, some else, modificatory form (which renders the latter's own being an ordinary part of the former's one).

We have, secondly, laboriously shown in the first part of the present Essay that ~~no~~ no modificatory forms are not proper forms of being, and, consequently, that the modification of a generic form in any one and all of its specifications cannot be accounted as a sort of extraneous "action" of a unique and distinct form of being upon the generic one, nor as a kind of, again, extraneous mutual action between two such forms of being. To put it slightly metaphorically: a form of being is suspended from an object, a determinant; a modificatory form, by being shown not to be such a form of being, is suspended from nowhere (from nothing external regarding the situation), since, not being possibly from a determinant or abstract thing, cannot also be considered as suspended from any other category of objects; hence, the modificatory modification of a generic form of being cannot be conceived as a kind of interaction between a determinant and another object, yielding another (the determinate) determinant.

Here an obvious objection comes unconstrainedly to mind. We seem to presuppose, in the above argument, that there is no peculiar category of objects presenting themselves under exactly the modificatory forms which were, indeed proven only not to be forms of being (and thus proven only not to be attached to determinants). And surely, it might be said, this presupposition renders our whole argument partially a case of *petitio principii* of some sort.

It would not, especially after what we have already said concerning our methodology, be void to retort to this objection as follows. Forms in general are, strictly speaking, forms under which objects in general present or exhibit themselves^I. Thus forms, strictly speaking, cannot but be that which these objects are, in other words, forms of being

I.

They are, to speak with Hegelian flavour, the showing forth or "appearing" or outward manifestation of the inward interiority of an object.

of the corresponding objects¹. Consequently proper forms are formae essendi or forms of being. But forms of being are precisely forms under which determinants alone primarily present themselves (and only secondarily other objects, for example, as we have found, concrete things). Consequently, we may rightly say that determinants determine everything which an object may or may not be, after one or another fashion²; and they determine it by being it after the unique manner (namely substantiation) of their having the corresponding forms of being. Thus, it is evident, genuine forms cannot attach but to determinants and to those objects which have being secondarily by and through their connections with determinants. And even in this latter cases, the objects in question exhibit secondarily the form which is primarily attached to, and exhibited by, the corresponding determinant. Hence we cannot suppose that modificatory forms attach to any object whatsoever, save by simultaneously claiming eo ipso their primary attachment to determinants---which has been proven to be an absolutely erroneous claim.

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1. This should not be thought to contradict our earlier claim that forms of forms of being are not themselves forms of being (for example, see part A, p. 75). For forms of being being no proper objects of whatever category, forms of them are no forms of objects, and hence no proper forms at all. Of course, on the other hand, the present remark does not in the least invalidate our previous claim, since that claim can be precisely formulated without resort to the use of the word 'form', which thus proves to be simply ambiguous in the two cases.
 2. More precisely, they determine the material as distinguished from the purely formal being of objects. Concerning this distinction we may say some things later on. We only note here that it does not coincide with matter-form distinction, as previously used. What we here call 'material' is the formal being of objects considered in its aspect that "counts", in its content, as distinct from the purely formal properties which it may be considered to exhibit, and which would be, as it were, the form of its formae essendi. To put it thus, the antithesis of material to formal here utilised is comparable to the Hegelian antithesis of content to form, and not to the Aristotelian antithesis of matter and form---which latter alone, let it be said, is everywhere employed in these inquiries.

But certainly, as a last desperate resort, the modificatory form may not be held to be a proper or genuine form in the above explained sense, and thus not be claimed to be ultimately a form of being (in this way complying to our proven requirements), and nonetheless insisted to be a "form", call it improper if you like, uniquely attached to, or suspended from or supported (substantiated, as it were) by, certain objects, in the sense, for example, of a fact's "having" a certain "being", or presenting itself under a certain "form"¹ (where "having", "being" and "form" do not signify proper having, being and form, respectively, of whatever sort).

Thus the objector is forced into the uncomfortable position that modificatory forms are forms under which a special category of objects present themselves, not as an entity² presents itself under certain forms (of being), but in the very general and loose sense in which even a fact may be said to exhibit a certain "form" or content. Let us call objects belonging to this special category (postulated ad hoc to face our retort to the objection above advanced) 'modifiers' or rather 'specifiers'. Specifying forms, then, interacting with generic forms yield specific forms.

Against such a theory, apart from its obviously audaciously ad hoc character, we may urge the following.

A/ From what has been said, it follows that, according to the criticised theory, specifiers are not entities, i.e. unitary objects with a forma essentialis of their own. Thus, they must either have no content at all (like bare generalities), or have a content consisting exclusively in the being of their constituents and their (the constituents') connections, these constituents in addition belonging to various other categories of objects, independently existing (at least relatively to the objects in question) on their own, and having in themselves proper forms of being. But both horns of this alternative are strongly counterintuitive, since it is evident that

I.

Of course there is a sense of 'form' in which it is quite natural to speak of the form of a fact; but this is precisely the sense of 'form' in which it is opposed to content, not that one in which it signifies the "contentual" being-determinateness which is contrasted to the material bare substratum. See p. 62, n. 2.

2.

See Part A, pp. 2ff.

specific differences(i.e. the forms of specifiers),on the one hand cannot be but items having at most a composition of the elements -complex kind(and indeed of that particular subkind of this kind consisting in the generic form plus specific difference constitution of the specific forms of being) and,hence,cannot have a content consisting in the connections of certain categorially heterogeneous,and independently existing items,which do not coalesce in virtue of these connections in the thorough unity of the complex-elements kind, so as to become the total form of a unitary object,i.e. an entity;and on the other hand,obviously,specific differences must needs have a particular content of their own,since it is by the imposition of exactly that content upon the generic form that they yield the corresponding specific one.Thus specifiers should be,if at all,entities,and indeed the presumption lies on their being(again if at all they do exist) some sort of determinants---which have been proved conclusively not to be.

B/Suppose fP_0 being modified by fp_01 to yield fP_1 ; fP_1 being modified by fp_12 to yield fP_2 ;and fP_2 being modified by fp_23 to yield fP_3 .We claim as a lemma,that the modification of fP_2 which results in fP_3 is a modification of fP_2 in so far as it itself is modified(or rather is result of a modification) and in respect of the modification which resulted in it,i.e. in the same respect in which the modification by fp_12 of fP_1 yields fP_2 .

This can be seen positively,by observing that the unity of fP_2 entails that its(fP_2 's) modification is the modification of it itself in its "capacity" of being the result of a modification of fP_1 ,and,thus,that fp_23 is a modifying form of the result of a modification of fP_1 ---and consequently,by dropping the mediating result,that we have here to do with a modification of a modification of fP_1 and its(the modification of the modification's) result.

Negatively the same point may be established as follows. fp_23 is a modification(not the result)of fP_2 .Now either it is a modification of the way fP_1 was modified so

as to yield fp_2 , or not. If it is, our point is conceded. If it is not, then the modification in question is a modification of another element within fp_2 than the modificatory form fp_{I2} . But the only other element within fp_2 is f_{PI} as an element of $(-in)fp_2$. Consequently, fp_{23} must be, on the present account, a modification of f_{PI} . But then either this is a simple modification yielding a proximate specific form, and then fp_3 instead of being a proximate specific form of fp_2 is such an one of f_{PI} , which is contrary to our hypothesis; or it is a composite modification, being a modification of a modification of f_{PI} , in which case it cannot be but the modification of that modification of f_{PI} which yields, as an intermediate step, fp_2 ---and we have again found our claim deduced from our opponent's one.

Having thus established our lemma, we see that fp_{23} can be rightly viewed as nothing but a modification of fp_{I2} , that is, as a specific form of it as generic, or rather, to be more precise, as a form which by being imposed upon fp_{I2} in its capacity as generic form, yields a composite modification, as a resulting one. In such a case, obviously, modifying forms must be forms pertaining to determinants, and specifiers, must be determinants, since there are the former which are characteristically structured through the generic/specific connection, and the latter, exactly and conjugately correspondingly, which are characteristically structured through the determinable/determinate one. And the further difficulty would be the necessity of introducing further forms of simple modifications yielding (in being assumed by these latter) composite ones, and, subsequently, of asking for the nature of their own connections or disconnections among themselves, especially in respect of their (the connections⁴) comparability or coincidence with the specific/generic connection, once more, and so on.

C/ Obviously, any chance specifier cannot interact with any chance determinable determinant so as to yield determinate ones. Moreover, besides this general restriction

of interactibility to the members of appropriate couples of specifiers and determinables, there is ~~the~~ a more specific requirement which specifiers interacting with a certain determinable must satisfy. For a modifying form which by supervening upon a certain generic one (capable of such acquisition) yields one of the proximately subordinate specific forms, must be necessarily connected with all other specifying forms which by being superimposed upon the same generic form yield the totality of the proximately subordinate specific multiplicity. And what else can the sort of this required connectedness be, if not the sort of the connection among the various proximately subordinate specific forms themselves, namely the family-nexus or co-ordination of a group of specific forms proximately subsumed under one and the same generic form, as its various specifications---since it is the connectedness of the modifying forms which produces the connectedness of the multiplicity of the specific ones, given that the generic one is common to all the latter? But if modifying forms are connected in this peculiar sort of way, they are of necessity forms of being, requiring a generic form of their own kind in order to be subsumed under it as its proximately subordinate specifications, and so on---in short we end with the conception of specifiers as (a kind of) determinants, a conception conclusively refuted in part A of the present Essay.

It is relatively easy to go through the various steps of our development of that part concerning the said conception in order to draw up various other objections regarding the details of the here criticised theory. In fact, the there expounded and refuted theory can be seen, in one of its aspects, as nothing but an attempted improvement of the here treated one, the relative amelioration consisting in that it frees itself from the arbitrary and gratuitous assumption of a special, ad hoc postulated, category of objects (namely of specifiers---whose postulation, besides, proves anyway to be untenable), while maintaining the doctrine of the extraneous interaction of two distinct items (belonging, as forms, to two

separate objects, which now belong to one and the same category, as their proper and unique forms) in the production or constitutive derivation of a specific form of being.

After discarding the above examined conception, we are justified in condemning altogether the basic assumption common to the two main forms discussed, of an extraneous interaction involved, in that derivation, thus vindicating our second point on p. 61. Therefore we conclude that the specification-affair, though it may be thought as involving three forms (namely the generic, the specific and the modifying forms), really involves no more than two objects, namely the two determinants (the determinable and the determinate one).

We see, then, that the second element within the specific form (i.e. the modifying form) cannot be accounted for by the postulation of a transcendent form of a special specifier, in the way in which the first element (i.e. the immanent generic form as an element in it) is accounted by the existence of the transcendent form of being of the determinable determinant. There thus remains the problem of a satisfactory and adequate account of it, or of this aspect of the constitution of the specific form in its specificity.

By discounting the possibility of any extraneous interference in the derivation of the specific form from the generic one, we are naturally led to hold the inner, as it were, "growth" of the former out of the latter by completely internal (as regards their coupling) means. Thus the modification which, if actually interposed, yields the specific form, must be already written in the nature of the generic form, after some fashion or other. The generic form must not only be according to its own nature susceptible of specification in general; it must furthermore be susceptible of the particular specifications resulting in its proximately subordinate specific forms, and this just by being what it is. Thus not only the susceptibility of specification in general, not even only

the susceptibility in particular of definite specifications left undetermined, but also the definite specifications themselves in their determinateness must preexist in it, after some fashion or other.

This completes the "unpacking" (so to speak) of the self-evident claim advanced at the beginning of the present chapter. But equally well, this exhibition of the claim's systematic articulation helps us to proceed further in establishing the correct distinctions and connections among forms of being, their aspects or moments, and the corresponding diversity of their connections with determinants.

44/ We have seen that not only is $fP1$ an element in $fP2$; moreover is $fP2$ included, after some fashion, in $fP1$ itself. There is, of course, no inconsistency involved in these two claims; simply the latter fashion is not identical with, or indeed at all like, the fashion of an actual complex/element connection.

It is, in consequence, required that what is explicite put in the specific form, must be already implicite present in the generic one. And what is thus explicite and implicite found (respectively), is the modifying form. We may say that the generic form includes potentially or as regards potency the modifying form, upon the actual inclusion of which becomes the corresponding specific form. Or we may equivalently say that the specific form is included causally, or in respect of cause in the generic one, in such a way that the actual effectiveness of this causal inclusion yields the specific form. Obviously, the three idioms here employed, are considered as expressing the self same state of affairs.

Evidently, the generic form includes implicite, potentially or causally all the modifying forms corresponding severally to the totality of its proximate specific forms.

It becomes then clear why a given specification of the generic form, being the (ontological) positing explicit, actually or in effect of a certain one of the said modifying forms, is ipso facto the (equally ontological) negation of the positing (negative positing, as it were) of all the other modifying forms belonging to the co-ordinated family---a circumstance which grounds the incompatibility, among themselves, of the specific forms (which again, in its turn, grounds the incompatibility of the proximately determinate determinants of one and the same determinable). Thus we see the true content of the Spinozist dictum: "Omnis determinatio (i.e. what we call here specification) est negatio". It is not to say that negation is given a fundamental ontological status, contrary to our exhortations in Essay IV; it is only that a (positive) specification entails, by just bringing into explicit relief one modifying form out of a given variety or co-ordinated multiplicity of them (of all of which the generic form is intrinsically susceptible, and all of which it implicate or causally includes), the ontological, as it were, renouncement of all the other forms, in the sense that they cannot now, any more, co-exist with the actually included or posited one, neither on an implicit nor on an explicit basis. For, of course, the specific form does not even implicate includes the modifying forms corresponding to the other co-ordinated specific forms belonging to the same determinate family---except in the indirect way in which it may be held that even a specific form includes modifying forms cognate and not identical with its own one, in that it includes as a proper element of itself the generic form, which in its turn includes implicate all these other modifying forms as well as the initial specific form's own.

But even this latter formulation is not very exact, though grosso modo correct. And this can be seen, by bringing to bear the previously discussed doctrine of the three moments of forms of being. Thus, a form of being in its

power or capability of eidetic division, is the form of being qua including implicate, causally or potentially, the corresponding family of modifying forms. In particular, a form of being in its power or capability of being specified towards a certain direction of modification, resulting in a certain specific form, coincides with the form of being qua including implicate that one modifying form, the explicit positing of the which yields the said specific form; the particular modifying form in question is thus, in the present particular case, though only implicate present, put into relief---but not, obviously into the relief constituted by an explicit actualisation.

Similarly, a form of being in the activity of eidetic division is the form of being as explicite and actually including all its specific modifications, that is, the form of being in the totality of its proximate specific manifestations. We can consider the form of being itself in this activity, and then we have what in our standard example-schema we have called 'PPI-qua-element-in', which thus coincides with the generic form of being as actually and explicitly specified in so many specificities, but still considered as nonetheless apart from the specifications in which it is in reality fully embedded; it is, as it were, the form of being acting, but still considered apart from its action, while in its action (in this being distinguished from it in itself, when it is considered apart from its proper action and also in advance of this its action). Finally, in particular, the form of being in its activity of actually assuming one certain form from the family of the modifying forms of which it is intrinsically susceptible (and which it implicitly contains), and thus "fashioning" the corresponding specific form, is the same with the generic form of being in its specific manifestation which constitutes the said specific form, but still considered apart from this specific manifestation; the form of being in a specific action, considered apart from this specific action, while in this specific action.

After the above portrayal of the general scheme, to draw in further detail the correspondence and congruence between what we have just said and the previous distinctions of the generic form in itself, as an element of (in general and in particular), and as an element in (again in general as well as in particular), should be rather superfluous. We only add that the correct formulation of the connection between a given specific form and any other co-ordinated specific form, would be, to say that a particular specific form, in including as a proper, strict element of itself its generic form of being, includes simultaneously as well, and after a fashion, the alien (though co-ordinated), as regards its own specificity, modifications contained implicate in that generic form---but precisely because of this, since it is constituted by the said generic form in the latter's decided actual preference and choice, as it were, of just one of the modifications of which it is susceptible, and which it implicate contains in being generic, it (the specific form) includes all other modifications as explicitly suppressed, in the actual cancellation of their availability as possible modifications of the generic form---a suppression and cancellation which are not in themselves fundamentally real, let it be emphasised, but only acquire some ontological status by being the reverse side of what in its obverse one is the (positive---which is really superfluous) positing in actuality of one among the potential modifications.

45/ In consequence of the above advanced elaboration of what is involved in the generic/specific connection between forms of being, we can complete now the account of the variety of connections subsisting between determinants and forms of being or moments or elements of forms of being.

Thus we can resume and organise what we have argued and established as follows.

- A/ P_2 -ness (the determinate determinant) is connected with its own proper and unique form of being, fP_2 , through what has been called 'substantiation' or 'appropriation'.
 P_2 -ness substantially is P_2 or has fP_2 .
- B/ The connections between P_2 -ness and moments of the generic form of being proximately superordinated over its own form of being (namely, moments of fP_1) are as follows:
- a/ the connection between P_2 -ness and fP_1 -qua element-in in general is (strict) participation, a kind of immanent, collective sharing or belonging.
 - b/ the connection between P_2 -ness and fP_1 -qua-element-in- fP_2 (in particular) is elementary participatory substantiation, an exclusive owning or belonging (not sharing) of the substantial type, since the second item is an element in the substantially attached Form of P_2 -ness.
 - c/ the connection between P_2 -ness and fP_1 -qua-element-of in general, or fP_1 -qua-element-of- fP_2 in particular (these two items can go together since they do not differ in any relevant way) has been called 'participation_o', ---the connection with the first item being a kind of transcendent, several-and-collective sharing, and the connection with the second one being the corresponding kind of exclusive belonging.
 - d/ there is obviously no connection subsisting between P_2 -ness and the first moment of fP_1 , since the latter is considered in its explicit opposition, and contrast with, the generic form as connected, in one way or another, with fP_2 and P_2 -ness, thus being considered as unconnected with these (in explicit abeyance from its possibility and actuality of specification).

We may put together the last four points, by saying that the connection between P_2 -ness and fP_1 on the whole (the complete form of being in its entirety) is participation (using of course now the term in an absolutely technical sense to cover all the above mentioned features) or (as it were ^{in order} to emphasise the technical character of the notion) methexis. Thus we may say that P_2 -ness is participatorily or through methexis P_1 , or has, in the same sense and way, fP_1 .

C/ We are, furthermore, able now to supplement and complete the above list by adding that P_1 -ness is connected causally or in respect of cause or eminentia with fP_2 , meaning by this (still for the time being not raising any question of relative fundamentality or metaphysical priority) the same as that fP_1 , as the Form of P_1 -ness, implicit or potentially or causally includes in its own being the modifying form corresponding to fP_2 . Thus we shall say that P_1 -ness is causally P_2 , or has causally fP_2 .

46/ And now, we may turn to the most important question of the metaphysical ground of (1) and (2), chapter 36.

fP_2 , we have found, is the result of an a-temporal (indeed, eternal---since eternality is the mode of a-temporalness attaching to determinants and their forms) procession of fP_1 . The nature of this procession or derivation we have explained above.

But fP_2 substantially belongs to P_2 -ness, as its own uniquely peculiar form. And the same connection holds between fP_1 and P_1 -ness. Thus, that which P_2 -ness is (in our terminology, the forma essendi of P_2 -ness) is eternally derived from that which P_1 -ness is. The latter's forma essendi determines (in a strongly ontological sense) the forma essendi of P_2 -ness. Therefore, we may say that P_1 -ness's being what it is causes, through its own specification, P_2 -ness's being what it is, in that which it is. But the metaphysical cause of an

object's being what it is, in and as that which it is, is the "causa formalis" of the circumstance of its being thus and thus¹. Consequently, the formal cause of circumstance (2) (or, equivalently, of P₂-ness) is P₁-ness, or it in its being what it is---that is, circumstance (1).

On the other hand, we have distinguished² the causa efficiens of a fact from its causa formalis, the former being the cause of an object's (of the object which is the metaphysical subject of the fact in question) being what it is, in so far as it is that which it is, in its having the forma essendi which it has, as contrasted to the same object's being what it is, in so far as there is involved the form of being which is in fact involved. We thus are entitled to ask further: what is the efficient cause of P₂-ness³?

To answer this question we must see once more the whole examined situation in the light of the accumulated results so far achieved. We have two things, P₁-ness and P₂-ness, and the facts (1) and (2) of their total (total, because in the particular cases studied, we have to do exclusively with determinants) constitution. But these facts, we have proven, form a closed system, in that every determination included in this system proceeds out of some part of itself^{the system}, in so far at least as this particular system is considered in its isolation, and not as something to be intergrated in the whole world of Determinants. Thus, in confronting it with the question concerning formal causes, there were no other possibilities open than that either P₁-ness is the causa formalis of P₂-ness, or conversely, or, thirdly, that neither of the two has such a formal cause, at least in so far as their consideration as belonging to one

1. See Part A, chapter 13.

2. See again Part A of the present Essay, chapter 13, pp22-24.

3. Notice that there is no inconsistency involved in our speaking now of causes of facts, now of causes of things. For, according to our conception, a thing, as the metaphysical subject of a simple fact, is considered in so far it is actually determined through the determination constituting the fact, and not as the material substratum of such a determination. In other words with the same import, a thing is being considered

in these inquiries in so far as it is a being, i.e. as something being, or having a certain content or form of being.

isolated system (comprising just these two) is concerned; for the possibility of their having (any one of them or both) such a formal cause in an object outside their system is excluded as unreal by the shown closeness of the system in question. Now the development of our theory above conducted, rendered it certain that neither is it possible that none is the formal cause of the other, nor could it be supposed that the determinate is such a cause of the determinable; the former because on the one hand the question concerning the formal cause of (1) and (2) being legitimate, an answer must be available in truth, and on the other hand, our previous exhibition of the derivation of fP2 from fP1 precluded the equal independence of the two in general, and of the one vis-à-vis the other, and indeed made clear the direction of the necessary dependence as well; which established direction proved also impossible the latter supposition. Thus there remained only the case of the determinable's, qua determinable, being the formal cause of the determinate, qua determinate.

All this was, perhaps, apparently clearer in the case of the question regarding formal causes. But it equally well applies to the further question concerning efficient ones. Thus, on parity of reasoning, we must hold that either the determinable as such is the efficient cause of the determinate as such; or conversely; or neither of these two has an efficient cause; since the possibility (rather the abstract conceivability) of any one of them or both having an efficient cause in something exterior in respect to their system, is again excluded by reason of the mentioned and previously proven principle: in the nexus of determinable and proximate determinate nothing interferes save these same two determinants, in so far, of course, as the circumstance of their being connected by the determinable/determinate "relation" and entailed corollaries are concerned. (And, of course, by way of enforcement, further absurdities may be drawn from such a gratuitous supposition, in the present case, of such extraneous efficient causality). Now the third mentioned possibility is again dismissible on the same

ground as the corresponding possibility in the case of the issue concerning formal causes: the question being legitimately posited (I mean the question, whether the determinable as such is the efficient cause of the determinate as such, or vice-versa—extremeness of causality being excluded), it demands, in the nature of things, an unexceptionable answer. This leaves us with the two prior possibilities, of which the latter is easily discarded by invoking the principle that the metaphysically posterior in being cannot be a metaphysical cause (in any sense) of the metaphysically prior in being. Hence we are entitled to conclude that, in our present case, the determinable as such is both the efficient and the formal cause of the determinate as such. (Needless to notice that the objections urged against the factual (or in respect of subject) identity of the efficient and the formal cause of a simple fact with a concrete subject in Essay VII, are not valid here, as the there expounded presuppositions of their validity remain unsatisfied in the present case. Surely on the other hand, we claim even here only the factual, not of course the notional, identity of these two kinds of metaphysical cause).

47/ Still it is one thing to hold, as we do, that the determinable as such is the efficient and formal cause of the determinate as such, and another to exhibit the mechanism, as it were, of the causality involved, in both its aspects, the function or activity in which this causality precisely consists.

In other words, we have so far established the determinable as such as the metaphysically prior in being. Now, we must ascertain the exact nature of this priority, given the validity of our previous analyses.

The forma essendi of the determinable contains implicite the modifying form in which the specific difference of the forma essendi of the determinate consists, as well as all other akin and co-ordinated modifying forms specifically characterising the rest of the subsumed family of proximate determinates. The specification of this generic form in the specific one corresponding to the first mentioned modifying form is nothing but the rendering explicit or actual or effective of the said implicit or potential or causally contained modification, which rendering is simultaneously a rendering explicit of the non-modification of the initial generic form by all other mentioned modifying forms---that is, a kind of explicit cancellation or suppression of what was previously implicitly contained therein.

This, evidently, is the ground of the intrinsic inconsistency of the akin specific forms. It is also a further proof, if indeed further proof be needed, of the ~~incompatibility~~ impossibility of conceiving the eidetic division as a dissolving in itself and within itself (that is immanently, as contrasted with proceeding out of itself) of the generic form and the corresponding determinant in its subordinated specific forms and corresponding determinates, in the sense, in effect, of conceiving the determinable as just the mere collection of its determinates in their kinship and co-ordination (and either in their entirety or in their community of nature)--- a view which grants metaphysical priority to the species vis-à-vis their genera. For in such a case, one and the same thing would be identical with many inconsistent and incompatible things, results of specification explicitly refuting each other.

At this point, it is necessary that we should open a brief digression. When we speak of the intrinsic incompatibility of specific forms belonging to one given family of proximate determinateness in respect to a certain super-ordinated generic form, and, more basically, when we refer to a particular specification of a genus as the explicit onto-

gical affirmation of the corresponding modifying form together with the explicit ontological negation of all other correlative modifying forms-modifying forms which in their totality are implicitly included in the generic form as such- we do not mean to assert anything more than that the process or feature which positively establishes a certain specific form or nature in its identity to itself, is simultaneously and necessarily accompanied (as its opposite face, so to speak) by the process or feature which negatively establishes it and its identity, in its difference, in respect of being, from all other kindred specific forms. Thus, in particular, this assertion must not be conceived as providing the sufficient reason for the circumstance, according to which one and the same concrete thing cannot be characterised by more than one member of a family of such kindred specific forms. This circumstance, quite apart from its not being universal (as the consideration of many a case of a concrete thing's exhibition of various forms belonging to the same kind of being amply, apparently, testifies), cannot be shown to be a necessary, let alone an essential, feature of the forms themselves (or be grounded to such a feature of the forms), as distinct from, and in contrast to, the mechanism of their concrete exemplification---and this simply because there is no reason, arising out of the nature of the determinants as such and in themselves (and hence ascertainable in the abstract theory of determinants in which we are presently engaged), which could necessitate the obtaining of such a state of affairs universally or in part, and also providing, in the latter case, the principle of its selective applicability. The consideration of the mentioned topic properly belongs to the theory of exemplification (of concrete manifestation), for obviously it has, to do at least as much with concreteness, as with abstractness.

To continue then from the point where we have digressed.

I.

We do not, naturally, maintain that this is fundamentally so, only that it appears plausibly to be so. We do not wish to predetermine the solution to an issue, whose proper investigation lies within the limits of another theory than the one ~~in~~ with which we are presently occupied.

We have seen anyway, and quite apart from the consideration advanced in the paragraph immediately preceding the digression, that specification results in distinct and separate objects¹, one from another and from the initial specified one. Thus, once more, the process of the constitution of such a result of specification requires to be exhibited clearly, and does not allow of any "shortcuts", as the one above anticipated, which aims at avoiding the problem, or at least at relaxing its difficulty, by denying the absolute separateness as regards subject of the two things involved.

In order to succeed in this, I shall avail myself here of the metaphysically very important distinction between metaphysical (as opposed to physical) matter and form. Since I do not intend to treat of the problems centring round this distinction in the present dissertation, I shall make use of the distinction dogmatically. I must only remark here, that the sense of 'form' in its opposition to matter, is slightly different from the senses of the expression hitherto signified, in that from the form in question, considered as informing a certain matter, it may be excluded some determination of the corresponding compound thing (a composite of the matter and the form in question), which is without question formal in the hitherto acknowledged main sense (form of being)---and excluded or rather omitted, either because it is accidental to the said thing, or because the matter to which the form is opposed and simultaneously connected and attached, is not *prima materia*, but matter already determined up to a certain point of definite determinateness.

Now, a thing is a compound of matter and form. Thus the determinate determinant is such a compound. Not that the matter of determinants is the same with the matter of concrete things, far from it. But we rely here on analogical argumentation. From what we have said, the proximate matter of a determinate determinant must correspond exactly to its

I.

See above pp. 2ff.

proximate genus, i.e. its proximate determinable, and its form is the differentia constitutiva of its being. I say 'must correspond exactly' or 'must be absolutely congruous with' rather than simply 'must be' in the case of the matter: for the determinable being separate from, and transcendent in respect of, the determinate, it cannot in itself serve as the latter's proximate matter, which is, of course, immanent in that compound, whose matter it is. But this is only a parallel (and one to be expected) to what was found to be the case in the constitution of the specific forms of being out of the generic ones. That is, the latter, in its third moment, proceeded, as it were, outside of itself (strictly speaking; it proceeded outwards from where it substantially belongs, i.e. from its uniquely appropriate determinant, simultaneously developing itself from its first towards the third moment), and in this procession it was specified or crystallised in the respective specific form of being, through the rendering explicit, of one of its potential, and determinably held, modifications. To be thus specified without procession was already seen to be impossible; for it was only in the third stage of such a procession, as above, proven, that it could perform the function of an element-in-the corresponding specific form, and thus of being immanently constitutive of it.

Exactly the same considerations hold good, *mutatis mutandis*, if we are transposed from forms of being to their uniquely corresponding determinants. The determinable determinant proceeds from its pure being, to its capacity or power of eidetic specification, and, thence, to the activity of such division, in this third stage of its development being away from itself, in so far as it is now an immanent element, nay the material constitutive element, of the determinate determinant (or an element in it). This 'being away from itself' is, of course, metaphorical. It means that, ceasing to be the thing which it is (ceasing to be thus, not, of course, as regards its content and form of being, which remains unaltered in its totality), is projected as a constitutive material immanent

element (with exactly the same content of being) of another separate thing: its determinate. Or, in other words with the same import: the determinable projects from (or pours forth out of) itself something, with exactly the same content of being as itself, in order to serve as the (proximate) matter of a proximate determinate.

It must be noted by way of elaboration, that P_1 -ness in this capacity as matter for and of P_2 -ness (and of any other proximate determinate for that matter), being, of course, other and separate from P_1 -ness in itself, as the transcendent determinable it is, has not only the same content of being with P_1 -ness in itself, or the same with its form of being, if this is considered as an all-inclusive totality (of moments) --- but even the same form of being if this is considered in itself, as the first moment of the entire form of being. For this latter already contains implicitly or determinably all subordinate modifying forms, and it is exactly this implicit or potential inclusion which permits the determinable to serve, at the third stage of its developmental procession, as a matter for all, and each one, of the determinates. The total form of being is there, with its pure being, its power and its activity; only they are all there at the third stage of its procession, i.e. with the activity marked or in elevation.

In conclusion we may thus say, that the determinable proceeds to its determinates, meaning, by this the following state of affairs (complex circumstance). The determinable substantially-is its own forma essendi, and causally-is each one and all the forms of being substantially belonging to its proximate determinates. Its forma essendi develops itself in three stages, differentiating themselves not through any difference in being, but only by forming the three moments of a single, unitary form of being with the same content. The determinant follows a corresponding development, each stage of which is characterised by the ontological emphasis or predominance, as it were, of one or other of the three moments of its form of

being, none of which is entirely absent, or could be absent, in view of the presupposed unity in being of all moments of the involved form of being. For the determinable has its own forma essendi always in its entirety; but if the first moment is put into ontological relief, the determinable is considered as pure, definite determinant in its being-determinateness (a determinant, that is, with a certain, definite being-determination); if the second moment overshadows all others, the determinable presents itself as determinable, i.e. in its power of eidetic specification (in the potentiality of it, which is positive, productive power); while if, finally, the third moment overpowers the first two and becomes the elevated feature, the determinable is transformed to the proximate matter of its determinates. But in this third case, where it is separated from itself-in-itself, being emphatically, in prominence or in elevation characterised by the activity of the eidetic division of its peculiar form of being, yields, exclusively out of itself and outside of itself, the co-ordinate family of its determinates, in the way above detailed.

It is this, in brief, together with everything that this exposition systematically presupposes or implies, which is the specific content of what we mean by 'procession' in the present context.

48/ But the word, the word 'procession', may meet, and has been met, with fierce polemics. In vindicating its appropriateness, we, in spite of counting controversies concerning words as, in general, idle and void, shall attempt to show very briefly and roughly those real distinctions among realities, which the word happily suggests or brings, if properly understood, under notice.

Being the efficient cause of a fact, is originating its existence, bringing it to pass, or producing it. Let us call such a connection '(ordinary) production'. Indeed, when

we, for example, produce a sphere of gold (a sphere out of gold), we do not create either the gold or sphericity as such, not even do we create the nature of the sphericity of the produced sphere, i.e. its immanent, instantial sphericity; we only bring it to pass that the gold as matter be informed by sphericity as form--we cause the actualisation of the respective exemplification, that is, we are the efficient cause of the corresponding fact (and of the golden sphere in so far/^{as} it is a sphere of gold). In this our example, the transcendent^I formal cause of the golden sphere is, let us assume, sphericity in itself.

Notionally, or in respect of being, formal and efficient causality and causes are distinct; and even factually they are in general separate. But the factual coincidence of them, being not impossible simpliciter, constitutes, when it occurs, what we may call 'perfect production'. Here, we have not to look at different places in order to account on the one hand of a thing's being thus and thus, and on the other of its being thus and thus, or being that, which it is,--to formulate the often advanced point in terms of shifting emphasis. The same object is both the principle of the formal (in our sense, conjugated to form of being) determination of a thing, and the principle of its formal determination--to speak again with varying emphasis.

Now suppose further that not only the form and its having that form of a certain thing originate in one and the same principle, but that even the matter of this thing is somehow brought into existence as matter for this thing by the selfsame principle. What we have here, is, we may properly say, creation in general (not necessarily implying a personal creation as the result of a Will).

Finally, suppose that the particular way in which the matter of a certain created thing is brought into existence as the matter of this thing, is a derivation out of

I.

To be distinguished from the immanent formal cause of it, which is the immanent instance of the determinant involved (i.e. of sphericity in itself in our example--if this is a determinant, to which affirmation we do not consider ourselves as in any way bound), or the immanent formal element of the compound being (here ens, and not esse).

its creator (which turns then to be the originator of both the material and the formal immanent elements of the thing, as well as of their connection or composition). In such a case, the Principle or Absolute Cause of the thing is that out of which comes both the formal and the material immanent elements of the thing and their connection. We then ask: Is it not appropriate to speak on this occasion of the immanent elements proceeding out of the Principle of the thing, and indeed of the thing as the result of a procession of its Principle--- especially when in addition, this coming out and going forth is of the sort which we have above detailed as applying to the derivation of the determinates out of their (proximate) determinable?

I must add, lest I might be accused, on grounds of unduly leaving/^{much}wanting ~~the~~ of further elaboration in this chapter, that my object not being here to investigate the distinctions and connections of the various kinds of ontological derivation or origination, or to examine the real possibility, let alone the actuality, of what may appear in them as subjectively conceivable, I was entitled to skip over an inquiry aiming at offering no less than an adequate description and account of these matters, and concentrate on giving the place of the derivation of determinates from determinables (which alone was drawn in detail), in a rough plan of general origination, with the sole aim of showing the propriety of the much abused expression used to signify the said particular derivation.

49/ In consequence of all our previous developments, we have succeeded in specifying the nature of that determinable/determinate "relation" which was "phenomenologically" assumed to hold between a determinable and each one of its proximate determinates. This nature, above described, we

designate by saying that the determinable/determinate "relation" is a procession.

(There is, of course, no need to repeat that this procession is ^{an} a-temporal, nay eternal¹, process. Nonetheless, in the presented account, we find the full force of the 'determinable/determinate' terminology).

Thus, we also obtain, at last, a solution of the grave metaphysical problems firstly encountered in chapters 9-II of part A of the present Essay. For it is by now evident that a procession, being much stronger in commitments than simple or even perfect production, leaves no doubt as to the correct answer to the main question concerning the metaphysical dependence, in respect both of form of being and of existence, regarding the determinable as such and the determinate as such. The determinate as such, depends on its determinable both for its own Form of being, and for its existence; it depends absolutely on it for its Being, i.e. for its existing (under the definite form of being under which it exists), as well as for the form of being itself under which it exists.

To put it into the terminology there employed, that the determinate as such stands in the determinate/determinable "relation" to its proximate determinable (i.e. that it proceeds out of it) is constitutive of the entire being of it, in both aspects of being, namely both in its existence and in the form under which it exists. Whereas, on the contrary, the determinable as such is completely unaffected, as it were, from its standing in the determinable/determinate "relation" to its determinate; indeed, this "relation", the procession, "springs" out and forth from the determinable as metaphysical consequence of its nature, while, on the contrary again, the nature of the determinate is constituted by its standing in this "relation" to its determinable: it is erected through this "relation". We see, we have further confirmation of the appropriateness of speaking in our case of a special kind of creation.

I.

As we have explicated the term in Essay VII, pp25-27.

50/ What we have said concerning the derivation of P_2 -ness from P_1 -ness, applies equally well to the derivation of P_1 -ness from its own proximate determinable, and to the derivation of P_2 -ness from its own determinate. For each determinant, with the exception of the extreme, boundary cases, besides being simpliciter a determinate, in so far as its forma essendi is considered in the purity of a definite determinateness of a being-content, is also both a determinable, in so far as its form of being is considered under the aspect of the capability of eidetic specification (i.e. in its power of being), and a determinate, in so far as its form of being is considered as a particular result of the activity of eidetic division exercised on the part of the form of being of its proximately superordinated determinate.

This re-iteration of the procession in question extends on both sides of any given couple comprising a determinate with its proximate determinable. And it is important to see where exactly the repetition leads, as regards both its extremities.

Thus, on the higher side, we come necessarily by gradual ascent, to that determinable which is no more simultaneously determinate, but is only determinable, that is, which cannot be considered as exhibiting a form of being which is deducible by procession from a higher form of being. Thus, we come at the un-processed beginning of all procession, at the Determinate-Itself or as such, at the highest abstract thing, indeed at the Abstract Thing Itself. The forma essendi of this thing is, obviously, not this or that particular form of being, not the one or other generic or specific form of being, but Being itself. It has not this or that particular, however generic in nature, form of being---it has just Being, it is Being itself. To put it paradoxically: its form of being is pure Being; it exhibits, or presents itself as, mere Being. It is just being Being---where the first 'being' signifies existential being, and the second formal or "contentual" Being.

But this mere, simple or pure Being is simultaneously full Being, indeed the fullest and most complete and all-inclusive Being. It contains within it all particular forms of being proceeding ultimately out of it in all their exact connections, i.e. as a completely ordered system—only it contains them implicitly or determinably, i.e. not determinately or effectually. Still it contains them, and thus, also, the Abstract Thing Itself has causally all of them, at various removes of implicitness. The Determinant Itself is, in its own intrinsic nature, everything—eminenter.

Consequently, it is the formal cause of every determinant, again at various removes of directness. It is as well, as can be seen from what we have already said in respect of particular couples of determinable and determinate, the efficient cause of every determinant. In its alienation from itself, that is, at the third stage of its processional development, when, in its activity of self-division (of the first division), it projects itself as a degradation of itself out and away of itself^I as the material immanent element of its proximate determinates and thus, mediately or indirectly, of all determinants whatsoever, it constitutes the prima materia as well of the World of Determinants, i.e., as we may say, the intelligible prime matter (to be distinguished from the prime matter, properly called, of the World of Concreteness).

Thus, the Determinant Itself is also, ^{the} transcendent material cause of any and every determinant. Being all at once formal, efficient and (transcendently) material cause of all ~~material~~ determinants, it is the Creator or Absolute Source (of the procession) of all these, in the sense we have explained in the previous chapter. There fore, everything else in the World of Determinants depends on it absolutely for its entire being (both existence and form of being), whereas it, on the contrary, is absolutely free from any such dependence on anything else. Consequently, it is the sole thing which has absolute self-subsistence, owing to nothing else nothing of itself.

I. This is, no doubt, a metaphor, whose exact meaning is, I trust, evident from the whole of our relevant inquiries.

Thus, it is the Absolute or Unconditioned Principle of the said world (and indirectly of everything that has proper being), explicite or actually transcendent over all its other members (I mean the world's members), yet implicite containing all of them in its all-encompassing simplicity. It is everything else "before" the actual procession and, thus, separation from it of anything else, merging all its implicit diversity in an explicit unity and simplicity. It is in short, the God (of the World of determinants, if we take no offence at a word, since the proven characteristic features of it are traditionally (and even, in some measure, ordinarily) associated or included in the notion of a God.

Before proceeding to see what happens at the lower extremity of the structured system of determinants, let us take due notice of an objection which, no doubt, will be urged against the validity of our deduction of the nature of the Determinant Itself. For, it may be said, the ascent towards higher determinants does not necessarily lead to one supreme thing, such as we have hasten to assume, postulate and describe, but the possibility remains open of its ending up with several, more than one, highest abstract things, which have in common nothing at all, nor can they consequently be considered as the various specifications of a unitary nature, which by being in this way superordinated above them, constitutes the common element of and in each one of them. In support of such an objection the weighty authority of Aristotle would also be adduced; for is it not to hold the objection as justified tantamount to claiming that above some highest and simplest forms of being (be they Quality and Quantity etc., be they otherwise) there is no one nature of abstract pure being, by a first specification of which these various highest simplest forms are derived? And is it not exactly this part of the core of Aristotle's doctrine concerning the non-synonymity of being?

Surely one deviates from, or opposes directly an explicit Aristotelian doctrine at its own peril. Still, this, it would seem to me, is one of the rare occasions, where Reason obliges us to do so. And the reason is as follows: suppose that in the described ascent we arrive indeed up to a number of highest simplest forms of being of the sort above indicated. By hypothesis, then, they cannot be considered as derived from a still higher and simpler form of being, since this would ~~then~~ contradict their being themselves highest and simplest forms of being. This is so far correct. But what this proves is that they cannot be subordinated under a still higher and simpler form of being. Now this was not what we have claimed to be the case. For we are obliged to assume, according to the above given exposition and in terms of the present objection, that they are subordinated not under a still higher and simpler form of being, but under pure, simple and mere Being itself. And this not only is not contradictoriness; it is just unavoidable and necessary. For, evidently, an absolutely simple form of being is a first specification of pure Being. For of this Being which is nothing explicit and everything implicit, ~~that~~ that simple form of being which consists in just one simple explicit specification and a restricted class (restricted regarding those of the previous Being or in respect to the totality of available specifications of all orders) of implicit specifications is nothing but a first, most general and, thus, most simple specification. In brief: what we are forced to deny, and ungrundingly do deny, is that the mentioned simple forms of being are subsumed under a simpler definite content of being; what we are not only not forced to deny, but obliged to affirm (and what we have in fact straightly affirmed) is that they are nonetheless subordinated under pure Being, mere Being without any explicit definite import.

It is instructive to consider very briefly an argument advanced by Aristotle in support of his thesis according to which being (and one) is not a genus under which, as its species, are subsumed (the highest) categories of beings.

In substance the argument is this^I, roughly a case of reductio ad absurdum: Suppose that Being is the genus of the highest and simplest forms of being, the categories. Now a genus, though it is correctly affirmed of its species, cannot be truly affirmed of the specific differences which constitute, together with the generic nature, the specific natures. Therefore, Being, in the case envisaged, could not be correctly affirmed of the specific differences which constitute categories out of pure Being. But surely, everything real is. And so, the mentioned specific differences also do; they have being. Thus, we are bound to affirm being, of these; which flagrantly contradicts our previous result. Therefore Being is not a genus.

Now of course here is not the right place to be involved in the interpretative task of understanding the argument, within the context of the Aristotelian metaphysical system. And therefore what little we shall say now must in no way be considered as constituting an objection against the Aristotelian intention. But in so far as this argument can be used against our own doctrine, we have to remark that its validity is undermined first and foremost by the denial of the truth of a presupposition availed in it, namely that specific differences must needs be considered as having being. For we have shown that modifying forms are not forms of being, and it is only of such forms of being that pure Being is held to be their supreme genus. Thus at bottom of the objection (as distinct from the argument in itself or in its Aristotelian context) there lies an inadequate grasp of the nature of specific difference as such, and generally of the nexus of genus-difference-species connections. Needless to warn, that this is so given that we have to do "realistically" with abstract things and not with mere concepts; in the latter case, the mentioned nexus may be correctly analysed differently, thus leaving the argument perhaps protected from this particular line of attack. But we should, and do, abstain from pronouncing anything regarding this latter analysis while remaining in the discipline of metaphysics.

I.

See, for example, Aristotle's *Metaphysics* B, 3.998b22ff.

On the other hand, and in fairness, it should be noted and added that something more could very well lie at the core of the above urged objection, as its structural motivation. For the point may be that among eidetic divisions, all of which we insist, in this place and with the much noticed qualifications, on studying indiscriminately and in unison, there is a very important principle of distinction according to whether they are such as to result in families of specific forms, the assumption of any one of which on the part of any given concrete thing renders impossible the simultaneous and in the same respect assumption by the same thing of any other form belonging to the same family with the previous one--or not.

This can, indeed, be seen to constitute a substantial difference between two modes of division and, correspondingly, two kinds of families of specific forms. Only that, as we had already the opportunity of remarking^I, such a difference, depending as it undoubtedly does not on the nature of the divided genus and of the exemplified in concreteness specific results of the eidetic division in question, alone, but also, and primarily, on the principles and the conditions of exemplification in general and on the nature of concreteness as such--a dependence which is easily brought to perspicuity if only we consider the essential involvement, in the above given formulation of the proposed principle of distinction among eidetic divisions, of the notion of a concrete thing--does not fall within the compass of the abstract theory of determinants as such and, consequently, cannot be taken as anyhow affecting the arguments and conclusions professedly functioning within its limits, and based as regards their significance and validity exclusively on the nature of determinants as such and in themselves, apart from their tying connections with concrete things, and even apart from the general conditions of such exemplification in so far as they also depend on the nature of concreteness.

I.

Cf. supra pp. 77-78.

51/ The situation at the lowest level of the World of Determinants is, on the other hand, as follows. The successive specifications of Pure Being will achieve in each line of descent, sooner or later, a form of being absolutely impotent in itself and in respect to its own nature; the power of being, as we have defined it, is there exhausted; no further procession is possible any more. This total impotence, this complete extinction of the power and consequently of the actuality of the eidetic division means, of course, that we have arrived at the limit of determinateness. This again happens when the entire wealth, as it were, of modificatory determinations implicitly contained in Pure Being, has been rendered explicit by way of affirmation and negation (ontological ones). The procession stops when there is nothing to proceed to, or rather, to be more exact, when there is nothing, no possible modification, left implicit, which, by its own positive explicit manifestation, together with the simultaneous negative explicit manifestation of the kindred and co-ordinated modificatory elements (i. e. together with the explicit ontological suppression of those other congenial elements), would constitute a further processional development of what is latent.

Thus the forms of being corresponding to absolutely determinate determinants are constituted positively by an explicit ontological positing of some specifications (namely those belonging to one certain series of ascent) and negatively by an explicit ontological negation or renouncement of all other possible and available modifications^I. Nothing implicit there remains in it, nothing potential or causally present (which also explains the complete lack of power). Everything is in full actuality---positive or negative actuality, if I am permitted to use the metaphor of negative actuality.

I.

It should be added though, and by the way, that our use of 'explicit' in these contexts is, of course, not meant to convey what, in speaking about concepts, we may mean when we bring into contrast something included directly in a certain considered meaning with something indirectly implied in that meaning; in our case the opposition is the one we have above explained between explicit or substantial and actual inclusion in a specific form of what lies implicitly or potentially in its genus and this latter.

Now, in case that we are asked what, if at all, necessitates a stop somewhere in the descent towards the more determinate, why is it that a lower end to the World of Determinants should be assumed at all--the answer, while still remaining within the precincts of the abstract Theory of Determinants, is twofold.

Firstly, the positing of the absolutely determinate is doubtfully "agreeable" to reason, in the sense that it is presented to her in unmistakable self-evidence, even commanding assent to well-tutored unperverted and unprepossessed subjective minds; simultaneously, the supposition of a continuous descent in an unbottomed well of determinateness is manifestly repugnant to reason, as annihilating determinateness itself. This intuitive remark, if correct, would at least shift the onus probandi on those wishing experimentally or for reasons of their own to deny the existence of such a lowest end.

But if proof is required, and not simple intuitive, immediate self-evidence, here is a brief, though conclusive one: Denial of a lower end entails an infinite number of descending steps. But in the realm of determinants and forms every (real) possibility is actualised. Hence an infinite number of determinants must of necessity be postulated. But an actual infinity is an absolute impossibility, indeed a flagrant contradictio in adjecto. Therefore an end must be.

Additional arguments could, perhaps, be adduced from other quarters as well. Thus from the Theory of Exemplification and Concreteness, a concrete thing, in its full actuality, must be absolutely determined in all respects. Though it can, of course, be changed, and thus potentiality does, in truth, pertain to it, yet in each moment of its existence, there is no potentiality as regards that given moment (and there cannot be such an one) unsettled positively or negatively. That is, its undeniably characteristic of its concreteness possibility of change, is the possibility of changing its

complete and completely determinate actuality of that moment, to another equally complete and absolutely determinate one. Thus its possibility of change is onething, and its absolute determinateness in its momentary fullness of actuality another---which latter, further and in a sense, is presupposed by the former. So far and so much will be conceded, I trust, even by the sternest critic of absolute determinateness. Nothing can remain in a concrete thing in suspension, unsettled either by way of positive and actual incorporation or by way of equally definitive extrusion. But then, given that a concrete thing's determinations are formally (in virtue of a formal causality) grounded on corresponding determinants (exhibiting in prototype or archetype, as it were, the same forms of being, which concrete things exhibit secondarily), its absolutely determinate determinations must be grounded on absolutely determinate determinants---which was to be proven.

Abstaining then from providing further instances of such superfluity, let us conclude with the admittance of the fact that the World of Determinants is bounded at the upper level by the all-inclusive Abstract Thing Itself, and at the lowermost level by a certain, definite number of absolutely determinate determinants---in the senses above explained.

52/ We may fittingly conclude, with a very brief systematic presentation of the Doctrine of Being contained in our series of Essays, by way of a uniting recapitulation of remarks already made, and used therein, but in a more or less scattered form.

Being is not an object. Nor are objects its various distinctions and divisions, or their results. This circumstance was reflected in our insistence on normally

referring to them, in occasions requiring general reference, by the use of the most "aseptic" and non-committal word 'item' instead of 'object'.

But though Being and its distinctions and divisions (and their results) are not objects, nonetheless beings are objects, and indeed objects of certain special kinds or rather categories of objects.

Now the first distinction (in contrast to a division, for it is not as yet a division) of Being in itself, is the distinction of it in Being-Something or "contentual" Being or "Sesein", and the being or having such a Being-Something or Content of Being, which having is, the existential or connective being (Not yet existence).

Being as Content, in its contentual aspect, is divided (and this is the first division in general of such Being, in contrast again to the first distinction above mentioned) into various forms of being, each one containing^I and being founded on a definite content, and all of them forming in their totality a structured system.

Forms of being present three distinct aspects of being or include three distinct moments of being, which do not differ in respect of (content of) being, but only in respect, we may say, of the degree of explicitness of the implications, as regards eidetic division, latent or implicit in each form of being. The Form of Being in its third moment is an element in the specific multiplicity proximately subordinated under it. The three degrees mentioned are: in-itself-being (or being in its determinateness), power and activity of being.

We have said that Being, Contents of Being and Forms of Being (with their moments) are not objects. Yet they are most intimately and peculiarly attached to objects --- though not to every category of object. They are intimately and peculiarly attached to entities alone. And even this

I.

This containing or having has obviously nothing to do with the immediately previously spoken having a content of being or being such a content of being.

intimate and peculiar attachment exhibits gradation. Thus Contents and Forms of Being attach primarily to things as against instances; and within this primal attachment, they are attached preeminently to abstract things. But in general, it is, in fact, this attachment which renders an entity a being(ens); thus, entities (and primarily things and eminently abstract things) are beings. And conversely---in so far at least as we are willing to abide, into proper "material" being, in the sense indicated exp. 62, n. 2. above.

Moreover, Contents and Forms of Being (and "Contentual" Being itself) constitute the one pole, as it were, of a necessary and fundamental bifurcation of entities, and primarily of things. For a thing is intrinsically in a state of basic bifurcation; it is matter and form, substratum and complete determination (I mean prime matter, of course, here, not the proximate one). Its form (its total form) is, as it were, the showing forth of a thing's innermost ~~ess~~ core, its definite determinateness; whereas, in contrast, its matter is its interiority or its foundation and carries with itself the possibility of its definiteness. Its formal element is, of course, contributed to a thing transcendently, by Being-Something and its divisions.

Now the connection of entities with Contents and Forms of Being, that is, the connection of Entity with Being-Something or "Sosein", is what we have above described as the second member of the first distinction of Being in general, namely, the being or having of a Being-Something, or in other words the existential being. (To be noticed, that this connection is not the connection between the substratum of a thing and its total form, though, of course, on the other hand, these two connections are so closely connected that the obtaining of the one entails that of the other).

Of this (the former) connection or having, there are modes, and there are types, and there are grades.

Modes of being (to be remembered that this being is not being-something, but the being a being-something) there are, in general (that is, not taking account of the "idiosyncrasy" in the present respect of the particular category to which any given entity belongs), three: potentiality, necessity and actuality--which latter can be either accidental or necessary depending on whether it is the result of actualisation of a mere potentiality or of a necessity.

There are no proper kinds of the said connection, in the strict sense in which kinds presuppose a common generic nature, normally lying within the realm of determinants. But we may discern three types of the tying connection in question, corresponding to the three categories of entity: concrete things, abstract things and instances. Thus, we have the connection between concrete things and being-something; the connection between instances and being-something; and the connection between abstract determinants and being-something. The former two are secondary in respect to the third, which is primary, in that it is this latter which affords, as formal cause and through the mediation of the exemplificatory or instancial tie, respectively, between concrete things or instances and determinants, the content as well as the fact of their (the concrete things' and instances') determinations, i.e. of their being. Let us call, then accordingly, the type of connection able to subsist between abstract things and being-contents or forms of being (in the present context the distinction between the two is irrelevant or, at least, immaterial) 'primary being', and the types of connection capable of holding between concrete things or instances and being-contents or forms of being, 'secondary concretionary being' and 'secondary instancial being' respectively. These three then, are the wanted types of (existential) being, which are, obviously, at the same time, three types of existence^I.

I.

For the connection and distinction between existence and connective being (being being-something), see Essay VII, part A, passim.

just as, let it be remarked, the previously discriminated modes of being constitute simultaneously corresponding modes of existence.

Finally, primary being as above defined (and thus secondarily and dependingly, also secondary being of either the concretionary or the instantial variety) is susceptible of a threefold distinction into substantial being or substantiation, participatory being or participation (in the technical sense above availed) and causal or eminent being (esse eminente) as above expounded. These constitute the three grades of being, corresponding, as above detailed, on the side of existential being or of being or having being-something, to the three moments of each form of being, and fundamentally to the three degrees of explicitness of being, on the side of being-something or "Sosein".

And with this overall classification of Being, let the present Essay be concluded, with the explicit warning, once more, that what we have attempted to do was nothing more than an abstract investigation of the nature of determinants as such---in particular, without commitments as regards which they are, or even as regards to which specific or general kinds or subcategories do they belong.